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TIME LINES

From the beginning of the investigation into the shootings at Columbine High School, a timeline was established to record the significant events of April 20, 1999. The timeline was updated several times as new information became available from all the different sources. The result is a PRIMARY Timeline, which offers a brief chronological account of the events of April 20, 1999, the movements of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the law enforcement and emergency responses and the media coverage. This timeline is the basis for a more detailed, comprehensive NARRATIVE timeline of the April 20 events that is included in this report.

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Narrative time line of the events

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- April 20, 1999 - 12:00 pm - 5:00 pm

CRIME SCENE DIAGRAMS

The following diagrams show the significant events and movements of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold on April 20, 1999. The witnesses to each event are shown as green dots. The injured are shown as yellow only during the event that caused the injury and return to green if they witnessed other events. The deceased are shown as red and convert to gray once that event has passed. Harris is shown as a red dot with the letter “H” inside it and Klebold is shown as a blue dot with the letter “K” inside it. The diagrams only show the portions of the school where the events are occurring. Where appropriate an overview of the school is shown with a red square indicating what area of the school is magnified. Harris and Klebold are not shown on every diagram, but rather only during the events that witnesses actually observed them.

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AUDIO

JCSO utilizes Channel #1 for primary communications to the deputies on the street. Channel #2 is used for command, tactical operations and two way communications. When names, addresses or phone numbers were given they have been removed from the tapes and you will hear silence.

RIGHT CLICK CURSOR OVER PHOTO TO START AUDIO - CLICK STOP BUTTON ON TOOL BAR TO STOP AUDIO

- Jefferson County Channel #1 Radio Traffic - 11:20 am - 11:51 am
- Jefferson County Channel #1 Radio Traffic - 11:51 am - 12:18 pm
- Jefferson County Channel #2 Radio Traffic - 11:25 am - 12:09 pm
- Jefferson County 911 Audio #1 - 11:19 am - approximately 40 minutes
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Jefferson County Miscellaneous 911 phone calls

Jefferson County 911 call from student in Kitchen (approx 1:30 pm)

Jefferson County 911 call with fire alarm in background (approx 11:31 am)

911 Call from Teacher in the Library (11:25 am)

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VIDEO

LEFT CLICK TO DOWNLOAD THE VIDEO CLIPS - CLICK STOP BUTTON ON TOOL BAR TO STOP VIDEO

- KUSA-TV Channel 9 - Students Evacuated (approximately 2:48 pm)
- KUSA-TV Channel 9 - Air Space Closed 1.5 miles (2:40 pm - 2:50 pm)
- KUSA-TV Channel 9 - Huge Exodus / Evacuation of Students (approximately 2:56 pm)
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- Cafeteria Surveillance Tape
INSTRUCTIONS FOR VIDEO / AUDIO / LINKS

- FORWARD and BACK between links
- REFRESH: Use the REFRESH button if the photos or the entire page fails to download when opening.

DOWNLOAD: Video from KUSA-TV Ch9

AUDIO TAPE

AUDIO OPERATION
With “Internet Explorer” move the cursor over the hotbox, use the RIGHT click to open control panel that has a PLAY command.

VIDEO OPERATION
With “Internet Explorer” move the cursor over the photo (box) and the video will start to play. To STOP use the button in the toolbar above. To start again move the cursor across photo.

DOWNLOAD: Video from KUSA-TV Ch9

Narrative: Findings of Outside Investigation Team

11:19 – 11:23

HOT LINKS
The UNDERLINED text will link the reader to detailed narrative text items. Once the text has been opened the link will change color.

AUDIO OPERATION
With “Internet Explorer” move the cursor over the hotbox, use the RIGHT click to open control panel that has a PLAY command.
11:19 – 11:23  

**Narrative: Findings of Outside Investigation Team**

- Several witnesses identify Harris and Klebold standing together at the top of the west exterior steps, both wearing black trench coats and carrying a backpack and duffel bag. That location is the highest point on campus and allows them an elevated vantage point of the school’s west side, the southwest senior parking lot and portions of the junior lot, the cafeteria exits and entrances, and the athletic fields to the west.
April 20, 1999

Foreword

On a sunny spring day in April 1999, a suburban high school in Jefferson County, Colorado, found itself under attack by two of its own. In less than fifteen minutes of the first-lunch period on that Tuesday, two student gunmen killed 13 and wounded 21 before they turned the guns on themselves – the most devastating school shooting in U.S. history.

Columbine High School is one of three in the unincorporated southeast portion of Jefferson County. The county itself lies on the west side of the Denver metropolitan area and is the most populated county in the state. The large unincorporated region along the county’s southern plains and foothills has a population of nearly 100,000 residents - 1,945 of who attended Columbine High School.

The two student gunmen were Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. Their plans for attacking the school, recovered by investigators after the tragedy had taken place, evolved over one year’s time. In those plans, Klebold and Harris outlined a mission to kill as many students and faculty as possible. They would set off destructive bombs inside the school and then shoot any survivors trying to run out. Bombs inside their cars would explode later, killing law enforcement, fire or medical personnel responding to the scene.

There are indications that their initial plan was for the Columbine High School attack to occur on Monday, April 19. While there was no specific reference made in their writings to this date being an important anniversary, it must be noted that April 19, 1999 was the fourth anniversary of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and the sixth anniversary of the Branch Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas.

However, the Columbine tragedy occurred on April 20, perhaps due to unfinished preparations on the part of the killers. Or perhaps there is a connection with the history of this date. To begin with, 4/20 carries the same numerals as 420, the California criminal code for possession of marijuana. Due to the significance of these numbers in popular drug culture, some students were absent from school that day in recognition of what they termed “national marijuana day.” April 20, 1999, also marked the 110th anniversary of Adolph Hitler’s birth.

It is also critical to note that when many of the Columbine students heard what sounded like pop guns coming from outside the cafeteria during the first lunch period, they thought that senior prank day had come. School-wide pranks initiated by graduating seniors are a tradition throughout the United States, and up to that point Columbine’s seniors, ready to graduate in just four weeks, had not participated in any such activity. It seemed right to students who heard the first few shots that, as it was toward the end of the school year, prank day was finally upon them.

But it wasn’t a prank. Not when two hate-filled students, heavily armed with firearms and bombs,
chose April 20, 1999, as the day to attack and kill students and faculty at their school.
IN MEMORIAM

Cassie Bernall
Steven Curnow
Corey DePooter
Kelly Fleming
Matthew Kechter
Daniel Mauser
Daniel Rohrbough
William "Dave" Sanders
Rachel Scott
Isaiah Shoels
John Tomlin
Lauren Townsend
Kyle Velasquez
From the beginning of the investigation into the shootings at Columbine High School, a timeline was established to record the significant events of April 20, 1999. The timeline was updated several times as new information became available from all the different sources. The result is a Primary Timeline, which offers a brief chronological account of the events of April 20, 1999, the movements of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the law enforcement and emergency responses and the media coverage. This timeline is the basis for a more detailed, comprehensive timeline of the April 20 events that is included in this report.

- 11:10 AM - 11:23 AM
- 11:24 AM - 11:26 AM
- 11:27 AM - 11:28 AM
- 11:28 AM - 11:30 AM
- 11:30 AM - 11:31 AM
- 11:32 AM - 11:34 AM
- 11:35 AM - 11:36 AM
- 11:37 AM - 11:40 AM
- 11:41 AM - 11:45 AM
- 11:46 AM - 11:47 AM
- 11:47 AM - 11:54 AM
- 11:55 AM - 12:00 AM
- 12:01 AM - 12:08 AM
- 12:10 AM - 12:19 AM
- 12:20 AM - 12:26 AM
- 12:27 AM - 12:34 AM
- 12:36 AM - 12:43 AM
- 12:44 AM - 12:57 AM
- 1:00 PM - 1:09 PM
- 1:10 PM - 1:44 PM
- 1:50 PM - 2:13 PM
- 2:17 PM - 2:26 PM
- 2:29 PM - 2:39 PM
- 2:40 PM - 3:00 PM
- 3:00 PM - 4:00 PM
- 4:00 PM - 6:00 PM
The Columbine High School Shootings

During the investigation of this case, several sources were utilized in compiling an accurate chronological timeline of the many different events that occurred at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999. This included dispatch and 911 tapes from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, dispatch tapes from the Littleton Fire Department, several newscasts from local media, the record of the school fire alarm system and the cafeteria surveillance videotape from Columbine High School.

During the first two weeks of the investigation, investigators learned that the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office had recently calibrated its digital clocks used for dispatch tapes with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) atomic clock in Boulder, Colorado. Therefore, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office dispatch time was the standard used for the timeline. It was further learned that the Sheriff’s Office 911 times had not yet been calibrated and were fast by two minutes and 46 seconds. The Littleton Fire Department dispatch time was four minutes slow and the fire alarm from Columbine High School was three minutes slow. The times on the cafeteria videotape matched the Sheriff’s Office dispatch time.

In order to accurately reflect the events occurring on April 20, it became necessary to adjust the times so that they were synchronized to one time -- in this case, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office dispatch time. The following changes were made and are reflected in the finished timeline:

- 4 minutes were added to the Littleton Fire Department dispatch time
- 3 minutes were added to the school fire alarm time
- 2 minutes 46 seconds were subtracted from the Jefferson County 911 time
- No adjustments were made to the high school cafeteria surveillance tape.

NARRATIVE TIME LINE OF EVENTS

11:10 am to 11:59 am

11:10 a.m.

- On the last day of his life, Eric Harris arrives alone at the student parking lot at Columbine High School and parks his 1986 gray Honda Civic in a space assigned to another student in the south junior parking lot.

- Dylan Klebold subsequently arrives at the high school student parking lot alone in his 1982 black BMW. He parks in a space assigned to another student in the southwest senior lot. Klebold’s and Harris’ cars flank the school’s cafeteria and the exits and entrances into the lower level.
Harris speaks to one student briefly outside the west entrance of the school. According to the student, Harris tells him to leave the school because he likes him. Shortly thereafter, the same student is seen by witnesses walking south on Pierce Street away from the area. This student is the only person Harris and Klebold direct away from the school grounds moments before the killing begins.

11:14 a.m.

- Between 11:14 a.m. and 11:22 a.m. Harris and Klebold leave their cars and walk into the school’s cafeteria, carrying two large duffel bags containing enough explosive power to kill the majority of the students who soon would be arriving for “A” lunch. The gunmen place the bags on the floor beside two lunch tables and walk back out.
- Blending in with 400 other backpacks and bags scattered throughout the cafeteria, the duffel bags conceal 20-pound propane bombs timed to explode at 11:17 a.m. Harris earlier had determined that 11:17 a.m. was the exact time for the high school cafeteria to be packed with the maximum number of students possible.
- The school custodian goes into the video room to change the school’s cafeteria surveillance videotape.

11:17

- After placing two 20-lb. propane bombs in the cafeteria, Harris and Klebold go back out to the student parking lots to sit in their respective cars and wait for the bombs to explode.
- From their cars, they have a clear view of the cafeteria area. Based on comments Klebold and Harris made in their homemade videotapes, the investigation determined the two planned to shoot any surviving students able to escape from the cafeteria after the bombs exploded.
- Klebold and Harris also have bombs constructed with timers in their cars, set to go off once they go back into the school.

11:19

- Jefferson County Dispatch Center receives the first 911 call from a citizen reporting an explosion in a field on the east side of Wadsworth Boulevard between Ken Caryl and Chatfield Avenues. The explosion is actually a timed diversionary device. Two backpacks with pipe bombs, aerosol canisters and small propane tanks had been placed in a grassy open space three miles southwest of Columbine High School. Only the pipe bombs and one of the aerosol canisters explode but the explosion and subsequent grass fire are enough to get the attention of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and the Littleton Fire Department. The bombs exploding in the field along Wadsworth Boulevard are intended to divert the attention of law enforcement away from what is planned to be a much more devastating scene at the school.
Several witnesses identify Harris and Klebold standing together at the top of the west exterior steps, both wearing black trench coats and carrying a backpack and duffel bag. That location is the highest point on campus and allows them an elevated vantage point of the school’s west side, the southwest senior parking lot and portions of the junior lot, the cafeteria exits and entrances, and the athletic fields to the west.

At about 11:19 a.m. a witness hears one of the suspects say, “GO! GO!” Klebold and Harris then pull their shotguns out of their bags. They already have 9-mm semi-automatic weapons hidden under their coats. From their position at the top of the steps they begin shooting at students in the area. Thus begins what is now known as the worst U.S. school shooting in history.

The first gunshots, fired toward the west doors, kill Rachel Scott and injure Richard Castaldo, students at Columbine High School. Rachel and Richard had been sitting on the grass eating their lunch outside the school's west upper entrance near the north side of the library.

Students Daniel Rohrbough, Sean Graves, and Lance Kirklin, having just come outside through a side door of the school cafeteria on their way to the “Smoker’s Pit” at Clement Park, are hit by gunfire. All three fall to the ground.

Five students, sitting on the grass to the west of the stairs, are shot at as they begin to run from the melee. Michael Johnson suffers gunshot wounds but is able to reach the outdoor athletic storage shed where he takes cover with others. Mark Taylor suffers a debilitating gunshot wound and falls to the ground, unable to flee with the others.

Klebold goes back down the stairs to the area outside the cafeteria and shoots Daniel Rohrbough again at close range, killing him instantly. He also shoots Lance Kirklin again, this time at close range, but Lance survives.

Klebold briefly enters the side entrance to the cafeteria and stands just inside the doorway, perhaps to discover why the propane bombs have not exploded. He then goes back outside and joins Harris at the top of the outside stairs.

Harris shoots down the stairs hitting Anne Marie Hochhalter. Anne Marie is shot multiple times as she stands to run for cover into the cafeteria.

Witnesses hear one of the gunmen shout, “This is what we always wanted to do. This is awesome!”

From the onset, both suspects are seen lighting and throwing explosive devices onto the roof, into the parking lot and toward the grassy hillside.

11:21

Deputy Paul Magor, a Jefferson County Sheriff’s deputy patrolling the south Jeffco area, is dispatched to the scene of the fire and explosion on Wadsworth Boulevard.
The school custodian, after rewinding a recycled videotape, hits the record button on the VCR that records images of lunchtime activities in the school cafeteria. The tape immediately shows students near the windows beginning to notice something happening outside and some start toward the cafeteria windows to look.

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Deputy Neil Gardner, community resource officer at Columbine High School, has just finished his lunch while sitting in his patrol car at the students’ “Smoker’s Pit” when he receives a call from the school custodian on the school’s radio. He’s needed in the “back lot” of the school.

11:23  **Narrative: Deputies on Scene**

- A 911 call from a Columbine High School student reports a girl injured in the south lower parking lot of the high school. “I think she’s paralyzed,” the caller tells dispatch.
- Deputy Magor, on his way to the explosion in a field off Wadsworth, is advised of a female down in the south parking lot of Columbine High School.
- Deputy Gardner, pulling his car onto Pierce Street and heading south to the student parking lot, hears the same call, this time coming over the Sheriff’s radio, “Female down in the south lot of Columbine High School.” He activates his lights and siren.

11:24

- Several of the school’s custodial staff and faculty, including teacher William “Dave” Sanders, are attempting to find out what is happening outside the school cafeteria.
- Realizing a danger, Sanders and school custodians Jon Curtis and Jay Gallatine enter the cafeteria and direct students to get down. Students begin to hide under the cafeteria tables.
- Deputy Paul Smoker, a motorcycle patrolman for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, is writing a speeding ticket on West Bowles Avenue, just west of Pierce Street, when he hears dispatch report that a female is down in the south lower lot of Columbine High School. Smoker’s traffic stop is just north of the school so he radios dispatch that he is responding to the school.
- Teacher Patricia (Patti) Nielson is working as a hall monitor when she hears a commotion outside the west entrance of the school. She looks outside, seeing two male students with what she thinks are toy guns, and assumes that a school video production is being taped. She is on her way outside to tell the boys to “knock it off” when one of the **gunmen fires into the west entrance**, causing glass and metal fragments to spray into the hallway. Nielson suffers abrasions to her shoulder, forearm and knee from the fragments.
- Beside Nielson is student Brian Anderson. Brian had been told by a teacher to get out of the school because of the explosions and commotion. Not realizing where the danger is, he exits through the first set of west doors, and is caught between the interior and exterior doors when Harris fires at the doors in front of him, shattering the glass. Brian suffers wounds to his chest from the flying glass fragments.
- Despite their injuries, Patti Nielson and Brian are able to flee into the school library while Harris and Klebold are distracted by the arrival of Deputy Gardner. Gardner has just pulled up in the lower south parking lot of the school with the lights on his patrol car flashing and the siren sounding.
- As Gardner steps out of his patrol car, Eric Harris turns his attention from shooting into the west doors of the high school to the student parking lot and to the deputy. Gardner, particularly visible in the bright yellow shirt of the community resource officer’s uniform, is the target of Harris’ bullets. Harris fires about 10 shots at the deputy.
with his rifle before his weapon jams.

- **Gardner fires four shots at Harris.**

- Harris spins hard to his right and Gardner momentarily thinks he has hit him. Seconds later, Harris begins shooting again at the deputy. Although Gardner’s patrol car is not hit by bullets, two vehicles that he is parked behind are hit by Harris’ gunfire. Investigators later found two bullet holes in each of the cars.

- Harris then turns and enters the school through the west doors.

- Students in the cafeteria realize the activity occurring outside is more serious than a senior prank. A mass exodus of students is seen on the school’s surveillance videotape as students escape up the stairs from the cafeteria to the second level. Several students recalled Sanders directing them to safety by telling them to go down the hallway to the east side exits of the school.

**Diagram #2 – layout of school**

- Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office dispatch advises that there are possible shots fired at Columbine High School. “Attention, south units. Possible shots fired at Columbine High School, 6201 S. Pierce, possibly in the south lower lot towards the east end. One female is down.”

- Teacher Patti Nielson, hiding under the front counter in the school library, calls 911 to report shots being fired outside the library.

**11:26**

**Narrative: Findings of Hallway Events - Part 1**

- Littleton Fire Department dispatches a fire engine to the explosion and grass fire on Wadsworth.

- After exchanging gunfire with Harris, Gardner calls on his police radio for additional units. “Shots in the building. I need someone in the south lot with me.”
• Dispatch reports several shots fired at Columbine High School.

• Teacher’s 911 call from inside the library reports smoke coming in through the doorway. She yells at students to get on the floor and under the tables.

• Jefferson County Deputies Scott Taborsky and Paul Smoker arrive on the west side of the school and begin the rescue of two wounded students lying on the ground near the ballfields.

• Smoker sees Gardner down the hill to his right, holding a service pistol. Gardner yells to Smoker as a gunman, carrying a semi-automatic rifle, appears on the inside of the double doors.

• Harris, leaning out of a broken window on the set of double doors into the school, begins shooting a rifle. Smoker sees Gardner down the hill to his right, holding a service pistol. Gardner yells to Smoker as a gunman, carrying a semi-automatic rifle, appears on the inside of the double doors.

• Harris, leaning out of a broken window on the set of double doors into the school, begins shooting a rifle. Smoker sees Gardner down the hill to his right, holding a service pistol. Gardner yells to Smoker as a gunman, carrying a semi-automatic rifle, appears on the inside of the double doors.

• Smoker fires three rounds at him and the gunman disappears from the window. Smoker continues to hear gunfire from inside the building as more students flee from the school.

• Student witnesses who entered the north main hallway from adjoining classrooms see Klebold and Harris standing just inside the school’s northwest entry doors. Both suspects, they later recalled, are armed with guns. Witnesses see Klebold fire a semi-automatic weapon east towards the students in the main hallway and south down the library hallway. They also hear bullets hitting lockers and other objects in the hallway as students run for cover.

• A student in the gym hallway observes Klebold and Harris walking east down the north hallway. Both are firing weapons … and both are laughing.

• Student Stephanie Munson and another student walk out of a classroom into the school’s north main hallway. As they enter the hallway, they see a teacher and several students running behind them. The teacher yells for the students to “Run! Get out of the building!” They both run through the main hallway leading to the school’s main entrance on the east side. Stephanie is shot in the ankle but both are able to escape the building and continue across the street to safety at Leawood Park.

• A student in the counseling hallway sees students in the north hallway running east through the lobby. Klebold is running behind them, but comes to an abrupt halt near a bank of phones at the entrance to the main lobby area.

• Yet another student, on the telephone with her mother, glances up in time to see the sleeve of a black trench coat shooting a TEC-9 towards the main entrance of the school. She drops the phone and hides in a nearby restroom until she can no longer hear any activity in the hallway. The gunman, she assumes, has turned around and gone back the other way. She goes back to the phone and whispers to her mother to come pick her up and then escapes through the east doors to the outside. Her mother’s cell phone bill shows this call is made between 11:23 and 11:26 and lasts 3.8 minutes. The student estimates that she talks to her mother about two minutes before she sees the gunman.

• Klebold is last seen running back down the north hall to the west in the direction of the library hallway.

• Teacher Dave Sanders, still on the second level, turns into the library hallway toward the west entrance and the sounds of gunfire. As Sanders passes the entrance to the library, he apparently sees a gunman coming toward him from the north hallway. Sanders turns around and heads back the way he had just come. Just before turning the corner to go east, he is shot. Sanders is able to crawl to the corner of the Science hallway where teacher Richard Long helps him down the hallway into classroom SCI-3. A group of students, including two Eagle Scouts, Aaron Hancey and Kevin Starkey, gather around him, attending to his injuries and administering first aid.

11:27

• Deputy Gardner, who is in the south parking lot and has exchanged gunfire with Eric Harris, radios dispatch with a “Code 33.” Code 33 means “officer needs emergency assistance.”
• Deputy Magor sets up a road block on Pierce Street at the southeast corner of the student parking lot. He immediately is approached by a teacher as well as students reporting a person in the school with a gun.

• Dispatch announces that possible hand-grenades have been detonated at the school.

• **Harris and Klebold walk up and down the library hallway**, randomly shooting but not injuring anyone. Investigators later scrutinized Nielson’s 911 call made from the school’s library. From the tape, the investigation shows that Harris and Klebold spend almost three minutes in the library hallway randomly shooting their weapons and lighting and throwing pipe bombs. They throw two pipe bombs in the hallway and more over the stairway railing to the lower level.

• A pipe bomb is thrown into the stairwell from the library hallway and lands in the cafeteria below. A large flash is observed on the cafeteria videotape. A second pipe bomb also is thrown into the cafeteria from the upper level.

• **Teacher Patti Nielson, hiding under the front counter just inside the library entrance, continues her phone contact with the Jefferson County dispatcher.** Nielson reacts to the sounds of gunshots and explosions coming from the hallway outside the library. Interspersed with short conversations with the dispatcher, she screams at the students in the library to get under the tables and to stay hidden. She then reports that a gunman is just outside the library entrance.

11:28

• **Numerous students, running from the school, seek safety behind Taborsky’s patrol car** on the school’s west side. The students tell the deputies that gunmen are inside the school randomly shooting at people with UZIs or shotguns and throwing hand-grenades. They describe the younger of the two gunmen as possibly high school age and wearing a black trench coat and a hat on backwards. The second gunman is described as “taller, a little older” and also wearing a black trench coat.

• Smoker can see other deputies on the west side of the school near the concrete shed and the ballfields.

• Dispatch alerts the deputies that the shooter may have a shotgun.

• A 911 call reports that students are injured outside the school.

• Deputy Smoker radios that students are saying the shooter is wearing a black trench coat.

11:29

• Gardner requests emergency medical response to the west side of the school.

• Dispatch alerts all units that Deputy Gardner is under fire and the suspect just ran into the building. “Shots fired on the southwest side with a large weapon.”

• Harris and Klebold walk into the school library. The 911 call records a male voice yelling, “Get up!”
**Narrative: Findings of the Library Team**

11:29 – 11:36

- **Harris shoots down the length of the front counter.** One student, crouched behind a paper copier, is injured by flying wood splinters from the counter.

- The gunmen walk through the library toward the west windows, killing one student on the way, before they **shoot out the windows** toward law enforcement and fleeing students.

- Law enforcement returns the fire.

- The gunmen then turn their attention to students inside the library. **They kill four and injure four more** in the west area of the library before moving back toward the library entrance to the east.

- Harris and **Klebold shoot out the display cabinet** near the front door before firing their guns in this section of the library, injuring five and killing three.

- Harris and Klebold leave the library’s east area and enter the center section, reloading their weapons at this point.

- Two more students are killed and two more injured in the library’s center section before the gunmen leave the library.

- In 7 ½ minutes, 10 people are killed and 12 more wounded. There are a total of 56 people in the library; 24 **escape injury**.

- Two library employees remain hidden in the television studio. One teacher hides in the periodicals room. Patti Nielson, originally hiding under the front counter, drops the phone. She ultimately crawls into the library’s break room to hide in a cupboard. All four women remain in the library until they are evacuated by SWAT around 3:30 p.m.

11:30

- Jefferson County Patrol Deputy Rick Searle, on the upper grassy area on the southwest side of the school, is evacuating students who have **taken cover behind Taborsky’s patrol car.** In three separate trips, Searle transports the students, including those wounded, south to a **safe location at Caley Avenue and Yukon Street.** Medical triage soon will be established at this spot. As soon as he gets back from his evacuation trips, he discovers even more students who have escaped the school and taken cover behind Taborsky’s patrol car.

- Deputy Kevin Walker, positioned at a southern point in the student parking lot, is able to watch the lower level main south doors of the school and the entrance to the cafeteria. He can provide rescue and cover for the students fleeing to the south from the school’s lower level.

- Deputy Taborsky reports hearing additional shots being fired inside the school -- “large caliber.”

- Dispatch reports possible shots fired in the library.

- Littleton Fire calls for personnel to stage at the scene. As the department learns that some students fleeing the school are possibly injured, personnel are instructed to stage in several areas nearby and set up triage sites to treat the injured.

- The county’s dispatch center goes into an emergency command system as the incoming reports begin to provide glimpses of the incident’s magnitude. Additional dispatchers soon arrive to help deal with the escalating...
radio traffic and 911 calls.

11:31

- Deputy Searle reports smoke coming from the building.
- Deputy Taborsky reports a person down on the southwest side of the school.
- The 911 tape from the library records the sound of many gunshots being fired during this minute. One of the gunmen in the library yells, “Yahoo!”
- The first fire alarm sounds from the upper level corridor of Columbine High School.

11:32

**Narrative: Communications Problems**

- Deputy Walker reports possibly seeing one of the gunmen through the windows on the upper level, southwest corner. Walker describes him as wearing a “white T-shirt with some kind of holster vest.”
- As students and faculty escape the school to the south, they report what they saw or experienced to Deputy Magor, whose patrol car is blocking the traffic on Pierce Street to the south. Magor realizes the severity of the escalating situation and radios that the Sheriff’s Office needs mutual aid at the scene.
- Many agencies already are aware of the situation at the high school because of the radio traffic they are hearing and personnel are quick to arrive at the scene. Several arriving Denver police officers and one Littleton police officer have children who are students at Columbine. One student, hiding with others inside the school’s kitchen, is on a cell phone with the Denver Police Department. His father is an officer in the department.
- The first call is received by the Sheriff’s Office from the media requesting information about what is happening at Columbine High School.

11:33

- Jefferson County SWAT commander Lt. Terry Manwaring, on his way to the high school, orders the Jefferson County SWAT team and the Sheriff’s Office command staff to be paged.
- Dispatch reports a possible shooter on the football field behind the shed.
- Jefferson County Dispatch asks if any deputies on scene have a “long gun” (a rifle or shotgun).
- In response to Magor’s call for mutual aid, Jefferson County Dispatch advises that additional assistance is coming from other agencies.
11:34

- Suspects move to the center section of the library.

11:35

- Dispatch advises additional gunfire being reported.
- Dispatch advises that several SWAT teams are en route.
- The last victim is killed at Columbine High School.
- Suspects move to the front counter of the library.

11:36 – 11:44 a.m. **Diagram: of movements in the science area**

- From the library Harris and Klebold go into the hallway and make their way to the science area. Witnesses describe the two as looking through the windows of some of the classrooms’ locked doors, making eye contact with some of the students, yet not attempting to break into the rooms or harm any more students.
- A teacher sees Klebold and Harris in the science hallway, stopping in front of the chemical storage room just east of Science Room 3 where she is hiding.
- Several students witness the suspects shooting into empty rooms. Klebold and Harris also tape an explosive device on the storage room door next to the area where teacher Dave Sanders and several students are hiding. Witnesses say the gunmen do not appear to be overly intent on gaining access to any of the rooms. The gunmen easily could have shot the locks on the doors or through the windows into the classrooms, but they do not. Their behavior now seems directionless.

11:36 **Narrative: Command Post formed**

- Deputy Searle reports a man on the roof wearing a red, white and blue striped shirt. Initially thought to be a possible shooter, the man is later identified an employee of a heating and air conditioning company on a service call at the school to fix a leak above the girls' locker room. The repairman is on the roof when the first shots are fired and, when he realizes something is wrong, he uses a pair of vice grips to clamp the roof access hatch closed so nobody can come up to the roof.
- Sgt. Ken Ester of the Intelligence Unit reports to the southeast side of the school and assists Deputy Magor.
- Several more pipe bombs are thrown into the cafeteria from the library hallway a floor above. Another explosion can be seen at this time on the cafeteria videotape.
- Dispatch advises multiple reports of shots in the library and multiple suspects with different descriptions -- the
last being “a white, red and blue striped shirt up on the roof.”

- Jeffco SWAT team commander Manwaring arrives at Pierce and Leawood and advises dispatch that the command post and the SWAT staging area will be set up at that location.

#### 11:37 Narrative: Findings of the Hallway Events - Part 2

- Another pipe bomb is thrown over the railing from the hallway above and into the cafeteria area where it explodes. This can be heard on the 911 call made from inside the library.

- Littleton Fire Department is staged at Weaver and Pierce Streets.

#### 11:38

- Deputy Walker, on the south side of the school, reports an explosion that blows out windows near the cafeteria. The explosion is from a pipe bomb.

- As the pipe bomb explodes, several students run out of the south cafeteria doors toward Walker. The deputy directs them to take cover behind several cars, covering them with his own gun while they position themselves away from the line of fire. Walker radios to dispatch that he has students with him, but he does not have any safe path to evacuate them from the parking lot.

- Dispatch reports that one shooter is in the food preparation area and that the shooter has 17 students in that area with him. In actuality, a 911 call received from a student hiding with 17 others in the school’s kitchen reports what he thinks is a shooter in the area. The investigation determined from the cafeteria videotape that several custodial staff, equipped with keys and school radios, were in the kitchen area at that time. The student assumed what he heard were the shooters and reported to dispatch that the shooters had keys to the school and walkie talkies.

#### 11:39

- Jefferson County Patrol Sgt. Phil Hy arrives on scene and begins identifying and disseminating pertinent information to the initial responders.

#### 11:40

- Deputies report 30 students have exited the school on the west side. Many of these students taking cover behind the patrol cars are those who are able to escape from the school library after Klebold and Harris leave the library and go into the science area.

- Deputy Taborsky, protecting students who have fled out the west side of the school, reports that one of the shooters might be “Ned Harris” and that he is possibly wearing bulletproof armor. The witness probably was saying “Reb,” which was Harris’ nickname.

- Dispatch advises that the suspects are possibly wearing body armor.

- Deputy Walker reports more explosions inside the school. The explosions seem to be moving east.

#### 11:41
NARRATIVE TIME LINE

- Deputy Searle reports the man is still on the roof and has moved over to the north side.

11:42 – 11:43

- Based on 911 calls coming in, dispatch advises that a suspect has possibly left the building.
- Dispatch also reports one person wearing a red and white shirt on the north side of the roof, one suspect in the library with a shotgun and several bombs, and another person in the cafeteria with "bulletproof equipment and several bombs."

11:44 **Narrative: Findings of the Cafeteria Team**

- In response to reports that one of the suspects may have left the building, several deputies on scene radio their positions around the school, confirming that a perimeter has been established and all exits are covered by law enforcement.
  1. Jefferson County Deputy Bob Byerly reports that he and members of the Colorado State Patrol (CSP) are on the northeast side of the school by the tennis courts. He maintains a view of the north side of the school and the northeast doors.
  2. Deputies Taborsky and Smoker are on the southwest, protecting and evacuating numerous students escaping out the west side.
  3. Deputy Searle is on the northwest side of the building, assisting with evacuation and transportation of students and staff.
  4. Sgt. Ester and Deputy Magor are on the southeast side, assisting students and diverting traffic away from the area.
  5. Deputy Neal Schwieterman is on the west side by the ballfields and athletic shed, assisting with transporting students to triage and to safety.
  6. Deputy Walker is protecting and evacuating students on the south side.
- Klebold and Harris leave the science area and go down into the cafeteria. The cafeteria videotape records Harris kneeling down and resting his rifle on the stair railing and firing several shots at one of the large 20-pound propane bombs hidden in a duffel bag. Photos of the cafeteria show duffel bags and backpacks scattered throughout the area, yet Harris seems to know exactly where the bombs are located and in what bags. He apparently shoots at the one, presumably in an attempt to make it explode. It does not.
- The videotape also shows Klebold walking directly over to the same bomb after Harris’ failed attempts to detonate it. Klebold seems to be tampering with something on the floor.
- The suspects both take a moment to drink from water bottles left by students on the school lunch tables.
- A witness hiding in the cafeteria hears one of the gunmen say, “Today the world’s going to come to an end. Today’s the day we die."
cameras that captured the activity inside the cafeteria and recorded the events on tape. The recording switches between the four cameras capturing short sections of tape from each direction. This explains the jerking motions and gaps within the recording at the left.

11:45  **Graphic – list of agencies who responded**

- Harris and Klebold walk toward the food serving line in the cafeteria area.
- Klebold throws something in the vicinity of the propane bomb.
- Lt. Dave Walcher of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office arrives on scene. Walcher assumes the role of incident commander.

11:46

- Harris and Klebold are in the cafeteria about 2 1/2 minutes.
- The cafeteria videotape shows that, as the gunmen are walking away, there is a partial detonation of a bomb and a subsequent fire. The bomb is attached to smaller containers of flammable liquids that may have been ignited by a device thrown by Klebold. That explosion causes the fire in the cafeteria that, in turn, moments later activates 5 fire sprinklers in the area. These events are recorded on the cafeteria’s surveillance cameras. The large 20-lb propane tank and the second complete bomb/duffel bag beside a nearby table do not explode.

DOWNLOAD:   Video from Cafeteria

DOWNLOAD:   Cafeteria Fire
Deputy Searle, outside the building, reports a fire in the cafeteria.

Four students run out of the cafeteria through a side door.

11:47

- One student can be seen on the cafeteria videotape crawling out of the cafeteria side door.
- One gallon of fuel ignites in the area of the partially detonated propane bomb.
- Dispatch advises of reports of two suspects with UZIs, pipe bombs and shotguns.
- During its late morning news program, Denver’s KMGH-TV Channel 7 announces that Jefferson County has confirmed gunshots fired at Columbine High School.

11:49

- Suspects are in the office area.
- Sgt. Ester reports that Denver Metro SWAT has arrived on the east side of the school.

11:51

- The 911 call made by Patti Nielson from the library is terminated by the dispatch center since no more activity could be heard on the line.

11:52

DOWNLOAD: Channel #1 Radio traffic between 11:51 am and 12:18 pm

CLICK RIGHT MOUSE OVER PHOTO TO START AUDIO - CLICK STOP BUTTON ON TOOL BAR AT TOP OF PAGE TO STOP AUDIO
Jefferson County Undersheriff John Dunaway arrives at the command post and authorizes SWAT to make an immediate entry into the school.

Deputy Byerly reports shots fired on the east side of the building.

The fire sprinkler system alarm in the cafeteria is activated.

**11:53  Narrative: County Support**

Jefferson County Sheriff John Stone, on his way to Columbine High School, calls Jefferson County Commissioner and Board Chairman Patricia Holloway. He alerts her that gunshots are being fired at the south Jefferson County school and there are reports of students injured and possible hostages taken.

Dispatch informs the command post that bomb squads from the Jefferson County and Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Offices are en route.

Dispatch also confirms a live bomb at Wadsworth and Chatfield. “Repeat. A live bomb at Wadsworth and Chatfield.”

**11:53 – 11:55**

Law enforcement officers on the east side of the school report noises and shots coming from the school’s northeast side.

Searle reports that Denver Police Department personnel are at the shed on the west side of the school and they have “long guns.”

A two-hour 911 phone call (from 11:29 a.m. to 1:24 p.m.) from a school secretary and a school security officer hiding in the school’s main office reports shots fired in the office, into the ceiling and in the art hallway to the north.

Dispatch gives the command post a description of one of the suspects: “Eric Harris, 5’10”, thin build, shaved blond hair, black pants and white T-shirt, light blue gym backpack.”

Littleton paramedics transport student Stephanie Munson, shot in the ankle while escaping out the east main entrance, to Littleton Hospital.

**11:56**

Klebold and Harris’ movements continue to be extremely random. The cafeteria videotape shows the gunmen coming back down the stairs and into the cafeteria. Klebold is holding the TEC 9.

Television news announces reports of two gunmen at Columbine High School.

Deputy Smoker advises dispatch that four down on the west side need to be evacuated.

**11:57**

Two ambulances, responding to Gardner’s call for medical assistance on the south side, approach the south
parking lot.

- Walker reports shots fired from inside the school.
- The cafeteria videotape shows Klebold and Harris standing in the cafeteria surveying the damage.
- The suspects walk back toward the kitchen area.
- Deputy Schwieterman reports an ambulance has arrived on the south side.

11:58

- Schwieterman, positioned by the west side athletic shed, reports that there are five victims outside on the southwest side of the school and gives directions where ambulances should come into the area to rescue them.
- Littleton Fire Department announces that its command post is set up at Leawood and Pierce.

11:59

- The suspects leave the kitchen area.
NARRATIVE TIME LINE OF EVENTS

12:00 noon to 5:00 pm

12:00 noon

- Klebold and Harris leave the cafeteria and go upstairs to the library.
- The command post tells dispatch to request Channel 7’s news helicopter flying overhead to land in Clement Park in order to pick up a Sheriff’s deputy for an aerial survey of the school.
- An armored vehicle is requested to rescue the injured because the scene is “not safe for medical.”
- Uninterrupted media coverage about the shooting in progress at Columbine High School begins on local television channels.

12:02 p.m.

- SWAT commands use of a Littleton fire truck to provide cover as the first Jefferson County, Littleton and Denver SWAT officers approach the school. Deputy Del Kleinschmidt, a Jefferson County K-9 team member assigned to SWAT, volunteers to drive the truck.

12:03

- A television reporter interviews the mother of a student who told her about gunmen dressed in black in the high school’s commons area. The station also reports that, according to information gleaned from its police scanners, the school is being evacuated.

12:02 – 12:05

- Littleton Fire Department paramedics rescue Sean Graves, Lance Kirklin and Anne Marie Hochhalter as they lay wounded outside the cafeteria. Because the scene is not safe, law enforcement deputies and officers move in closer to provide cover for paramedics Mark Gorman, Monte Fleming and John Aylward and emergency medical technician Jerry LoSasso as they retrieve the victims.
- Gunfire erupts from the second story library windows above the cafeteria as the paramedics rescue the wounded students outside.
- Deputy Walker sees a muzzle flash from a library window and returns fire.
- Deputy Gardner fires three shots at the gunmen.
- Denver police officers also provide suppression fire to the library windows. This allows the paramedics to retrieve the three wounded teens. The fourth student, Dan Rohrbough, is determined to be deceased. The paramedics rush the living to medical attention.

- After the ambulances leave the scene with the wounded, the gunfire coming from the library windows ceases. No gunshots attributed to the gunmen are heard again.

- Gardner turns his attention to a group of 15 students huddled behind a vehicle in the parking lot just a car away from him. One at a time, he evacuates the students down the line of cars to the protection of the last car farthest away from the school and the shooters.

- Other students begin to escape, some out a side door of the cafeteria, and the officers “leapfrog” them back to Gardner or other waiting deputies.

- A television news helicopter begins broadcasting aerial images of Columbine High School.

- Jefferson County crime lab is en route to the scene with its mobile crime laboratory unit.

12:06

- The first SWAT team, on foot behind a Littleton fire truck, arrives at the east main entrance to the school. Manwaring, leading the ad hoc team, splits the group into two teams and directs Jefferson County SWAT Deputy Allen Simmons to take his team into the school. It is estimated that at 12:06 p.m., Simmons’ team of five officers enters Columbine High School through the southeast doors. Manwaring will lead the second team, using the fire truck as a shield, to the west side where students are reported “down” and gunfire occurring.

- Television news coverage broadcasts images of the SWAT team outside the high school.

- Student Anne Marie Hochhalter is transported to Swedish Medical Hospital.

- Dispatch advises that a victim shot in the head is at the Caley/Yukon triage area.

12:07

- Deputy Walker asks dispatch to check on the status of the party on the roof.

12:08  

**Narrative: The deaths of Klebold and Harris**

- Shortly after that last gunshot is fired from the library window at law enforcement and paramedics, Harris and Klebold kill themselves.
• Medical triage is officially established at Yukon Street and Caley Avenue southwest of the school at the south entrance to Clement Park. Law enforcement had already transported numerous students to the area as they were evacuated from the school’s south and west sides. One patient is transported by Air Life and several are transported by ambulance from this area. A second triage and treatment area is set up on the east side of the school after the command post is informed the remaining victims will be brought from inside the school out the east side.

12:11

• The heating and air conditioning repairman, initially thought to be a possible sniper, is removed from the roof.

12:12

• A television reporter positioned at the Yukon and Caley triage area describes the scene as a “very bad situation.” He tells the television audience that four or five students are currently being treated and some are bleeding extensively.

• Sean Graves, critically injured outside the cafeteria, is transported to Swedish Medical.

12:14

• Dispatch tells the command post that a dispatcher is still on the line with students who say that there are suspects in “Rooms 1, 2 and 3” and several parties are shot, including one faculty member.

• The Jefferson County, Denver and Arapahoe County bomb squads begin to arrive and stage in the parking lot at Clement Park north of the school. As the incident progresses, bomb technicians from Littleton Fire, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) join the initial bomb squads. A total of 16 bomb technicians share in the initial response, some sent to evaluate the construction of the divisionary device, others sent to the homes of the suspects, still others providing safety information to the responders, and many later entering the school to deactivate and/or remove the explosives.

12:15  **Narrative: The Victim Services Response**

• Sgt. Hy, at the command post on Pierce, reports a possible shooter and hostages at the front door of the school.

• Moments later a lone student comes out of the main doors and runs to the fire truck. The teen is quickly checked for weapons and injuries, then picked up and put in the back end of the truck’s cab. The boy reports that no other people are in the office area.

• A news helicopter lands at Clement Park. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Sgt. Phil Domenico is put on board and uses the helicopter’s camera system to survey the school’s roof. He remains in the helicopter for the next several hours surveying the area.

• The Jefferson County administrator, emergency management coordinator and public information officer arrive at the Sheriff’s Dispatch Center to offer assistance. They soon are asked to help field the escalating media calls as the word of the Columbine shootings begins to spread worldwide. County Commissioners Pat Holloway and Rick Sheehan arrive at the dispatch center soon after the county staff.

• The Victim Services Unit of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office reports to the command post. Personnel are assigned to Columbine Public Library to provide services to the students and parents collecting there. By 12:45,
additional counselors and volunteers respond to Leawood Elementary School where high school students and parents are also gathering.

12:17

- Deputy Byerly reports that a male wearing a white shirt and black pants is walking on the west side of the school. The young man had heard of the shooting on TV and ran through Clement Park towards the school carrying an unloaded .22 Caliber rifle and a knife in order to “help the police.” He subsequently is contacted at gunpoint. Deputies determine that the individual is not involved in the incident.

12:18

- Medical personnel at the Yukon/Caley triage area report four critical, four serious and three stable patients and request 10 ambulances and one helicopter.

12:19

- Deputy Walker reports that he has six students with him.

12:20

- A student being interviewed on air by a television reporter says that the gunmen shot one of his friends. He recognizes the shooters as Columbine students and members of the “Trench Coat Mafia” but does not know their names. He also reports that there may be two or three shooters and they have pipe bombs, sawed-off shotguns, and automatics.

12:21

- Lance Kirklin, shot outside the cafeteria during the first few minutes of the shooting rampage, is transported to Denver Health Medical.

12:22

- The Air Life helicopter lands in Clement Park in preparation to transport critically wounded to area hospitals.

12:23

- Dispatch reports that all cellular lines are busy and it is unable to call the command post.

12:25

- Mark Taylor is transported to University Hospital. Mark was injured outside as he and a group of friends sat on the grassy hill to the west of the stairs where Klebold and Harris first began their shooting rampage.

- Dispatch advises that parents are to go to Leawood Elementary School. Law enforcement and victim
advocates will assist in coordinating the reunion of parents and children at the elementary school.

12:26

- Mike Johnson is transported to St. Anthony’s Hospital. Mike was shot as he fled the grassy hill to the west of where Klebold and Harris first began shooting.
- The news reports that there are possibly two gunmen and eight victims at Columbine High School.

12:27

- Jeanna Park is transported to Denver Health Medical. Kacey Ruegsegger is transported to St. Anthony’s. Both girls had been injured by gunfire in the library. All of those who escaped the library ran out of the emergency exit next to the west entrance to the school. They ran to Deputy Taborsky’s patrol vehicle and hid behind it until Deputy Searle and several Denver officers were able to load the students in their vehicles. The officers then transported the students either to Deputy Schwieterman at the shed by the ballfields or directly to triage.

12:28

- Aided by the local news stations, the Jefferson County School District announces a parent hotline number for parents of Columbine students.

12:30

- The Jefferson County SORT team (Special Operations Response Team) is paged. The SORT team, which deals primarily with jail disturbances and crowd control, will respond to Leawood Elementary School where students are being evacuated, and parents and media will soon be collecting.
- An officer from the Salvation Army arrives and immediately calls in a mobile kitchen, which sets up near the command post to provide water and nourishment for those at the scene. By 1:30 p.m., the Red Cross has staffed its mass feeding vehicle and sends it to the command post and nearby Clement Park where media, students and families are gathering.

12:31

- Lt. Manwaring reports that his SWAT team is on the north side of the school with the fire truck, working its way toward the west side.
- Valeen Schnurr is transported to Swedish Medical with gunshot wounds. Valeen was in the library at the time of her injuries and was able to escape through the library’s emergency exit when Klebold and Harris left the library.

12:34 - 12:39

- Manwaring’s SWAT team reports that it is now on the west side at the back entrance, upper level.
- The first objective of Manwaring’s team is to rescue two students lying in front of the west doors. Using the...
fire truck as a shield, the team of Jefferson County and Denver SWAT officers inch the truck as close to the west doors as possible.

- Two Denver SWAT members rescue student Richard Castaldo from the **area in front of the west doors** and lay him on the bumper of the fire truck.

- Jefferson County Deputy Scott Taborsky puts Richard in his patrol car and rushes him to medical assistance.

- The SWAT team makes a second approach to the **area outside the west doors**, this time to retrieve Rachel Scott. They bring Rachel to the fire truck and determine that she has already died.

- The team makes a third approach, this time in an attempt to rescue the **boy at the bottom of the stairs**. They return without him, acknowledging that Daniel Rohrbough is deceased.

### 12:39

- Dispatch announces that the Jefferson County Sheriff's mobile command bus is on scene and activated.

### 12:40

- **Dan Steepleton** is transported to Littleton Hospital.

- Information is received that a natural gas leak is occurring in the school. A decision is made to have Public Service Company shut off the gas as soon as it is considered safe to approach the main valve. A crew from PSC is present and is notified to be ready to accompany officers into the school when possible.

### 12:41

- Additional SWAT from Jefferson County arrive at the command post on Pierce Street. This team of 10 is commanded by Sgt. Barry Williams.

- Reports being relayed to the command post include possible multiple shooters, a hostage situation, and gunfire and explosions in nearly every wing of the school building.

- Students on cell phones inside the school are calling out – to 911, their parents, and several times to
local television stations.

- Students calling from their cell phones report hearing shots inside the school and give numerous locations for the gunshots, including the gymnasium, the auditorium, the business wing, the music rooms, the science area and the business offices.

- The news media announces that students who have safely escaped the school should call the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office or 911 to report their safety. The phones at the Sheriff’s Office are immediately jammed until personnel contact local TV stations to correct the message. Students are encouraged to call the school district’s parent hotline instead.

**12:43**

- Deputy Simmons, leader of the first SWAT team that entered the 250,000-square-foot school, requests additional SWAT for the east side. Due to the size of the school, the numerous rooms and hallways that have to be searched, and the amount of students and faculty being rescued, Simmons calls for more assistance.

**12:44**

- [Makai Hall](#) is transported to Littleton Hospital. He is later transported to St. Anthony’s Hospital by Air Life.

- Dispatch reports cover fire by Denver Police Department, most likely during SWAT’s rescue of Richard Castaldo at the school’s upper west entrance.

- Dispatch reports that an EMT dispatcher is on the phone with a party inside the school. The individual is with a critically injured victim.

**12:50 – 13:09**

- Two SWAT deputies are positioned on rooftops of houses on West Polk Avenue, the first neighborhood street just south of the school. From their vantage point, the marksmen have a clear view of the south parking lot, the library windows and the cafeteria area.

- Williams’ SWAT team utilizes a front-end loader parked near the command post to move around the school to the west side.

- Using the front-end loader as cover, Williams’ team first moves into position on the northwest corner of the school, opposite from where Simmons’ SWAT team had entered the building.

- Williams is advised that students have been shot and numerous bombs have exploded. The number of suspects, still in the building, is unknown but reports indicate as many as eight.

- Williams’ team is also told that activity has been reported in both the cafeteria and the library.

- A “live” bomb blocks the outside west doors leading into the upper level hallway and entrance to the library. The closest point of entry is into the cafeteria directly underneath the library.

- A [window into the teachers’ lounge](#) next to the cafeteria will provide an entry point for Williams’ team.
12:51

- Media reports that several area schools are in “lock down.” Schools are locked from the inside and, for safety reasons, “no one goes out and no one goes in.”

12:57

- **Austin Eubanks and Jennifer Doyle** are transported to Littleton Hospital.

13:00

- The Jefferson County Critical Incident (Shoot) Team is activated.

13:03

- Nick Foss is transported to Littleton Hospital.

13:04

- Richard Castaldo, rescued by SWAT from the outside upper west entrance, is transported to Swedish Medical Center.

13:09

- **Williams’ team breaks an outside window to gain entrance into the teachers’ lounge.** The team is met with the deafening noise of fire alarms, the flash of strobe lights, ceiling tiles hanging at odd angles and three inches of water coming in under the closed door to the cafeteria. The alarms and the sprinkler system have been set off by the explosions and the cafeteria area and adjacent rooms are flooding. Another concern is “a hissing sound and the sound of something spraying.” Williams fears it might be a broken natural gas line.

  - Williams’ team first clears the kitchen and back storage areas, evacuating groups of students and staff hiding behind locked doors.

  - Air Life transports Mark Kintgen from the Yukon/Caley triage to Denver Health Medical.

13:10

- Investigators are at or en route to area hospitals as injured victims are being transported.

13:11
• Brian Anderson is transported to Lutheran Medical Center.

• The medical triage at Yukon and Caley reports that all injured have been transported to area hospitals.

13:15

• Investigators arrive at the Harris and the Klebold residences.

13:18

• Simmons’ SWAT team evacuates 30 students and faculty from south classrooms on the upper level.

13:22

• SWAT teams continue a search and rescue inside the school building. Simmons’ team works east to west on the upper level, and Williams’ team works west to east on the lower level.

• Dispatch reports that Arapahoe SWAT team is on scene and ready to assist when needed.

13:26

• Williams’ team evacuates numerous students and staff from the back storage rooms and kitchen area. The students are evacuated out the same window that provided entry for the SWAT team.

DOWNLOAD: DISPATCH_AUDIO_between_a_student_in_the_kitchen_area, Denver Police and Jefferson County.

CLICK RIGHT MOUSE OVER PHOTO TO START AUDIO – CLICK STOP BUTTON ON TOOL BAR AT TOP OF PAGE TO STOP AUDIO

13:32

• The cafeteria videotape shows Williams’ SWAT team entering the main cafeteria area, commonly referred to as the “commons.” The team had just finished clearing and evacuating students and staff from the teachers’ lounge, kitchen area and back storage areas.

• Williams is advised by radio that there are possible bombs throughout the school. He is told the bombs may be hidden in backpacks and constructed with timers and motion-activated devices. The information is relayed from bomb technicians who have inspected the diversionary bombs placed on Wadsworth and realize similar devices may have been placed inside the high school.

• Williams’ team is advised that the suspects’ last known location was downstairs by the business classrooms. This information was relayed by a student on a cell phone inside the school.

13:40
Air Life transports Makai Hall from Littleton Hospital to St. Anthony’s Hospital.

**13:44**

- Three male subjects, appearing in a field north of the high school in Clement Park, are contacted by Jefferson County Sheriff's deputies and detained for questioning.
  - The three are dressed in black clothing, which matches the known description of the shooters, and are spotted in an unsecured area close to the school.
  - These individuals, who are not Columbine students, identify themselves as the “Splatter Punks” and insist they have shown up at Columbine High School mainly out of curiosity.
  - The images of the three being taken into custody by law enforcement authorities, aired live on local television channels, raised numerous questions from the community about their involvement in the crime.
  - After initial questioning, the three youths are released the same afternoon and are re-interviewed at length on April 24. It is determined that they had no known affiliation with the [Trench Coat Mafia](http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/columbine.cd/Pages/NARRATIVE.Time.Line2.htm), and, shortly thereafter, are cleared of any involvement.

**13:45**

- Jefferson County SORT arrives at Leawood Elementary School where they provide perimeter security, assist with the evacuation of the elementary children to their parents, assist in the reuniting of Columbine students and parents, handle traffic control and maintain a media area outside the school building.

**13:57**

- Williams’ SWAT team announces that it has found several students and faculty hiding in the ceiling of the kitchen. Six individuals are evacuated out the west side.
  - Dispatch tells Williams there is a male upstairs “in the library past the stairs” doing CPR on an injured party. The SWAT team is also told that a blue and white shirt is hanging on the door knob.

**13:59**

- Williams asks for better directions on how to get to the injured party.

**14:08**

- Students are evacuated from the Technology Lab on the main floor.

**14:12**

- The Lakewood SWAT team, with an armored vehicle, approaches the west side of the school next to the south parking lot.
14:15

- SWAT positioned on the roof of a residence to the south of the school reports a sign in a window on the upper level. The sign reads, “I bleeding to death.”

14:17

- Williams splits his team and half clears the computer and business classrooms on the lower level southeast of the cafeteria. They evacuate two people found in the furthest business classroom out the south side.

14:19

- A Columbine parent, waiting at Leawood Elementary for word about his son, is transported to Littleton Hospital because of chest pains. He is one of many parents in anguish awaiting word of their children.

14:24

- Adam Kyler is transported to Littleton Hospital.
- The second half of Williams’ SWAT team, having cleared the two-story auditorium, is entering into the school’s music area on the second floor where there are reports of students hiding in a music room closet. The team discovers 60 students and evacuates them in groups of 10 through a protective wall of SWAT officers and out the west side.
- The same SWAT team then moves into an area across the hallway and to the left of the music room where an additional 60 students are found and safely evacuated from the building.

14:26

- Sgt. Domenico, surveying the area from Channel 7 news helicopter, reports that someone is trying to climb out a second story window on the southwest side of the school.

14:28

- Simmons advises that the administration area on the upper level is cleared and his group is moving to the art and consumer education areas.

14:29

- The Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office requests Littleton Fire to dispatch engines and rescue units to Eric Harris’ residence. Already on scene are the Sheridan and Lakewood Police Department investigators, ATF personnel and Arapahoe County bomb technicians preparing to investigate a gasoline smell and the report of a bomb at the residence.
14:30

- Having just searched the business and computer classrooms, the first half of Williams’ team clears the stairs to the upper level. Once on the upper level, Williams sees Simmons’ team clearing the school to the east of where he stands.

14:33

- President Clinton refers to the shooting at a high school in Littleton, Colorado, during a scheduled news conference to talk about the American economy. “Ladies and Gentlemen, we all know there has been a terrible shooting at a high school in Littleton, Colorado. Because the situation, as I left to come out here, apparently is ongoing, I think it would be inappropriate for me to say anything other than I hope the American people will be praying for the students, the parents and the teachers and we’ll wait for events to unfold and there will be more to say.”

14:38

- Patrick Ireland, shot in the library and slipping in and out of consciousness, has slowly made his way to the west window. Sgt. Domenico, in a news helicopter, and deputies on the south and west sides of the school see a figure at the window and realize the young man is attempting to climb out the second story broken window. The only thing below him is a concrete sidewalk. The image of Patrick’s rescue has come to epitomize the Columbine tragedy. Using the roof of an armored vehicle so they can reach him, several Lakewood SWAT members catch the young man as he falls out the window at 2:38 p.m.

14:39

- Patrick Ireland is transported to St. Anthony’s Hospital.

14:40

- Forty students are evacuated out of the vocal room.

- Littleton Fire shuts off the electricity and natural gas to the Harris’ residence.
14:42

- Williams’ SWAT team requests medical assistance to the science area on the second floor, west side, for a teacher with multiple gunshot wounds. The teacher is Dave Sanders.

- Williams’ also announces that 60 students are to be evacuated from this same area.

14:47

- Members of Williams’ SWAT team evacuate approximately 60 people from the science area. Two SWAT members move the students and teachers first to the stairway landing, then down to the lower level and through the recently cleared cafeteria and out the west side door. Two SWAT members stay with Sanders waiting for paramedics.

14:52

- Simmons’ SWAT team working on the upper east side of the building announces the band room and woodshop areas are clear. The team is progressing west down the hallways to clear various rooms including a gym and weight room.
15:12 – 15:17

- Fifty students are evacuated from the east upper level and are directed across the street to safety.

15:22 - 15:37

- The first team to enter the library is Williams’ team of four Jefferson County SWAT members. A Denver SWAT officer holds the doorway. The four Jefferson County members spread out and work their way through sections of the library. They step over numerous bombs trying to get to each one of the children.

- Among three victims laying on the floor under desks is Lisa Kreutz. She has been shot several times but she is alive. SWAT, seeing her wounds, calls for a paramedic.

- In addition to the one girl who is injured, Williams’ team reports that they have found 12 dead. Among the 12 are two males on the floor in the southwest part of the library who appear to have self-inflicted gunshot wounds to the head. Guns and numerous explosive devices lay on the ground beside the bodies. Williams advises the command post that the two males match the description of the suspects.

- A female employee, hiding in the magazine room in a back part of the library, comes out of hiding. She is instructed to put her hand on the back of one of the SWAT officers, look only at the back of his helmet and follow him out of the library. She is quickly passed off to another officer and evacuated to the outside.

- Three other employees subsequently are evacuated from the library, including teacher Patti Nielson who was hiding in a cupboard in a west room of the library.

- Williams’ SWAT team works its way to the back emergency door that opens to the outside upper level near the west entrance. Although several bombs are laying inside the door, the SWAT team realizes the urgent need to get a team of paramedics into the library to attend to Lisa Kreutz. Two paramedics come in with a backboard, put the wounded student on it and quickly get her out of the library. Lisa is transported to Denver Health Medical at 3:37 p.m.

- After searching the library, Williams’ SWAT team requests the bomb squad.

- The other half of Williams’ team and Simmons’ SWAT team, still searching other parts of the school building, hear over the radio that William’s first team has made it to the library and found one female still alive. They continue clearing classrooms on the upper levels, working their way toward the library.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15:25</td>
<td>Littleton Fire reports that live bombs and gasoline have been located at the Harris residence. Adjacent houses in the neighborhood are evacuated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:36</td>
<td>SWAT command personnel meet at the east doors of the school to discuss follow up sweeps of the school and to relieve initial teams, replenishing them with fresh SWAT teams from other agencies. Simmons’ team, after clearing the gymnasium and weight room, enters a north-south hallway which is where the library is located. The team arrives outside the library as Williams’ team completes clearing the library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:40</td>
<td>Teacher Patti Nielson is transported to Littleton Hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:55</td>
<td>Lakewood SWAT reports two cars on the southwest side of the school are possibly booby trapped. One car is described as being a black Honda Civic, Mercedes or BMW with NIN bumper stickers. The other is a blue 1980’s two-door with a Ramstein sticker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Bomb technicians remove an explosive device from the Harris residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:04</td>
<td>A Littleton fire captain enters the school and is able to silence the fire alarms and shut off the emergency sprinkler systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16:35

- Two explosions are reported on the north side of the school. SWAT advises that they are shock locks fired by a SWAT team. Shock locks are explosive devices used to gain entry into locked rooms.

16:38

- Dr. Christopher Colwell, attending emergency room physician at Denver Health Medical Center, and Robert Montoya, a Denver Health paramedic, are escorted by SWAT team members through the library “to look for any signs of life.” Dr. Colwell had already pronounced Rachel Scott and Daniel Rohrbough, two of the youths shot outside, as deceased.

16:45

- Colwell performs a second sweep of the library, this time pronouncing each of the 10 victims and the two suspects deceased. He is also escorted to the science area where he pronounces teacher Dave Sanders as deceased.

**Phase 2 -- Making the Scene Safe**

By 4:45, the SWAT teams finished the initial search of Columbine High School, clearing the 250,000 square-foot two-story building. The deceased, including two suspects, had been checked and pronounced dead by Dr. Colwell of the Denver Health Medical Center. The deadly shootings and massacre at Columbine was over.

DOWNLOAD: Video from KUSA-TV Ch9

MOVE CURSOR OVER PHOTO TO START VIDEO - CLICK STOP BUTTON ON TOOL BAR AT TOP OF PAGE TO STOP VIDEO

**Phase 3 – Processing the Scene Begins**

On Wednesday April 21, 1999, personnel from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, including Lt. Dave Walcher, incident commander; Sgt. Randy West, investigations supervisor; Investigator Kate Battan, lead investigator; Chris Andrist, lab supervisor, and Dr. Nancy Bodelson, county coroner, entered the school at 7:30 a.m., April 21. Their first priority was to begin the process of identifying the deceased and to then begin the investigation into the tragedy at Columbine High School.
The following diagrams show the significant events and movements of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold on April 20, 1999. The witnesses to each event are shown as green dots. The injured are shown as yellow only during the event that caused the injury and return to green if they witnessed other events. The deceased are shown as red and convert to gray once that event has passed. Harris is shown as a red dot with the letter “H” inside it and Klebold is shown as a blue dot with the letter “K” inside it.

The diagrams only show the portions of the school where the events are occurring. Where appropriate an overview of the school is shown with a red square indicating what area of the school is magnified.

Harris and Klebold are not shown on every diagram, but rather only during the events that witnesses actually observed them.

**SCHOOL DIAGRAMS**
- Diagram 1 - Outside of school and parking lots
- Diagram 2 - Upper level of school
- Diagram 3 - Cafeteria
- Diagram 4 - Cafeteria and west entrance
- Diagram 5 - Library & west entrance
- Diagram 6 - Science area

**LIBRARY ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS**
11:29 - 11:36 a.m.
- Diagram 47 - Harris injures Todd
- Diagram 48 - Klebold / Harris enter library
- Diagram 49 - Klebold shoots Velasquez
- Diagram 50 - Klebold and Harris set down backpacks
- Diagram 51 - Klebold / Harris move toward windows
- Diagram 52 - Klebold / Harris shoot out windows inside library shooting Hall, Steepleton and Ireland
- Diagram 53 - Klebold drops trench coat
Diagram 8 - Harris enters school through west entrance - 11:10 - 11:14 am
Diagram 9 - Klebold arrival and parking - 11:10 am
Diagram 10 - Klebold enters school through library - 11:14 - 11:22 am
Diagram 11 - Harris with duffle bag - 11:14 - 11:22 am
Diagram 12 - Harris and Klebold returning to vehicles - 11:14 - 11:22 am
Diagram 13 - Harris / Klebold approach the west stairs - 11:19 am
Diagram 14 - Shooting begins at West entrance - 11:19 am
Diagram 15 - Harris takes off trench coat
Diagram 16 - Shots fired down the stairs - 11:19 - 11:23 am
Diagram 17 - Shooting toward grassy hill
Diagram 18 - Graves moves toward the cafeteria
Diagram 19 - Klebold shoots Kirklín
Diagram 20 - Klebold shoots Rohrbough
Diagram 21 - Klebold enters cafeteria
Diagram 22 - Harris shoots Hochhalter
Diagram 23 - Klebold / Harris shoot toward Soccer field
Diagram 24 - Areas where explosive devices are thrown
Diagram 25 - Klebold / Harris injure Nielson and Anderson
Diagram 26 - Harris and Klebold enter school

Diagram 54 - Harris shoots Curnow
Diagram 55 - Harris shoots Ruegsegger
Diagram 56 - Harris shoots Bernall
Diagram 57 - Harris taunts student
Diagram 58 - Klebold shoots Ireland
Diagram 59 - Klebold grabs Shoels
Diagram 60 - Harris shoots Shoels
Diagram 61 - Klebold shoots Kechter
Diagram 62 - Harris throws explosive device
Diagram 63 - Smoke from under table 16
Diagram 64 - Harris jumps on bookshelves
Diagram 65 - Harris shoots bookshelves
Diagram 66 - Klebold shoots out the glass in trophy case at the Library entrance
Diagram 67 - Klebold shoots Kintgen
Diagram 68 - Klebold shoots Schnurr and Kreutz
Diagram 69 - Klebold shoots Townsend
Diagram 70 - Harris enters east section of the library
Diagram 71 - Klebold / Harris speak to students under table #3
Diagram 72 - Klebold / Harris reload and taunt Schnurr
Diagram 73 - Harris shoots Nowlen and Tomlin
Diagram 74 - Klebold shoots Tomlin
Diagram 75 - Harris shoots Fleming, Townsend, Park an Kruetz
Diagram 76 - Harris looks out South Library windows
- Diagram 27 - Harris exchanges gunfire with JCSO Deputy Gardner - 11:24 am
- Diagram 28 - Reports of shots down the main hall and out East doors 11:24 - 11:26 am

**INSIDE ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS**

**11:25 - 11:29 am**
- Diagram 29 - Nielson and Anderson arrive in library
- Diagram 30 - Klebold shoots inside school
- Diagram 31 - Shooting continues inside the east hallway
- Diagram 32 - Klebold shoots in library hallway
- Diagram 33 - Shooting resumes in the east main hall
- Diagram 34 - Klebold shoots Munson
- Diagram 35 - Klebold shooting toward the East (main) doors
- Diagram 36 - Harris Walks toward the East entrance
- Diagram 37 - Klebold moves back toward the West entrance
- Diagram 38 - Dave Sanders is shot - 11:26 am
- Diagram 39 - Klebold shoots while Harris looks in duffel bag
- Diagram 40 - Klebold near top of Cafeteria stairs
- Diagram 41 - Klebold moves toward the library hallway
- Diagram 77 - Klebold / Harris move to the center section
- Diagram 78 - Harris retrieves ammunition
- Diagram 79 - Klebold / Harris allow a student to leave the library
- Diagram 80 - Harris shoots Mauser
- Diagram 81 - Klebold / Harris shoot Depooter, Doyle and Eubanks
- Diagram 82 - Klebold / Harris move toward computer tables
- Diagram 83 - Harris throws explosive device
- Diagram 84 - Klebold / Harris move behind front counter
- Diagram 85 - Klebold taunts student
- Diagram 86 - Klebold shoots into Break room behind counter
- Diagram 87 - Klebold / Harris have conversation
- Diagram 88 - Klebold / Harris leave the Library
- Diagram 89 - Numerous students leave the Library through the West door

**SCIENCE AREA DIAGRAMS**

**11:36 - 11:44 am**
- Diagram 90 - Klebold / Harris explosive device detonates
- Diagram 91 - A fire breaks out in storage room
- Diagram 92 - Harris shoots into a Science class
- Diagram 93 - A teacher in Science room extinguishes the fire

**CAFETERIA AREA DIAGRAMS**
Diagram 42 - Sanders assisted into classroom

- Diagram 43 - Klebold outside Library
- Diagram 44 - Klebold moving in hall outside Library
- Diagram 45 - Klebold looks in Library window
- Diagram 46 - Harris throws explosive device in hall

11:44 - 11:47 am

- Diagram 94 - Harris shoots at one of the duffel bag
- Diagram 95 - Klebold / Harris move through the Cafeteria
- Diagram 96 - Klebold / Harris leave as the duffel bag detonates

MAIN HALL / OFFICE DIAGRAMS

11:47 am - 11:56 am

- Diagram 97 - Klebold / Harris go to the administrative offices
- Diagram 98 - Klebold / Harris move through the office into the art hallway

CONTINUED MOVEMENT DIAGRAMS

- Diagram 99 - Klebold / Harris return to the Cafeteria and Kitchen - 11:56 - 11:59 am
- Diagram 100 - Klebold / Harris return to the library and shoot out of the windows - 12:02 - 12:05 pm
- Diagram 101 - Klebold / Harris commit suicide - 12:05 - 12:08 pm
- Diagram 102 - Patrick Ireland comes out window - 2:38 pm
Deputies on Scene

Community Resource Officer Called to “Back Lot”

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Deputy Neil Gardner soon would complete his second year as the uniformed community resource officer assigned to Columbine High School. Gardner, a 15-year veteran of the Sheriff’s Office, normally ate his lunch with the students in the cafeteria during first lunch period. His car would have been parked in his “normal spot” in front of the cafeteria doors - between the junior and senior parking lots.

On April 20, however, Deputy Gardner and campus supervisor Andy Marton, an unarmed school security officer employed by the school district, were eating lunch in Gardner’s patrol car. They were monitoring students in the “Smokers’ Pit,” a spot just to the northwest of campus in Clement Park where the students congregated to smoke cigarettes.

Gardner had just finished his lunch when he received a call over the school’s radio from a custodian. “Neil,” called the custodian in a panicked voice, “I need you in the back lot!”

Gardner pulled out of the parking lot near the school’s tennis courts and drove onto Pierce Street in front of the school. The “back lot” being referred to by the custodian, he assumed, was the south student parking lot by the cafeteria. As soon as he pulled onto Pierce Street, he heard another call being dispatched over the Sheriff’s radio, “Female down in the south lot of Columbine High School.” He activated his lights and siren. It was 11:23.

In his own mind, he recalled later, he thought someone probably had been hit by a car.

First Shooter Seen

As soon as Gardner pulled into the south parking lot off of South Pierce Street, he saw kids running out of the school in every direction. As he drove around toward the south lot, he also saw smoke coming from the west end of the parking lot and heard several loud explosions. Students standing on the soccer field were pointing toward the building. He could hear gunshots coming from inside the school but could not pinpoint from where.

Gardner pulled his vehicle into the senior parking lot where he had a good vantage point. He could see both parking lots, the cafeteria and the second story west entrance to the school. As he got out of his patrol car, he received a second call on the school radio. “Neil, there’s a shooter in the school.”

Numerous patrol units and emergency vehicles already were responding to the school as the...
Sheriff’s dispatch center reported “female down” and “possible shots fired at Columbine High School.” There was so much traffic on the police radio that Gardner could not tell dispatch he was on scene.

As Gardner stepped out of his patrol car, Eric Harris turned his attention from shooting into the west doors of the high school to the student parking lot and to the deputy. Gardner, particularly visible in the bright yellow shirt of the community resource officer uniform, was the target of Harris’ bullets. Harris fired about 10 shots from his rifle at Gardner before his gun jammed. Although Gardner’s patrol car was not hit by bullets, two vehicles that he was parked behind were hit by Harris’ gunfire. Investigators later found two bullet holes in each of the cars.

Officer Exchanges Gunfire

Gardner, seeing Harris working with his gun, leaned over the top of the car and fired four shots. He was 60 yards from the gunman. Harris spun hard to the right and Gardner momentarily thought he had hit him. Seconds later, Harris began shooting again at the deputy.

After the exchange of gunfire, Harris ran back into the building. Gardner was able to get on the police radio and called for assistance from other Sheriff’s units. “Shots in the building. I need someone in the south lot with me.”

It was 11:26 a.m. Only five minutes had passed since Jefferson County Sheriff’s dispatch center had announced a bomb explosion and subsequent fire on South Wadsworth Boulevard.

Fleeing Students Report Multiple Shooters

When Gardner called for additional units to respond to the south parking lot of Columbine High School, he had just exchanged gunfire with Eric Harris. Gardner could also hear gunshots coming from inside the building but he did not know who else was shooting, how many were in the school or where.

While he was on the radio calling for assistance, five other Jefferson County deputies already were on their way, arriving only minutes after the first report of a “female down” at Columbine High School.

As the first deputies arrived on campus, they were met by chaos and hysteria. Terrified students and teachers were fleeing in all directions from the high school in the suburban neighborhood. Others were still inside.

The deputies could hear explosions coming from inside the school. The students were telling them about bombs, guns and hand-grenades, and about gunmen with assault rifles and semi-automatics.

There were other reports of possible terrorists, four shooters, six shooters, 17 hostages.
There was a man wearing a trench coat; there were two guys in trench coats. There was a guy in a white T-shirt, with hats, not with hats. The gunmen had changed clothes to blend in with the other students. There was a shooter on the roof. The gunmen were in the auditorium. No, they were in the cafeteria.

The deputies had no concrete information about what was actually happening inside the building. They were facing live fire and had potentially 2,000 victims and hostages.

Other Deputies in the “Hot Spot” on the Southwest Side of the School

At 11:21 a.m., Deputy Paul Magor, on patrol in the south part of the county, was dispatched to an explosion reported on Wadsworth Boulevard. He never made it to the site because two minutes later, Magor was advised of a female down in the south lower parking lot of Columbine High School, three miles to the northeast of the reported explosion.

Deputy Paul Smoker, a motorcycle patrolman for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, was writing a speeding ticket on West Bowles Avenue, just west of Pierce Street, when he heard the report coming from dispatch of a female injured at the high school.

Smoker, close to the school, was heading toward the campus when the second radio call came. “Possible shots fired. Unknown situation.”

Instead of taking the streets around the park to the school’s east entrance, Smoker cut through Clement Park, driving on the grass toward the west side. The realization that something major was occurring at the school came with the sound of loud explosions, interspersed with what might be gunshots. Black webbing woven through the wire backdrop of the baseball fields obstructed his view as he approached the school from the northwest. But the sound of explosions continued.

Smoker was also scanning the area for Gardner, the community resource officer assigned to Columbine High School.

A Jefferson County patrol car came up behind Smoker and he recognized Deputy Scott Taborsky. Instantly realizing that a car provided more protection than riding astride a motorcycle, he quickly got in Taborsky’s car on the passenger side and they drove closer to the school.

A sports box, or concrete shed used for the storage of athletic equipment, obstructed their view but they could see two students lying on the ground. Both were bleeding. The first student the deputies got to was the furthest from the school, lying by the shed south of the baseball field. Wounded but still conscious, the student told the deputies that he thought the person who had shot him was “Ned Harris.”

Deputy Rick Searle was the third deputy arriving at the shed. He had driven into the area from the north between the west doors of the school and the shed and immediately heard gunshots.
and explosions at the west doors. He pulled his car up to the shed and attended to the wounded student while Smoker and Taborsky moved forward to rescue the second student lying unprotected on the ground closer to the school. With no paper or notepads, Searle wrote “Ned Harris” on his patrol car. He would radio that name to dispatch as soon as he could get to his radio.

**Injured Students Given Cover**

Taborsky drove his patrol car in front of the downed student, providing him with cover from any additional gunfire. Smoker walked alongside the car.

He was trying to see where the shots had come from as numerous students took cover behind the patrol car. In short, hysterical breaths, their stories intermingled. Gunmen were shooting inside the school with UZIs or shotguns. They were throwing hand-grenades. There were two gunmen. They were dressed in black. One was younger and “kind of thin,” maybe high school age. He was wearing a black trench coat and had his hat on backwards. The second one was taller and a little older but also wearing a black trench coat. The gunmen were randomly shooting anyone they confronted.

Because of the tremendous amount of radio traffic, Smoker was having difficulty advising dispatch of the condition of the students and the information they had just relayed about what was happening inside the school.

His first priority was to get those students who had sought refuge behind the patrol car to a safer location. Hiding behind his car, they were still too close to the scene. Their hysteria was causing more confusion. Some were bleeding. Taborsky and Smoker told the boys to take their shirts off and use them to help stop some of the bleeding of the wounded. They told them to try to help each other while the deputies figured out how to get them to safety.

Looking back at the concrete tool shed near the baseball fields, Smoker could see other deputies and Denver police arriving on scene. They devised a plan to shuttle the students away from the school grounds, using their patrol cars as protection for them.

Searle evacuated groups of students out of the area, either to officers from the Denver Police Department who took them from his car or directly to Caley and Yukon streets for emergency medical assistance. Smoker and Taborsky stayed in their positions to provide cover for the students until they could be evacuated.

**Gunman Fires From Broken Window**

Behind him and to his right, Smoker caught a glimpse of Gardner in the south parking lot. Gardner had his weapon drawn.

“There he is!!” Gardner yelled to Smoker as a young man, carrying a semi-automatic rifle,
appeared on the inside of the double doors.

Gardner started shooting. Smoker couldn’t see who Gardner was shooting at. A half-fence and a dumpster now blocked his view of the area where gunshots could be heard. He moved further out into the open so that the west side doors came into view. A gunman with a rifle was leaning out of a broken window, using the doorframe as cover, and shooting his weapon toward students and law enforcement.

Smoker shot three rounds before the gunman disappeared from the window. He could hear gunfire continuing in the building, but nothing from outside. More and more students came running from the building and sought the protection of the deputies and the patrol cars.

While Smoker and Taborksy were with the students fleeing the west side of the school and Searle was transporting groups of them to safety, Gardner called for ambulances. He had just exchanged gunfire with Harris for the second time and could see the first victim, the girl initially reported “down” in the lower level parking lot, and at least three more wounded near the cafeteria. They were dangerously close to the gunman’s fire.

Possible Grenades Detonated

Magor, driving from the south toward Columbine High School, arrived at the high school at 11:27 a.m., parking his patrol car on Pierce Street at the southeast corner of the student parking lot. He was protecting the entrances to prevent suspects from escaping out of the parking lot onto Pierce Street, and he was also blocking traffic so the gunmen would not fire upon civilians driving by.

Magor immediately was approached by an older adult he assumed was a teacher who reported that there was a person in the school with a gun. At the same time, dispatch announced on the radio that possible grenades had been detonated.

Six Deputies Are On Scene

Deputy Searle was on the upper grassy area on the southwest side of the school, behind Taborsky and Smoker, and was assisting with the evacuation of the students from that area. He drove close enough to Taborsky’s car to evacuate the first eight to 10 students. In three separate trips, Searle was able to transport the wounded to the medical triage area at Caley Avenue and Yukon Street.

On the south side of the school in the parking lot south of the lower level main doors was Deputy Kevin Walker. Walker had driven in through the south student parking lot off Pierce Street. From his vantage point, he could see the entrance to the cafeteria and could help rescue and evacuate students fleeing from the south side

By 11:30, within four minutes of Gardner’s reports of shots being fired in the building and the need for additional units, six Jefferson County deputies, including Gardner, were on scene.
Gardner had already exchanged gunfire with Harris twice, once when Harris shot at him as he arrived in the south parking lot and again from inside the west entrance doors. Smoker had shot at Harris during the second exchange between Gardner and Harris. Taborsky, Smoker and Searle were providing immediate cover and evacuating students as they fled the school. Searle, with the help of Sheriff’s Deputy Neal Schwieterman and several Denver officers, gave first priority to the wounded, transporting them in their patrol cars to emergency medical triage being set up to the south. The armed deputies had also set up an inner perimeter around the school, covering the school exits on the south, west and east sides in case the suspects would attempt to escape.

Gardner called dispatch. All units around him were under fire.

**Explosions Shake the Cafeteria**

The explosions at the high school continued. Smoker saw the glass windows in the cafeteria flexing with the reverberations. The bombs were shaking the whole cafeteria and the noise, he said, was “unbelievable.”

“This was not the dope deal gone bad,” he later recounted. “There was an unknown inside a school. We didn’t know who the ‘bad guy’ was but we soon realized the sophistication of their weapons. These were big bombs. Big guns. We didn’t have a clue who ‘they’ were. But they were hurting kids. I couldn’t imagine something like this happening.”

Walker, on the south side of the school, reported an explosion by the south double doors that blew out two of the windows. Also a member of the bomb squad, Walker realized the firepower of the explosions. “You could feel the explosions,” he explained. “You could see the windows flexing out and then being sucked back in again.” To his left, but in his line of vision, he saw a fireball explode in the cafeteria.

As the cafeteria lit up with the explosion, six students ran out of the south cafeteria doors and headed toward Walker. The deputy directed them to take cover behind several cars, covering them with his own gun while they positioned themselves away from the line of fire. “Are we going to die?” one hysterical young woman kept asking him. “No, you’re not going to,” he reassured her.

Walker radioed to dispatch that he had six students with him, but did not have any safe path to evacuate them from the parking lot. By this time, dispatch had also announced possible shooters on the roof. So in addition to covering the south doors and the cafeteria windows, he was watching the rooftop. To the east of the cafeteria area, and on the second story, he saw a girl at an upper window. She was pounding on the glass and holding up a sign. But it was too far away and the windows too reflective to read the sign. He just could not decipher what it might say.

His thought was that the gunmen might come out the south doors from the cafeteria and jump
the fence into the neighborhood just south of the school. He was watching the south exits, intent that they would not make it to the fence.

Walker momentarily caught a glimpse of one of the gunmen through a window on the upper level in the southwest corner. He radioed dispatch with a description of the gunman as wearing a “white T-shirt with some kind of holster vest.”

Ambulances Arrive Amidst Gunfire

Two Littleton Fire Rescue Units, responding to Gardner's call for medical assistance on the south side, entered the south parking lot and drove toward Walker's position.

Traditionally, fire and rescue personnel do not come into active scenes. They assemble nearby until law enforcement determines the area safe and allows them to enter. Yet unaware of the danger, the rescues drove close to the downed students lying outside the cafeteria and jumped out of their vehicles. They looked toward the law enforcement personnel who had moved in closer to cover them. “Is it safe?,” they mouthed to the officers.

“NO!!!! It's not safe!!!!” was the response. “Get 'em and go!!!! Get ‘em and go!!!!!!”

As the paramedics jumped out to rescue the injured and law enforcement moved into positions to protect them, gunfire erupted from the second story library windows above the cafeteria. Walker saw a muzzle flash from a library window and he and Gardner returned the fire.

Denver police officers also provided suppression fire to the library windows, allowing the paramedics to retrieve Sean Graves, Lance Kirklin and Anne Marie Hochhalter. The fourth student, Dan Rohrbough, was determined to be deceased. The paramedics rushed the living to medical attention.

After the rescues had retrieved the injured and exited the scene, the gunfire coming from the library windows ceased. Officers could still hear shots from inside the school but the shooting outside had stopped.

SWAT Teams on Scene

Gardner turned his attention to a group of 15 students huddled behind a vehicle in the parking lot just a car away from him. One at a time, he evacuated the students down the line of cars to the protection of the last car farthest away from the school and the shooters.

Other students began to escape, some out a side door of the cafeteria, and the officers would “leapfrog” them back to Gardner or other waiting deputies. Two Denver officers rescued the six students near Walker in the south lot.

Meanwhile, Deputy Al Simmons and a hastily assembled SWAT team from Jefferson County
Sheriff’s Office and Denver and Littleton Police Departments, had just entered the school on the upper east side. Lt. Terry Manwaring, SWAT commander, had deployed Simmons’ team on the east and directed a second half of the ad hoc team around the north side to the west. From the radio traffic, Manwaring knew there were students injured and active gunfire on the west side.

Deputies Hold the Perimeter

The deputies, all of whom had responded to the high school within four minutes of Gardner’s call for assistance, held their perimeter positions as the Jefferson County, Littleton and Denver SWAT teams went into the building. They remained at their positions until around 3:30 p.m, providing cover and evacuation as students and teachers came out from different areas of the school. The deputies checked each person for injuries and weapons, and then transported them to safety and to anxious families and parents.

It was the deputies on the ground and one in the Channel 7 helicopter who first saw the injured male figure at the second-story library window and realized the young man was intent on coming out. But there was nothing but a concrete sidewalk below to break his fall.

Frantically waving and yelling, the deputies got the attention of the Lakewood SWAT team and the armored truck in the south parking lot. The image of the rescue of Patrick Ireland as he fell into the arms of two SWAT members standing atop the truck’s roof caught the attention of the world.

“Everybody was working as a team,” Gardner explained. “We saved a lot of kids and a lot of lives that day – even though we didn’t know who the ‘bad guys’ were.”

Officers on the East Side Assist Escaping Students

Sgt. Ken Ester, then with the Jefferson County Intelligence Unit, arrived at 11:41 a.m. on the east side of the school and assisted Deputy Magor on Pierce Street to the south. The deputies were helping students running from the school and preventing other students from trying to go back to the school once they had run to Leawood Park.

At 11:44 a.m., Deputy Bob Byerly was on the northeast inner perimeter of the school, assisting students who were escaping to Clement Park. He maintained a visual on the north side of the school as well as a partial view of the northeast doors.

By Day’s End

By day’s end, nearly 1000 law enforcement officers and emergency medical personnel were on scene. Those first responders were responsible for the evacuation and rescue of nearly 2,000 students and over a hundred faculty and staff from the school. Many provided emergency
first aid and helped get the wounded to medical attention. They secured the perimeter around the school, preventing any escape of the suspects. They managed the crowds forming, keeping them at a safe distance from the school, and coordinating the reunion of students and parents. Within the first hour, they had a list of names of possible suspects and were beginning to piece together information on the perpetrators from witness accounts. They helped in traffic control and set up outer perimeters, joining in several SWAT sweeps of the school, removing bombs and explosives, and securing the scene.
Managing the Incident

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office on Scene

Lt. Terry Manwaring, SWAT commander for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, was the first member of the Jefferson County command staff to arrive at Columbine High School. Manwaring had been patrolling in the foothills 13 miles to the west and immediately responded to the school, ordering the SWAT team and the command staff to be paged as he went.

At approximately 11:36 a.m., Manwaring parked his patrol car in the middle of the intersection of Pierce and Leawood Streets a short distance to the north of the school, thus establishing the original position of the incident command center.

Three minutes later, Sgt. Phil Hy of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office arrived on scene. Hy previously had been the support supervisor for the SWAT team and he understood Manwaring’s urgent need for information about what was happening at the school in front of them. Hy began trying to decipher the radio traffic exploding over the airwaves and piece together what information he could.

The third Jefferson County supervisor to arrive at the forming command post on Leawood and Pierce was Lt. David Walcher. Arriving at approximately 11:45 a.m., Walcher parked behind Manwaring’s patrol car and was quickly briefed by Manwaring and Hy as the SWAT leader donned his tactical gear.

Walcher was uniquely qualified to handle the incident command role because he was thoroughly SWAT trained. He had been with the Jefferson County SWAT team for seven years, coming off the team exactly one year before the Columbine incident. Walcher was also the second ranking Jefferson County officer currently at the scene, and he would manage the incident minute to minute as it unfolded managed by using a structured Incident Management System (IMS).

Sheriff John P. Stone and Undersheriff John Dunaway were at the county’s government center in Golden when they were informed that shots had been fired at the south Jefferson County high school. They hurried to the scene in separate cars, Dunaway arriving before the Sheriff. In his role as chief operations officer, the Undersheriff named Walcher as incident commander and authorized SWAT to make entry into the school.

Sheriff Stone, having been a commissioner in the county for 12 years, knew immediately who to contact and what resources would be available to the Sheriff’s Office in response to the situation. He made those first calls as he drove to the site.
Other Agencies Respond

At 11:32 a.m. Deputy Paul Magor, the first patrol deputy dispatched to the high school, radioed for mutual aid. A metro-wide community response already had begun to organize and other law enforcement units and emergency personnel and equipment were beginning to arrive on scene. Later reports by law enforcement described the scene as “the world just descending upon Pierce Street. Within minutes, there were hundreds of people showing up from all kinds of different agencies, all kinds of different ranks.” In all, 35 different law enforcement agencies, 11 fire and EMS agencies and nearly 1,000 personnel would respond.

Command Post Organized

Within the next few minutes, scores of law enforcement, fire and emergency medical services personnel arrived at the scene, increasing the chaos, intensity and difficulty of managing the incident. Also arriving to offer any assistance necessary from their respective agencies and to work with Walcher were:

- Littleton Fire Department Chief Bill Pessemier
- Littleton Fire Department Division Chief Chuck Burdick
- Denver Police Department Division Chief Gerry Whitman
- Denver Police Department Captain Mike O’Neill
- Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office Captain Bob Armstrong
- Littleton Police Department Commander Bob Brandt
- Littleton Police Department Sergeant Bill Black
- Colorado State Patrol Major John Wise

Shouting over the constant roar of so many police, emergency, and fire vehicles arriving and television news helicopters hovering overhead, the command officers quickly began to identify and coordinate the tasks before them.
Managing the INCIDENT

Working alongside Walcher at the command post was Littleton Fire Chief Pessemier, head of the Littleton Fire Department whose jurisdiction included Columbine High School. While the city of Littleton has a population of 40,000, its fire district serves nearly 190,000 and has partnerships with 16 separate law enforcement agencies. Because Columbine was in Littleton’s fire district, the department was responsible for the fire and EMS response to the incident.

Littleton Fire Chief Pessemier and Division Chief Burdick took over the management of the medical issues from their first arriving Battalion Chief, Ray Rayne. Medical concerns included setting up four triage areas, transporting the wounded, and coordinating a joint effort rescue of wounded students in an active situation with law enforcement personnel providing protective cover fire. They also made plans for any fire-related issues that might occur at or in the school. Their coordination was crucial due to the task at hand and the number of different agencies they managed by using a structured FIRE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

Chief Whitman and Captain O’Neill were tasked with deploying the eventual hundreds of Denver Police officers who came to Columbine. The Denver Police Department was heavily involved from the outset of the incident and continued with that involvement throughout the day. As their officers arrived, they were involved with Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office personnel in initial rescues, gunfire, protection of evacuees, SWAT, perimeter, traffic control, explosive ordinance, investigation and interviews, as well as the crime scene.

Captain Armstrong, likewise, volunteered the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office to assist in any way necessary. Captain Armstrong worked with the Jefferson County School District to utilize buses in the transportation of evacuated students to Leawood Elementary School. Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office was also heavily involved in the investigation, explosive ordinance issues, perimeter, and response to local hospitals.

Commander Brandt, who in turn requested Sgt. Black to assist him, was asked to coordinate the SWAT teams that had been deployed and deploy other SWAT team members as they arrived at Columbine and were needed. They readily accepted that challenge and worked with other SWAT commanders as the incident unfolded.

Major Wise, along with numerous Colorado State Patrol troopers, assisted wherever possible. The CSP was used extensively in traffic control and setting up perimeters at the scene.

Concerns to be Addressed

In the next few hours, those at the command post would be required to address a myriad of concerns, including bombs, hostages, snipers, multiple shooters, fire, odors of natural gas, the media, air and ground traffic, evacuations within the school and the neighborhoods, alarms,
suspects, suspects’ homes and vehicles, other potential sites, witness interviews, organization of responding agencies, injured victims, fleeing students and frantic parents.

Information was coming into the command post from various sources – each jurisdiction was listening to its own officers or communications centers and sharing that information with the others.

Hy remained in his patrol vehicle on Pierce Street near the developing command post. With him sat a Jefferson County Sheriff’s deputy taking notes and writing down the significant radio traffic.

Hy was trying to supply Walcher and others at the command post with updated information on what was occurring at the high school and who the suspects might be. Reports from students and staff who had escaped, and even from some on cell phones still inside the school, mentioned up to eight gunmen in paramilitary gear, armed with grenades and automatic weapons. From those descriptions, the command staff and many of the first responders thought the situation sounded like they might be confronting some type of terrorist unit.

Setting Up Perimeters

Those at the command post realized the necessity of setting up perimeters around the 250,000 square-foot school. In an incident such as the one unfolding at Columbine, the fear was that the suspects would escape and move into the larger surrounding community, escalating the situation into an even worse scenario. Perimeters are a type of law enforcement strategy that helps contain the suspects and prevents them from fleeing a site, getting through the police lines and creating havoc in adjoining neighborhoods or businesses.

Containment was a major concern for the command post. Columbine is a large school of 1,945 students, a majority of whom were fleeing the building through one of the school’s 25 exits and entrances. The suspects easily could escape as well by blending in with the students or staff coming out. The school needed to be sealed off as protection for the children and the surrounding neighborhoods, schools and businesses.

With the help of so many jurisdictions that responded to the call for mutual aid, a strong inner perimeter was set up quickly. The first pieces of the perimeter were in place by the Jefferson County Sheriff’s deputies responding to the scene. By 11:30 a.m., within four minutes of the school resource officer’s reports of shots being fired in the building and the need for help, six Jefferson County Sheriff’s Deputies were on scene and in position, covering the school exits on the south, west and east sides. By 11:50 a.m., two more Jefferson County Sheriff’s officers were on the north side. The command post, using both Jefferson County Sheriff’s deputies and Denver police, strengthened that inner perimeter.

The first perimeter was set up as close as possible around the school, providing containment but also keeping other people from getting too near the school. A second perimeter went in
Capt. Armstrong of the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office quickly coordinated setting up the outer perimeter of law enforcement personnel, directing the Denver Police Department and the Colorado State Patrol to form that external perimeter along Bowles on the north, Coal Mine and Polk on the south, Leawood and Pierce to the east and Wadsworth on the west. That outer perimeter provided a buffer for the inner perimeter, preventing any suspects from escaping the general vicinity, keeping better control of traffic coming into the area, providing greater security for the command post, providing a safe area for the media, and coordinating and assisting with parents responding to the site.

Setting Up Triage

While the perimeters were being established, Littleton Fire was setting up the triage areas to the south and east of the school. Injured students and staff first were taken to one of four triage areas and then treated and transported, if necessary, to an area hospital. Area hospitals were now on standby to receive the injured. A total of 10 students were transported in the first hour, another 10 in the second hour, and four after that.

Despite the serious condition of some of those wounded, everyone triaged and transported to a local hospital survived.

Communication Problems

One of the technical problems of the Columbine incident was the inability of different agencies to communicate effectively because they were operating on different radio systems and different channels. Many were equipped with older radio networks that made it extremely difficult to communicate with one another. Incompatible radio frequencies combined with 47 different agencies on scene made communication a major challenge.

As the first SWAT team made its initial entry into the school, the problem of multiple jurisdictions with different radio frequencies was just as apparent. SWAT inside the school could communicate with one another on a protected channel; that is, if they could hear over fire alarms, strobes, and sprinkler systems. The real difficulty was the communication between SWAT and the command post and the communications center. In most situations, SWAT members will not give locations during an operation because they do not want to give any knowledge or advantage to the suspects. However, the SWAT teams inside the school had difficulty receiving information from the outside as they worked their way through the school building.
The Sheriff's Office utilizes a mobile command post vehicle for major incidents. Equipped with a mobile dispatch center, the Command 500 bus was in place on Pierce Street and operational at 12:39 p.m. It provided a quieter place than the hood of a patrol car for Walcher and the command post team to manage the crisis and provided a working area for dispatchers to assist the tactical operation. For the balance of the operation, Hy assisted the dispatchers in the command post with the enormous task of managing the information at the scene and with headquarters.

Investigation Begins

It was apparent at the onset that students and staff fleeing the school could supply vital information about what might be occurring at the school, information that would benefit SWAT and the first responders. Lt. John Kiekbusch of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Investigation Division began to coordinate the initial interviewing. A large contingent of investigators from the Sheriff's Office, Denver and other police departments set up debriefing areas to interview students and staff, both in Clement and Leawood Parks and at Columbine Public Library and Leawood Elementary School. Kiekbusch and his staff were also standing by for the tactical situation to be completed so they could launch what they knew would be a massive investigation.
Tracking Movements and Evacuations by SWAT

During the afternoon hours, the command post attempted to keep updated on the movements and evacuations of the SWAT teams inside the school. Two SWAT marksmen on neighborhood roofs relayed information, as did investigators interviewing students evacuated from various classrooms and storage areas.

The staging and deployment of the various SWAT teams responding to Columbine were coordinated by Patrol Commander Brandt and Sgt. Black of the Littleton Police Department. As the secondary teams arrived, they were staged but not sent into the building until the first teams had made their initial sweep and had found the gunmen and the bodies in the library. (Fresh SWAT teams would be deployed later by the command center to sweep the building again looking for possible victims or suspects still hiding).

At 3:22 p.m., one unit of the Jefferson County SWAT team reported that they had made entry into the library. They had found one victim alive and were arranging for her evacuation. But there also were 12 bodies, two of whom matched the general description of the suspects, and numerous explosives. SWAT requested the Jefferson County Bomb Squad.

Fatalities Acknowledged

Two and possibly three fatalities had been discovered on the outside of the school. Six victims already had been rushed to area hospitals with life-threatening wounds, some whose wounds were so severe that medics referred to them as “DOA” (in all probability "deceased on arrival" at the hospital.) SWAT had reported a teacher with massive wounds had died in a science classroom. Adding the number of dead found in the library to the other known dead and adding the critically injured being transported to area hospitals, the command post announced that fatalities of the Columbine tragedy could be as many as 25. “Up to 25 dead” was the number reluctantly passed on to the media as Sheriff Stone and Public Information Officer Steve Davis held a 4 p.m. news briefing.

Final Sweeps

The SWAT teams had just finished a grueling physical and emotional search of Columbine High School. They had cleared a 250,000 square-foot building with 75 classrooms on two different levels and 25 exterior doors. Searching the school could be compared to searching 100 homes that are 2,500 (average size house) square feet in size. On a normal school day,
the building would be populated with 1,945 students, 120 teachers and 20 staff members.

SWAT teams do not generally search buildings for two to four hours. Taking into account the SWAT teams' fatigue, as well as the size and expanse of Columbine High School, the command post was concerned that the first teams could have overlooked innocent victims or suspects still hiding somewhere in the building. Reports from the preliminary investigation included numerous opinions of a third, and possibly more, gunman. The command post called for fresh SWAT teams and 60 to 80 officers stepped forward.

There were unexploded bombs throughout the building, outside on the school grounds and in some of the vehicles in the student parking lots. Members of the bomb squad accompanied the SWAT teams on their final sweeps beginning later that night. The teams did not find any additional persons and cleared the school at about 11:50 p.m.
Critical Issues -- First Response

By noon or shortly after, all of the pieces of the response puzzle were in place. In the very first minutes of the incident and over the next several hours, many obstacles and concerns came to light that needed to be addressed by those at the command post, including:

- **Number of Shooters** – At one time or another, the number of shooters believed to be involved in the incident ranged from two to eight. Differing descriptions of the gunmen, different reports of their locations inside the school, the sheer volume of calls received about sightings and knowledge related to the incident, different observations made by law enforcement officers around the school, the number of explosions occurring, and the number of victims all played a part in the challenge to identify how many shooters were involved and where they were in the school. Additionally, there were erroneous reports that a suspect had left the school.

- **Entry into Building** -- Sheriff’s deputies began arriving at Columbine High School within minutes of the attack. The deputy assigned to the school engaged one of the suspects in a gun battle as soon as he stepped out of his patrol car. Acting on years of training, other deputies hastily established a perimeter to prevent the escape of the gunmen. Deputies and officers from other agencies assisted escaping students to safety and rendered aid to the injured. The Sheriff’s SWAT commander arrived at the scene within 15 minutes of the first shots that were fired. He identified other tactical officers at the scene and began to assemble an ad hoc team representing three agencies. Officers who did not know one another, much less having trained together, entered the school not knowing how many suspects they might face, their locations, whether hostages had been taken, and with their sensory and communication abilities severely impaired. Meanwhile other officers and SWAT teams arrived to assist amid reports of possible snipers and multiple shooters wearing body armor and armed with automatic weapons and explosives. The long-established SWAT practice of “time, talk, and tactics” was discarded out of necessity.

- **Containment** – One of the most significant challenges in any law enforcement situation is the containment of a scene. In a situation such as the one faced at Columbine, it is critical to the safety of the public at large that the gunmen not escape. On April 20, law enforcement established a perimeter around the school within minutes of their arrival. Deputies moved into positions to rescue and provide protection for the many children who ran to them for safety, to protect other people who might try to rush into the school, and to prevent the gunmen from getting out. If portions of the perimeter were not in place around the school, the suspects could have slipped out one of the building’s 25 exits – potentially harming innocent students and staff seeking safety away from the school and also taking their wrath into the larger community.

When the gunmen’s bodies were discovered in the school library with self-inflicted gunshot wounds, law enforcement also found numerous unexploded devices, knives, firearms and rounds of live ammunition, more than enough to kill all 56 people initially in the library. By the number of weapons and ammunition found with them, it was apparent that Harris and Klebold were prepared to kill or maim many more than the 13 who died at their hands that day. The number of law enforcement officers on scene within minutes of the reported shootings plus the entry of SWAT inside the school minutes before their suicides denied the gunmen additional time to plan further actions or take other lives or hostages.

- **Escaping Suspect(s)** – There was a report that a suspect had escaped the school. Law enforcement officers on scene were concerned of who might be behind them and who might be a threat to those groups of students they were protecting. An additional concern was that if a suspect escaped Columbine High School, where was he or she going and what was the next target?

- **Medical Assistance for Victims** – The continued flow of injured victims to medical assistance was being accomplished
by transporting victims to one of four triage sites set up in the area. After receiving emergency medical aid, the injured were transported to one of six regional hospitals. Shortly after noon, medical personnel came in too close to the school to rescue several wounded students and were fired on by at least one suspect. Law enforcement personnel provided cover fire to protect the students’ evacuation. As the situation progressed, medical personnel moved closer to the school in order to get medical assistance to the wounded as quickly as possible.

- **Sniper(s)** – There were reports of snipers on the roof of the school, which could have had an effect on the response and the ability to approach the scene. As it turned out, there was an innocent person on the roof of Columbine High School but, at the time, the proper assumption was that he or she was a suspect/sniper.

- **Bombs** – There were continued reports of bombs exploding -- a diversionary device near Wadsworth Boulevard and Ken Caryl Avenue, outside the school, inside the school, and the discovery of two car bombs in the student parking lot set on timers. Bomb technicians investigating the initial diversionary bombs realized that similar bombs with timers and motion-activated devices could have been placed at the school and relayed that information to the command post. Ultimately, bomb technicians responded from several different agencies to safely handle explosive devices as the incident progressed.

- **Hostages** – There were numerous reports of hostages throughout the school. This information came from people within the school and from law enforcement officers who interpreted their observations. Even as late at 2:26 p.m., a report of possible hostages inside the school was relayed. Throughout the incident, every room and every contact was managed as though it was a potential hostage situation. When there was no active gunfire, the likelihood that there was a hostage taker with hostages increased with each passing moment.

- **Fleeing Students** – Somehow, fleeing students of Columbine High School needed to be gathered and interviewed about their observations of what was occurring in and around the school. Potentially, some of the fleeing students could be accomplices of the crime that was occurring.

- **Fire** – Littleton Fire Department was responsible for the management of the emergency medical treatments and the preparations for a possible fire or explosion inside of the school. At least one fire was handled by the fire sprinkler system in the school but there remained the potential for more serious fires and explosions. Adding to the concerns were reports of natural gas odors in the building and the possibility of a natural gas leak.

- **Arriving Parents** – As word spread of the shootings at Columbine High School, parents were responding to the area to obtain information on the welfare of their children. The challenge of how to assist the parents of close to 2,000 students and continue to manage the incident unfolding at the high school was staggering. Leawood Elementary School and Columbine Public Library were used as central points to reunite parents with their children and as points where the Jefferson County School District could disseminate information about the whereabouts of students.

- **Evacuations** – As the incident seemed to grow in size and complexity, the need for evacuations of innocent parties became evident. For their own safety and for the protection of the public, homes and curious people too close to the area were evacuated.

- **Media** – Public Information Officer Steve Davis arrived and coordinated the release of information through Sheriff Stone and Undersheriff Dunaway. Hourly briefings were held to accommodate the need for the information. Also, television helicopters were initially hovering around the school to get their story. While the news helicopters assisted law enforcement personnel, later they ventured closer to the scene and were fired upon.
enforcement by surveying the rooftops and the grounds, there was also the concern that images aired live might be seen by suspects inside the school. Those suspects might be watching the television broadcasts while in the school and would be able to anticipate or react to the actions of law enforcement outside.

- **Investigation** – Lt. John Kiekbusch of the Sheriff’s Office Investigation Unit coordinated the start-up of the investigation and utilized investigators from numerous agencies to collect and report information coming out of the school, interview witnesses, secure crime scenes related to the crimes (homes of the suspects, etc.), and prepare warrants based on initial interviews. The Jefferson County Critical Incident Team for officer-involved shootings was also activated.

- **Traffic** – With most of Pierce Street, Bowles Avenue, Fair Avenue and the surrounding neighborhoods at a standstill, it was imperative to keep citizens out of the area while still allowing authorized personnel into the area. Additionally, a clear path had to be established for ambulances transporting victims to area hospitals.

- **Alarms** – The piercing sound of alarms going off in the school was a hindrance to law enforcement personnel trying to search inside. The control panels to shut off the alarms were in an unsecured area of the school so the alarms could not be silenced until much later in the afternoon.

- **Other Potential Sites** – The command post personnel worried that, if an organized group had put together the plan of the tragedy now unfolding at Columbine High School, other places might be targeted as well. If the enemy was an organized terrorist group, a similar incident or a “phase two” might take place at a nearby high school. Additionally, there was the possibility that the situation at Columbine was intended to divert law enforcement from other crimes to be executed elsewhere. If either of those scenarios became reality, law enforcement would have to respond and also deploy resources to those sites. Strategies to deal with another incident that might occur simultaneously were discussed by several commanders to ensure a response if the need did arise.

- **Suspect Homes** – After it was determined that Harris and Klebold were potential suspects, investigators and bomb technicians were dispatched to respond to their homes and secure the scenes at the residence and adjacent neighborhood until search warrants could be obtained.

- **Crime Scene** – Even before the incident was over, lab and evidence personnel were already planning the processing and handling of the crime scene. They had to consider not only the school itself, but the suspects’ homes, the site of the diversionary devices and the school grounds and surrounding areas had to be addressed.

- **Responding Agencies** – Individuals as well as agencies came to the aid of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office on April 20. The organization of the responders into worthwhile, functional components ensured that all of the tasks at hand were accomplished.

- **Continuing Updates From Within the School** – As the incident progressed, further reports of possible hostages and locations of the shooters continued, often conflicting with other reports also being received. The differing reports, combined with the time necessary to safely evacuate students and staff from locked and barricaded areas, slowed the search of the school.

- **SWAT Tactics** – Due to Lt. Walcher’s seven years of previous experience on the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office SWAT team, he knew what tactics and building search methods were being used. In the past, the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Office SWAT team has trained where there have been “active shooters” or “target rooms” that had to be immediately assaulted. However, shortly after noon on April 20, the reports of active shooters declined (while still receiving reports of hostages) leading everyone to assume that the shooters were taking hostages and/or setting up for law enforcement personnel. As Investigator Al Simmons later told Walcher, “around every corner or through every door, I thought the gunfight was on.”

This search, in such a large building, was a slow process. Rescuing students and staff in barricaded rooms where they would not open the doors, checking ceilings for potential suspects, checking all evacuees for weapons (who might be one of the suspects), evacuating students in the safest way possible to ensure they could not be injured by potential remaining suspects, and working around explosive devices that were located throughout the school were some of the challenges that SWAT teams had to deal with. Additional challenges included the distracting noise of the alarms, choking smoke that obstructed their vision, and ankle deep water in some areas as a result of active fire sprinklers.
Communication Problems

One of the technical limitations that surfaced during the Columbine shootings on April 20 was the difficulty for separate agencies to communicate directly with one another. With 46 separate agencies responding, it was inevitable that they would be operating on different emergency radio channels, and in different parts of the radio spectrum or bandwidth.

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and Littleton Fire Department, the two primary response agencies, both operated on VHF frequencies. The Colorado State Patrol also used VHF, but the Denver and Lakewood Police Departments and West Metro Fire Protection District used Ericsson 800 megahertz (MHz). Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office and Littleton Police Department used an analog 800 MHz system while Douglas County Sheriff’s Office uses a digital 800 MHz “trunked” format.

With such varying systems being used, not only were agencies prevented from communicating directly with each other, but groups with similar functions also could not communicate via radio. Ideally, groups with the same responsibility, such as the various SWAT teams or those officers setting up inner or outer perimeters, would have their own channel to use in order to report and obtain vital information about their particular area.

Additionally, if all agencies are using the same system, a central, or command, channel is established by the lead agency as the single point to which all agencies could report. At Columbine, so many agencies using a variety of radio channels and systems prevented the establishment of such a common command channel.

The inability to establish a common channel for all responders to use during Columbine also has a positive side. The use of a single radio channel would not have fixed all problems. The number of radios in use during the incident would have created an immediate bottleneck if all agencies were attempting to use a single channel. Keeping communications separate between law enforcement, fire and emergency responders helped minimize the confusion and overload that would have occurred on one single channel.

Without a common command channel, each agency had to communicate independently, or attempt to use one of the normal mutual aid channels such as ITAC (International Tactical Channel), CLEER (Colorado Law Enforcement Emergency Radio), NLEEC (National Law Enforcement Emergency Channel) or FERN (Fire Emergency Radio Network).

Each agency communicated predominantly with its own dispatch center. Communications between agencies often had to be relayed through their dispatch center, or through an agency...
representative at the incident command post.

This emergency procedure to communicate vital information was established out of necessity and, although somewhat cumbersome, the approach worked. The fact that numerous separate agencies did not have common radio channels did not hinder their ability to respond.

![Columbine High School April 20, 1999 Primary Response Agencies](image)

**Primary Response Agencies**

- Jefferson S.O. V.H.F.
- Littleton Fire V.H.F.

**Mutual Aid Agencies**

- West Metro Fire Ericsson 800 mHz
- Denver Police Ericsson 800 mHz
- Arapahoe S.O. 800 mHz Analog
- Douglas S.O. 800 mHz Digital
- Lakewood Police Ericsson 800 mHz
- Colo. State Patrol V.H.F.
- Littleton Police 800 mHz Analog

**Mutual Aid Frequencies**

- ITAC 800 mHz All 800 Users
- CLEER 450 mHz U.H.F.
- NLEEC 150 mHz V.H.F.
- FERN 150 mHz V.H.F.
SWAT

Special Weapons and Tactics

The Jefferson County Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team is a group of highly trained, specially equipped deputies from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and the Arvada and Golden Police Departments. The team is utilized in high-risk incidents where disciplined teamwork, specialized weapons and tactical skills are required.

The SWAT team that first gathered at Columbine High School on April 20 was an ad hoc team of 12 SWAT officers from three different agencies who were the first to respond, individually, to the high school scene. Many had never met before they entered the school together shortly after noon. Most did not have their tactical gear and equipment with them.

Ad Hoc SWAT Team formed

Lt. Terry Manwaring, SWAT commander for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, had been patrolling in the Tiny Town area in the foothills 13 miles to the west of Columbine. On hearing reports of shots fired at Columbine High School, he immediately headed to the school, calling for the Jefferson County SWAT team and the command staff to be paged.

Arriving on Pierce Street, the street that runs in front of the high school, he noticed teenagers gathering in groups along the curbside. Some of them, recalled Manwaring, were hysterical. Several appeared to be in a daze. Others were trying to comfort their friends.

Also parked on Pierce Street north of the school was Jefferson County Sergeant Phil Hy. Hy was attempting to coordinate on scene and arriving units from both law enforcement and fire and emergency agencies. The sergeant was also trying to listen and make sense of the radio traffic exploding on the airwaves. He briefed the SWAT commander on what he was hearing as well as giving him an assessment of perimeter security and the shooting and suspect information currently available.

Emerging, and often conflicting, information was being reported to the Jefferson County Dispatch Center. There were shooters in the cafeteria, in the library, in the science room. There were six to eight heavily armed gunmen in body armor. The gunmen were mobile and active. There were 17 hostages being held in the auditorium. There were snipers. There were shooters outside the building.

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Lt. David Walcher arrived on scene followed by Undersheriff
John Dunaway. The Undersheriff, as chief operations officer, named Walcher the incident commander and authorized the emergency ad hoc SWAT team to immediately enter the school.

As Manwaring was gathering his tactical gear, Deputies Del Kleinschmidt, a Jefferson County K-9 team member, and Allen Simmons of the Jefferson County SWAT team arrived. Manwaring told Simmons to locate as many SWAT officers as he could find because SWAT was to make an entry into the school as quickly as possible. Two more SWAT officers from the Littleton Police Department had now responded to Jefferson County’s call for mutual aid and they would accompany Manwaring in the first approach.

Manwaring’s knowledge of the school’s layout was based on the original floor plan when the cafeteria was on the east side of the school. He did not know that a major remodel four years before had relocated the cafeteria, and the school library, to the far west side.

Manwaring noticed several boys standing around and asked them to sketch a floor plan of the school. “Something quick so that I could see what this school looked like on the inside.”

At about this time, information was aired regarding a person on the roof of the school and a warning that this person was a possible sniper. If SWAT’s task seemed difficult before this announcement, it was even more so now.

Capt. Vincent DiManna, SWAT commander for the Denver Police Department, also arrived at the school in response to the call for assistance. DiManna had four other Denver SWAT officers with him. While preparing to accompany Manwaring’s first group of SWAT toward the school, DiManna also had a more personal concern weighing heavily on him. His son was among the 1,945 students at Columbine High School and possibly could still be inside the school.

Despite the fact that the first makeshift team was not fully equipped with their usual SWAT gear – several were lacking vests and weapons and there were only two protective shields among them – at approximately 12 noon Manwaring and his hastily assembled team of Jefferson County, Denver and Littleton SWAT moved forward. With a hurriedly-drawn map and conflicting information, Manwaring led the first contingent of SWAT officers to Columbine High School to search for unknown gunmen among nearly 2,000 students, faculty and staff.

Nearby, parked on Pierce Street, was a Littleton fire truck. The SWAT team used the truck as cover as they approached the school. Kleinschmidt volunteered to drive and gave his tactical ballistic vest to Deputy Simmons, whose SWAT gear was back at headquarters. Simmons would be leading the first SWAT group into the building. Kleinschmidt, driving the fire truck, relied only on his regular duty vest for protection.

Search For Shooter

The SWAT officers, now numbering 12, moved alongside the fire truck southbound in the middle of Pierce Street, heading for the school.
Manwaring split the group into two teams and assigned Simmons as one team leader. Simmons was directed to take his team of six into the school on the east side, into what Manwaring still thought was the cafeteria area.

Kleinschmidt pulled the fire truck as close to the school’s front doors as possible and Simmons, with SWAT members from Littleton and Denver police departments, entered the school through a door just south of the main entrance. They were immediately met by the deafening sound of Klaxon horns and the flashing lights of the fire alarm system. Smoke and fumes posed another potential hazard for the team.

Manwaring’s team was providing cover as Simmon’s team entered, watching the windows, doors and the “high ground” of the rooftops. Manwaring realized that if there were snipers on the roof, his team following the fire truck was fully exposed. But he also knew they needed to make their way to the west side of the school where reports of wounded students and continuing gunfire urgently pressed upon them.

As the fire truck approached the main east entrance doors, a person in the school’s office area placed his hands against the window. The team could see the pair of hands come up to the window, then disappear again. The potential for a hostage situation now existed.

Moments later, a student came out of the main doors with his hands held above his head. He ran to Manwaring, was quickly checked for weapons and injuries, then put on the floor in the back end of the truck’s cab. (There was no other cover for the boy’s protection or any means of removing him from the scene at this point). The boy reported that no other people were in the office area.

**Simmons’ team now inside the school** immediately began searching and clearing classrooms. Hallways led to the west and to the south from their point of entry. In order to expedite the search of the school, the six-man team split into two smaller teams. It was immediately apparent that additional officers were needed to effectively clear such a large number of classrooms.

Locked doors were an obstacle the team constantly encountered and delayed the pace of the search. Each lock had to be forcibly opened, every locked door had to be entered and each room searched before the team could move on to another classroom. Behind every closed door were potential victims, suspects or hostages and, therefore, no room could be overlooked or passed by.

Simmons provided cover for several officers as they moved down the east hallway entering and searching each classroom. The other “mini-team” moved down the south hallway, eventually turning down another hallway and proceeding west.

Because of the extremely high volume of noise being made by the fire alarm klaxons, the officers had to communicate with hand signals. With their sense of hearing taken away, they
could not hear any sounds of movement or aggression. They had to operate under the premise that around every corner, and inside every classroom, there was the distinct possibility of confronting armed suspects.

At this point, several more Denver SWAT officers appeared at the outside entry door and Simmons motioned them inside. With additional supporting officers providing cover, Simmons’ mini-team evacuated a teacher from one of the classrooms. They then moved to the north and entered the large open area of the school’s main entrance. The interior doors and windows were riddled with bullet holes. As they approached the administration offices on the north side of the main entrance, they observed a bullet hole in a television set mounted from the ceiling, and bullet holes in a window frame and window. A computer monitor had a bullet hole through the screen and racks of shelves had been knocked over. Searching the offices, Simmons’ team found two adult female staff members and evacuated them out the east side, believed to be the safest evacuation route.

**Medical Evacuation**

On the outside of the school, Manwaring’s team continued toward the northwest corner of the building. Aerial television footage, shot live as the event was unfolding, captured the images of the lime green fire truck and its band of SWAT members making their way around the north perimeter of the school to the west side.

Kleinschmidt drove the fire truck to the school’s west side where the team saw two victims laying outside near the west, upper level doors. The young man was waving one of his arms in the air.

Using the truck as a shield, the group inched forward but could only get the truck to the sidewalk and no closer. Two Denver SWAT members, Capt. DiManna and Lt. Pat Phelan, rescued student Richard Castaldo as other SWAT officers and deputies provided them with cover. Richard was carried to the front of the fire truck and placed on the front bumper out of the line of any fire. Unconscious and with shallow breathing, the student appeared to have bullet wounds to the chest.
Jefferson County Deputy Scott Taborsky was maintaining a perimeter cover position from behind his patrol car in the grass field directly behind the SWAT team’s location. He already had transported several wounded students out of the area to triage locations. Taborsky drove up close to the fire truck and SWAT officers put Richard in the back seat of his patrol car.

Manwaring’s SWAT team made another approach to the upper level west doors to rescue the female victim. Rachel Scott was brought back to the fire truck by the team, but they realized the girl was deceased. They laid her on the ground near the fire truck.

The team went a third time, protected by cover fire, this time in an attempt to rescue a boy lying motionless at the bottom of the concrete stairs leading to the south parking lot. They returned without him, advising the rest of the officers that Daniel Rohrbrough was deceased.

Taborsky, advised that the other victims were deceased, raced Richard Castaldo out of the area to medical assistance.
Tactics

Manwaring’s team observed an undetonated explosive device lying in front of the same west doors where they had just rescued Richard and retrieved Rachel’s body. Because of the bomb, the SWAT commander decided to use the fire truck to ram the west doors, providing the team entry into the school.

“If the bombs goes off,” Manwaring thought, “maybe the truck can take the brunt of the bomb blast since it’s carrying about 1,000 gallons of water.”

The pursuit of this short-lived plan ended when the fire truck became stuck in the mud. With the early spring weather, much of the ground was extremely soft, saturated with spring rains and snow. The fire truck was buried in the muck and the more the driver tried to maneuver it, the deeper its tires sank.

Jefferson County SWAT Team - SWAT TEAM MOVEMENT DIAGRAMS

The Jefferson County SWAT team, led by Sgt. Barry Williams, arrived at the command post at Leawood Avenue and Pierce Street about 12:30 p.m.

Williams knew that Manwaring was on the west side of the high school and Simmons and other SWAT officers had entered the building on the east side. Any other information he could gather was sketchy. Reports being relayed to the command post included possible multiple shooters, a hostage situation, and gunfire and explosions in nearly every wing of the school building. Students on cell phones inside the school were calling out – to 911, their parents, and several times to local television stations. Because of the noise, smoke and panic inside, many of the students calling from within reported hearing shots close to their own location – whether in the gymnasium, the auditorium, the business wing, the music rooms, the science areas and the business offices.

At 12:50 p.m., Williams’ team utilized a front-end loader owned by a private construction firm working in the area and used it to approach the school on the west side. Two SWAT marksmen were deployed to high ground positions on rooftops of houses on West Polk Avenue, the first neighborhood street just south of the school. From their vantage point, these SWAT members had a clear view of the south parking lot, the library windows and the cafeteria area.

The rest of the team, using the front-end loader as cover, moved into position on the northwest corner of the school, opposite from where the first ad hoc SWAT team had entered. Williams and his group were briefed by members of Manwaring’s team who advised them that students had been shot, numerous bombs had exploded and the number of suspects, still in the building, was unknown. They explained that Simmons’ team had entered on the east side but no one had yet entered on the west.

The SWAT members also confirmed that activity had been reported in both the cafeteria and
the library. Because a "live" bomb blocked the outside west doors leading into the upper level hallway and entrance to the library, the closest point of entry was into the cafeteria, one of the "hot zones," directly beneath the library. A window, which actually went into the teachers' lounge next to the cafeteria, provided Williams' SWAT team entry into the building.

**Entry Into Lower Level**

Williams’ team smashed the window glass and entered the teachers’ lounge at about 1:09 p.m. They were met with the deafening noise of fire alarms and the sight of flashing strobe lights, hanging ceiling tiles and three inches of water coming in under the closed door to the cafeteria. The alarms and the sprinkler system had been set off by the explosions and the cafeteria area and adjacent rooms were flooding, either from the sprinkler system or from broken water pipes as well. Another concern was “a hissing sound and the sound of something spraying.” It was feared that the sound might be from a broken natural gas line.

The team secured the small lounge and then opened the door into the cafeteria. Williams described the sight that met them as surrealistic—tiles and wires broken and hanging at odd angles from a ceiling blackened by explosions and fire, water three to four inches deep and rising, and several hundred backpacks and food trays, left behind as terrified students had fled the lunchroom.

**Rescue and Evacuation**

One part of Williams' team stayed at the cafeteria entrances to protect against any suspects escaping or ambushing the other SWAT members who moved to the school’s kitchen area and food storage rooms to the left. Just as Simmons’ team had encountered on the east side,
Williams’ team found every door locked. Again, each door had to be breached and searched before the team could proceed further.

To their surprise, the SWAT officers started finding groups of frightened students, hiding in ankle deep water in the kitchen storage rooms. The students were slow to respond to directions from the SWAT team; it was difficult for the men to convince them that it was safe to leave their hiding places and follow these people, dressed in black, to the outside. SWAT members were stationed in positions to get the students out of the building and to safety.

A line of officers provided protection and direction all along the evacuation route, covering each person being evacuated in case the shooting started again. The procedure was to send each group being evacuated out of the building from the same place, if possible, so that the officers receiving them on the outside were not unduly surprised by someone coming out from another direction.

Approximately 20 to 30 students were evacuated from the kitchen area. From the kitchen and storage rooms, the team moved to the freezers where they found two adult males – shivering from the extreme cold and barely able to move their arms.

Evacuating the kitchen area was fairly simple, Williams said, because the students and adults were directed the short distance through the cafeteria to the teacher’s lounge and out the window to waiting officers outside. Evacuation became more difficult the further the SWAT team moved into the building because more and more officers were required to provide protection to those being evacuated. Denver SWAT assisted by stationing an increasing number of its officers in place behind the Jefferson County team.

Most of the people were evacuated through the teachers’ lounge window (and later the cafeteria side door) and up the outside concrete stairs to the protection of waiting officers and patrol cars. The team knew that students would be running by at least two bodies of the children who had been killed outside. Officers instructed each student to follow the person directly in front of him or her, not to look at anything else and follow the line of officers to safety.

SWAT had been advised that the suspects might be trying to escape the building by changing their clothes and blending in with those being evacuated. For the safety of everyone, all students were checked for weapons as well as for injuries before they were transported from the scene.

Conflicting Reports

After clearing the kitchen area, Williams’ SWAT team now entered into the main cafeteria area and was told by dispatch that there might be bombs hidden in backpacks inside the school. The team was looking at 400 backpacks, some of them floating in the water flooding the cafeteria. The reports also cautioned that since the diversionary bombs on Wadsworth had been equipped with timing and motion-activated devices, some of the bombs at the school also could be
assembled with such devices, complicating the situation. Coupled with the possibility of a break in the natural gas lines, the team was forced to proceed with extreme caution.

The team finished clearing the cafeteria and moved out into the hallway. At this point the water was estimated by some of the members to be at least four inches deep. The auditorium and a long hallway extended to the east.

At 1:37 p.m., the same SWAT team received information that the suspects might be in the business offices on the lower level. A subsequent report advised that gunmen might be in the band room or hiding in the catwalk above the auditorium.

Still another report surfaced of a wounded teacher “in the science area.” Yet another report advised him of a party giving CPR to a wounded individual “in the library.” But Williams had difficulty getting directions to the science area or library, and he was not clear on which level of the school the wounded were located. The SWAT leader had sufficient radio communication inside the school with both Simmons’ team sweeping the upper level from the east side and with the second group of his own team. He was able to keep abreast of where everyone was in the building and what they were doing. However, his communication with the command post was limited because of the amount of radio traffic and the deafening noise inside the school.

Internal Deployment

At this point, the Jefferson County team split into two, one five-man group went to the lower level of the auditorium, directly off the cafeteria, and held that position while the second group cleared the business and computer wing.

The first group, made up of four Jefferson County deputies and two Denver officers, found an elderly adult, possibly a substitute teacher, and a student hiding together under a desk in one of the last rooms of the wing. Both were evacuated out a south side door to the Lakewood SWAT team waiting on the outside.

The second part of the Jefferson County team continued to search the lower level of the auditorium. The team forcibly opened locked dressing rooms, checked the areas above suspicious broken ceiling tiles, and cleared storage areas. While they were clearing the auditorium, more Denver SWAT officers arrived to assist. They held two lower rooms off the auditorium as the Jefferson County SWAT group cleared the control room and a closet containing choir robes.

No one on the lower level of the auditorium was found. During the auditorium search, however, the team received word that 60 students were hiding in the music room closet on the upper level outside the auditorium. Because they had found the choir robes, the team felt they must be close to the music room where the students were reported to be hiding. They made their way to the second level and into the music room, continuing to search and secure all areas along the way.
Once in the music room, the team found a locked storage closet. They saw movement through a window into the room and what appeared to be a hand, but no one would respond as SWAT called out to them. True to the report they had received, the team discovered nearly 60 students inside the closet. The students were so terrified that they initially refused to leave, possibly confusing the SWAT officers with the suspects.

The SWAT team checked to make sure no suspects were among them and then devised a plan to remove them from the closet in groups of 10. Each group of students had a point man, wingman and a rear guard so that they could be evacuated safely by SWAT to the west side through the auditorium and kitchen, which were still being held by Denver SWAT officers. They were told to keep their hands on top of their heads.

After those 60 students were moved out of the school to safety, the team moved into an area across the hallway and adjacent to the music room where more movement had been observed in yet another room. An additional 60 students were found in two rooms in that area and moved out of the building.

Meanwhile, Simmons’ SWAT team had cleared rooms in the southeast section of the school and cleared the main administrative offices on the east side of the building where they located two adult females. The team then moved north and searched the band room, ceramic and wood shop rooms, and then west down the main hallway to the weight room and gymnasium.

During the search, Simmons maintained radio contact with Williams, providing him with information on Simmons’ team location and the progress being made. He also relayed information to the Denver and Littleton SWAT officers with Simmons so that all SWAT personnel in the building were aware of each team’s location and activities. Knowing the location of each team, as well as having direct radio communication, reduced the danger of creating a crossfire situation and enabled the teams to coordinate their search efforts.

Williams’ group made their way up the stairway from the cafeteria area to the second or main level. Immediately, they started to see remnants of pipe bombs. They also realized that the stairway leading to the second floor was glass, wide open and provided no protection from any shooter as the team moved forward.

Reports from the marksmen positioned on rooftops outside were of a sign in one of the school’s windows. It read “1 bleeding to death.” Williams reasoned that the person bleeding to death must be somewhere on the upper level since SWAT had just finished clearing the lower floor. However, they still did not know in what room the wounded person was located. A further message from dispatch said that there possibly was a rag or a T-shirt tied on the door handle to mark the room where the wounded teacher lay bleeding.

The SWAT team proceeded cautiously around bomb materials lying on the floor as they worked their way to the second or main floor of the school. At about 2:30 p.m., the team cleared the stairs to the upper level. Once on the upper level, they could see Simmons’ team working...
They could also see a rag, tied as reported onto the handle of a classroom door. Painted on the wall alongside were the words, “Science Rooms.” The team faced several obstacles to reach the classroom door and make entry. The top of the stairs opened into an intersection of two hallways, one leading to the library on the west and one to the science and foreign language areas straight ahead and to the east. A pipe bomb had exploded and singed the carpet in front of them. Glass had shattered everywhere. There was blood in a large area on the carpet in front of them, on one of the windows, and blood made a trail into one of the other science rooms. Live ammunition rounds and spent casings were lying on the floor.

**Teacher Dave Sanders**

Around 2:40 p.m., the SWAT team entered Room UA-24 first, then proceeded to adjoining classrooms where they found about 30 students hiding behind tables they had set on end as barricades. Two of the students were helping a teacher who had been shot and was bleeding. Realizing the severity of the man’s wounds, the SWAT team immediately called for a paramedic.

Two Littleton paramedics, with medical equipment and a gurney, were staged and waiting for the signal to enter the school at the east doors. Because the hallway and classrooms leading to the science area had not been secured and it was considered too dangerous to send the paramedics in from that entrance, Williams continued to ask for a paramedic on the west side. The route on the west side through the cafeteria and up the stairs had been cleared and remained protected by Denver SWAT.

The students and teachers in the science rooms with Sanders were evacuated. Two Eagle Scouts, Aaron Hancey and Kevin Starkey, had administered first aid to Sanders and were reluctant to leave the teacher behind. While one SWAT officer led the evacuation, a second stayed with Sanders, never leaving his side, talking with him and applying pressure bandages to his wounds until the other officer came back.

The people evacuated from the science rooms were first sent down the stairway to the landing, where they were grouped together on the landing until SWAT could confirm the safety of the evacuation route. The students and staff were then moved from the landing through the cafeteria and out the side door. Throughout this process, the location of the gunmen was unknown.

While the world cheered as they watched television images of children escaping unharmed from the school, the two SWAT deputies with Sanders decided to move him closer to an exit route. After waiting for what they estimated to be 20 to 30 minutes, they decided a paramedic was not coming or could not get in, and that they would need to evacuate the wounded teacher themselves or at least move him closer to an exit.

Their plan was to take him out a door over to the staircase, down the stairs through the
cafeteria and out the side door, basically following the same route as the students just evacuated. They put Sanders on a chair so that they could move him easier and pushed him through the back doors of the science rooms into a storage area. Before they could move him from the storage room, a Denver paramedic arrived in the room. He had entered through the west side of the school and past SWAT where he was directed to Sanders. He advised the deputies that there was no pulse and, therefore, nothing more they could do. Dave Sanders had died.

The deputies left Sanders with the paramedic to join the rest of their SWAT team continuing to search the other science room areas. They found an additional 50 to 60 students and two teachers hiding in other darkened rooms to the east of Sanders’ location. Again, SWAT protection was set up for the evacuation of those students and teachers and they were evacuated, this time out the east side of the school.

The Library

Once the science rooms were cleared and secured, Williams’ team of Jefferson County and Denver SWAT officers made its way toward the library, the last area to be checked. Along the way, the team reported seeing gunshot holes in the windows, bomb fragments and shrapnel on the floor, more broken glass, and a pipe bomb embedded in the wall just outside the library door. The glass cases holding the school’s trophy displays just outside the library door and the windows into the library were shattered. To the left through the shattered windows, the team could see bodies on the library floor.

Four members of the Jefferson County SWAT team and one Denver officer entered the school library at 3:22 p.m. As soon as they stepped through the doors, they caught movement to the left. Student Lisa Kreutz, among three victims lying on the floor under desks, was moving slightly. She had been shot several times, but she was alive. SWAT team members reassured her that she would be okay and called for the paramedics.

While the Denver officer held the entrance, the four Jefferson County members spread out and worked their way through the library among bombs and bodies. They stepped over numerous bombs trying to get to each one of the children.

As they worked their way through the library, several SWAT members saw two males on the floor in the southwest portion. Their bodies were next to one another and both had gunshot wounds to the head. The wounds appeared to be self-inflicted. Guns and numerous explosive devices lay on the floor next to them. The command post was advised that the two males matched the description of the suspects.

The Deceased and the Injured

Williams’ SWAT team was still searching the library when a female employee came out from
her hiding place in a back office of the library. The SWAT leader took her by the arm and told her to put her hand on the back of one of the SWAT officers, look only at his back and follow him out of the library. She was quickly passed off to another officer and evacuated to safety.

The SWAT officers inside the library worked their way to the back emergency door that led to the outside upper level near the west entrance. Several bombs were laying inside the doorway, but the first priority was to get a team of paramedics into the library to attend to Lisa Kreutz. Two paramedics with a backboard entered the library through the back door, put the wounded student on it and quickly got her out of the library and to medical triage.

The other SWAT teams, searching in other parts of the school building, heard over the radio that William’s group had made it to the library and had found a female still alive. They worked their way towards the library.

A second female teacher, hiding under a desk in a west room of the library, was found by SWAT. She was badly traumatized and had suffered a shoulder injury. Two other employees had moved to the back rooms of the library and hid in cupboards and behind furniture until they were rescued by SWAT.

Williams reported that SWAT had found at least 10 other bodies in the library. The command post quickly added the 12 reported dead in the library to the two and possibly three fatalities discovered on the outside of the school. Six victims already had been sent to area hospitals with life-threatening wounds, some of whom were referred to as probably deceased. SWAT had also reported a teacher with massive wounds had died in the science area. Adding the number of dead found in the library to the other known dead and adding the critically injured transported to hospitals, the incident commander told the Sheriff that fatalities could be as many as 25. “Up to 25 dead” was the number reluctantly passed on to the media as Sheriff Stone and Public Information Officer Steve Davis held a 4 p.m. news briefing.

Due to the number of explosive devices and weapons on the library floor, Williams’ team ordered everyone else out of the library and requested the Jefferson County bomb squad respond to the scene. Jefferson County and Denver SWAT were posted at the front and back doors for scene protection and safety.

Dr. Christopher Colwell, attending emergency room physician at Denver Health Medical Center, and a second paramedic were escorted through the library at 4:30 p.m. to check for any signs of life. The doctor and paramedic made a second sweep through the library and pronounced each of the 10 victims and two suspects deceased at 4:45 p.m. Colwell was also escorted to the science area where he pronounced Dave Sanders dead.

The library scene was turned over to the bomb squad officers and the Jefferson County SWAT team went to the east side of the school to meet with Manwaring, then to Leawood Elementary School for a debriefing. Other SWAT teams were relieved of their duties and went first to the command post and then to their own headquarters for debriefings.
The SWAT teams had just finished a very grueling physical and emotional search of Columbine High School. Fresh SWAT teams, each accompanied by a member of the bomb team, would conduct another sweep of the school later that night for any other explosive devices and for victims or suspects. The bodies of Harris and Klebold had been found but reports of additional gunmen continued. The question became whether additional gunmen could still be hiding inside the school or had someone else escaped.

**SWAT’s Tactical Command Post Moves Forward**

After the Jefferson County SWAT team arrived with adequate personnel and equipment to relieve Manwaring’s emergency team and to take over the engagement and the interior search of the school, Manwaring and the Denver SWAT officers regrouped. Williams, inside the school with both the Jefferson County and Denver SWAT, was finding and evacuating large groups of students hidden throughout the building.

Manwaring, accompanied by Lt. Phelan, Capt. DiManna and Lt. Frank Vessa of the Denver Police Department, left the school’s west side and went back to the incident command center on Pierce Street.

Manwaring was unprepared for what he encountered as he approached the east side of the school and Pierce Street two hours after he had led his team to the west side. The street was jammed with emergency, fire and law enforcement vehicles with media cars and satellite trucks filling up the rest of the spaces. Parents, students, the media, victim advocates, mental health professionals, curious neighbors and a portion of the nearly 1,000 first responders were gathered there.

The SWAT commanders collectively made the decision to establish a forward tactical command post away from the incident command post and the activity surrounding it. They obtained floor plans of the school and met with other commanders and school personnel to determine the current status of the incident and future tactical planning.

Representatives of Jefferson County, Arapahoe County, Lakewood, Littleton, Englewood and Denver Police Departments, and the FBI organized their information, command and areas of responsibility. Based on the information provided by each department’s SWAT commander, Manwaring crossed off areas of the school that had been searched, determined the current location of each team, and how they were progressing through the interior of the school.

The commanders told their teams to hold their positions until they could meet with their team leaders at the school’s east doors to reorganize and reassign areas of responsibility for a second sweep of the school interior. They wanted to make absolutely sure there were no more victims or suspects either injured or deliberately hiding in the building, that there were no more fatalities who had not been discovered and that all explosive devices, exploded or undetonated, had been located.
Communications

Almost as soon as the school was considered clear at 4:30 p.m., the sound of shots came once again from inside the building. One of the SWAT teams, while searching the cafeteria and then the kitchen areas, breached two locked doors by firing several rounds into the lock mechanisms. Unfortunately, because they were working on their own radio frequency and not able to communicate with other teams, they could not ask for permission to fire and were not able to tell anyone they were going to fire. Both rooms were unoccupied.

After the second sweeps were completed, the SWAT commanders from the Jefferson and Arapahoe County Sheriff’s offices, and Denver, Lakewood and Littleton Police Departments entered the school building to assess the scene. FBI SWAT initially maintained the exterior crime scene, Denver held the interior and the scene was relinquished to the Jefferson County Bomb Squad because of the explosive devices.

The initial SWAT teams were directed to Leawood Elementary School to meet with the Jefferson County Critical Incident Team investigators. The Critical Incident Team, also known as the “shoot team,” conducts its own complete investigation in incidents where an officer or deputy fires his or her weapon. Members of the team meet with each officer to determine how many shots were fired, at what target and if the action was justified.

A psychiatric team, on contract with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, also met briefly with the teams before they were relieved of their duties.

Supporting SWAT Teams Provide Valuable Assistance

Several members of other SWAT teams in the area responded to Jefferson County’s call for mutual aid. The first of several Littleton Police Department SWAT team members became part of the first team to enter the school on the east side. Once inside, they worked for 45 minutes to clear the immediate area. The rest of the Littleton SWAT team arrived and was briefed an hour later. The entire team formed the second wave to enter the school on the east side and assisted in searching the science, math and finance rooms on the second level.

Denver Police Department put out a call to respond to Columbine about 11:30 a.m. and members of its team also went with the first ad hoc SWAT group advancing on the school. Many of its members, armed with AR-15 rifles, provided suppression fire during attempts to rescue down and wounded students outside or assisted in the rescues themselves. Many also helped evacuate students from different areas of the school, assisting in establishing security protection for the evacuees, helped search and secure classrooms; provided cover as other SWAT team members freed them from the building, and assisted in clearing the roof of the school.

Lakewood Police Department’s first assignment was to check the roof. A sniper had been reported on the roof, and later discovered to be an air conditioning employee who barricaded
himself on the roof and waited for someone to rescue him.

A second assignment was to search the school’s parking lots and identify Harris and Klebold’s cars, because the command post had received reports that there might be bombs in them. Lakewood’s job was to locate the cars and then make sure no one got in them and drove away. In the south parking lot the team located a black two-door Honda with a “RAMSTEIN” sticker on the back windshield. Inside the vehicle in the back seat was a spherical propane tank.

While searching the south lot, the team also reported seeing a sign in a second floor window of the school that said, “I bleeding to death.” The Lakewood team relayed this information to the command post.

A dramatic episode for Lakewood SWAT occurred in the mid-afternoon. Patrick Ireland, with bullet wounds to the head and slipping in and out of consciousness, had slowly made his way to the library’s west window. Sheriff’s deputies, holding their perimeter positions in the south parking lot, first saw the injured male figure at the window and realized the young man was determined to come out the second-story window. There was nothing but a concrete sidewalk below to break his fall.

The deputies could see members of the Lakewood SWAT with an armored truck in the south parking lot. Frantically waving and yelling, they got SWAT’s attention. The image of the rescue of Patrick Ireland by the Lakewood SWAT has come to epitomize the Columbine tragedy. Using the roof of the armored car so they could reach him, SWAT caught the young man as he fell out the window at 2:38 p.m.

The Special Response Unit of the **Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office** responded to Columbine High School between 12 and 12:30 p.m. Officers assisted in securing and holding the northeast hallways and helped to evacuate students and faculty out of the school’s east side. The unit also was assigned to provide security for paramedics responding to the library and to escort fire personnel searching for the fire alarm panel in the cafeteria area. The unit was
relieved at 5 p.m.

SWAT officers from the **Englewood Department of Safety Services** responded by 1:45 p.m. and were assigned to assist in the rescue/evacuation of students who had been able to escape on the northwest side of building. Officers also helped maintain the perimeter on the west side of the school until it was determined that the suspects had been located and there was no longer a threat.

The **Boulder County Sheriff’s Department** SWAT team is made up of Sheriff’s deputies and police officers from the Lafayette and Erie Police Departments and volunteer paramedics. That team was paged for a full SWAT response to Columbine High School at 4 p.m. in order to assist with a second full search of the school.

Also paged was the SWAT team from the **Boulder Police Department**. Both teams arrived at the scene around 5:30 p.m. and staged on the northwest side of school. Because of the explosive devices in and around the outside of the school, the second group of SWAT teams did not make entry until later that evening. Both Boulder units searched the cafeteria or commons areas, the kitchen and auditorium, and an adjacent block of classrooms. Also assigned to their team was a bomb expert and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) personnel to operate an infrared device. As the tactical team cleared hallways and rooms, the DEA infrared team would follow, checking the walls and ceiling for an indication of anyone hiding. As the team would clear the rooms, a team leader would note the date, time and the team that had cleared the area.

Also assisting in the secondary sweep of the school were 22 SWAT officers from the **Northglenn** and **Thornton Police Departments**. According to their reports, they were instructed to conduct “a slow and very methodical search in hopes of finding any possible survivors, to address any casualty first aid needs, to record the location of any fatalities encountered, to record the location of all unexploded bombs and exploded bombs not previously tagged and finally to report and engage any hostiles they may encounter.” They were advised that two suspects might still be in the school.

The **FBI**’s SWAT moved to an entrance on the school’s east side around 2 p.m. where a paramedic ambulance was stationed. Jefferson County SWAT escorted students and teachers from the interior of the school to the FBI SWAT team, who formed a protective corridor to uniformed police officers located on Pierce Street. Those uniformed police officers then searched and evacuated the students through neighborhood yards to waiting school buses. The FBI SWAT also helped clear the math and computer classrooms beginning around 3 p.m. and then relieved Jefferson County SWAT officers on the perimeter around the crime scene. The FBI SWAT remained on the crime scene perimeter until relieved by tactical members from Colorado State Patrol (SORT) around 7 p.m.

Additional SWAT teams assisting in the secondary sweep of portions of the school were 12 members from **Adams County Sheriff’s Office** and 12 members from the **Commerce City**
The Layout of Columbine High School

Columbine High School is located at 6201 S. Pierce St. in Littleton, Colorado. The school, named for the south Jefferson County area in which it is located, had a student population of 1,945 at the time of the April 20, 1999, shootings.

The high school opened in 1973 and was remodeled and expanded in 1994 and 1995. The layout of the school was drastically changed following the remodel, with clusters of classrooms and a new cafeteria and library added to accommodate the growing population in south Jeffco.

The expanded Columbine High School is a 250,000-square-foot building on two levels, a total of 5.3 acres under cover, with 75 classrooms and 25 exterior doors. The lower level incorporates the cafeteria and food preparation areas, a teachers’ lounge, the first level of a two story-auditorium, and a wing of primarily business, foreign language and special education classrooms.

The upper, main level houses the school’s administration and counseling offices, the second level of the auditorium, the school library, an athletic wing and gymnasium, an art wing, and departmentalized areas for social studies, language arts, math, science and music, both vocal and instrumental.

The classrooms are clustered together according to department and each department has its own traffic circulation pattern. While major corridors divide the various departments, each departmental cluster also has side or U-shaped hallways into which the classrooms feed. Those unfamiliar with the school’s layout often describe it as a maze of classrooms and work or storage areas.

Additional rooms can often be found within a classroom. For instance, the instrumental music area has an office and three practice rooms feeding into it. There are 16 different individual workrooms, offices or storage closets off the art area. Each of those 16 rooms is equipped with its own door, many of which were locked on April 20.

The first ad hoc SWAT team entered the school building on April 20 through a side entrance door on the main level, southeast of the main school entrance facing Pierce Street. The side door led them directly into a cluster of social studies and language arts classrooms. The team members faced internal hallways straight ahead or to their left; they could not see any major corridors leading to other parts of the school or any obvious signs of where the smaller internal hallways led. Searching the school could be compared to searching 100 homes that are 2,500 square feet in size.
AD HOC SWAT TEAM ENTRY AND PATH (east side)
SWAT TEAM ENTRY AND PATH (west side)

Cafeteria and Lower Level
TAC 1
JCSO and Denver led by JCSO Sgt. Barry Williams enter window in teachers lounge at 1:05 pm.

TAC 9
JCSO Sgt. Barry Williams team splits and 1/2 move into the Auditorium while the second 1/2 moves into cafeteria.

TAC 1
JCSO Sgt. Barry Williams team continues into the business, computer and special education classes on the lower level.

SWAT TEAM ENTRY AND PATH (upper level)
Auditorium and Science area and Library
TAC 9
Second ¾ clear the Auditorium and then move into the south side of the Science area on the upper level.

TAC 9
Second ¾ continue into the Science area and join Sgt Williams team in the Library.

TAC 1
JCSO Sgt. Barry Williams team continues into the clear the Science area and moves into the Music area then to the Library.

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The Critical Incident Team

Every incident in which a law enforcement officer uses “deadly force” while on duty must be investigated by a multi-jurisdictional team. That policy is a consensus decision of law enforcement chief executives in Jefferson County. On April 20, 1999, the First Judicial District Law Enforcement Critical Incident Team was activated at the request of Sheriff John Stone.

The critical incident team policy requires that a team “of highly trained and skilled investigators, comprised of personnel from each participating law enforcement agency and the District Attorney’s Office, be formed to investigate an incident in which any law enforcement officer within the judicial district uses deadly force, or attempts to use deadly force, against a human being while acting under the color of official law enforcement duties.”

“Typically, the Critical Incident Team will be utilized when an officer uses or attempts to use deadly force through the discharge of a firearm,” it states.

Members of the team called out on April 20 were 10 investigators from the area, including Arvada, Wheat Ridge, and Lakewood Police Departments; the Golden Police Department and the District Attorney’s Office. The team reported to Leawood Elementary School in the afternoon where they interviewed and collected the firearms of most officers who fired a weapon that day.

A total of 141 shots were fired by law enforcement officers at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999. No individual was hit or injured by “friendly fire.”

141 Law Enforcement Shots Fired

Among the many law enforcement officers who responded to Columbine High School on April 20, 12 officers fired their weapons:

- four from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office,
- seven from the Denver Police Department
- one from the Lakewood Police Department.

Of all the bullet casings recovered from the high school, 141 were fired from law enforcement weapons.

- Sixteen of those rounds were fired by Jefferson County Sheriff’s deputies,
- Four by a Lakewood Police Department agent;
The remaining 121 rounds were fired by Denver Police Department officers.

The majority of the shots were fired from the parking lot on the southwest side of the school and the grass and sidewalk areas outside the west entrance.

There were also shots fired from the junior parking lot, a lower classroom hallway and the bottom of the stairs outside the cafeteria.

In reviewing the ballistic evidence and the interviews with the officers, it was determined that the majority of the shots were fired toward the west entrance and the library windows. This was done when shots were exchanged with the gunmen, and when law enforcement and medical personnel were evacuating students.

There were no injuries or deaths as a result of shots fired by law enforcement officers.

### Shots Fired by KLEBOLD and HARRIS

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Harris</th>
<th>Klebold</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Library</td>
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<td>Outside</td>
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<td><strong>9MM Rounds</strong></td>
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<td>Library</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Fired</strong></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>188</td>
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**188 Shots Fired by KLEBOLD and HARRIS**
## Fire/EMS Agencies

17 fire apparatus, 50 rescue/ambulances, 27 staff, 1 MD, 1 SWAT Medic, 1 chaplain, 4 on-scene Communication Center Dispatchers, 172 personnel responded from the Littleton Fire Department and five neighboring fire agencies and five ambulance companies. Additionally, two helicopters provided assistance. Twenty-five victims were transported to six local hospitals (six were critical); 160 students were triaged at the scene.

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<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Assignments</th>
<th>Vehicle or equipment assistance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Littleton Fire Department</td>
<td>Command Post, communications, triage, treatment and transport of patients, bomb disposal, lighting, staging, and PIO assistance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Medical Response</td>
<td>Triage, treatment and transport of injured.</td>
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<td>Triage, treatment and transport of injured.</td>
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<td>Denver Fire</td>
<td>Assistance with Fire Task Force.</td>
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<td>Triage, treatment and transport of injured.</td>
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<td>Pridemark Paramedic Services</td>
<td>Triage, treatment and transport of injured.</td>
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<td>Rural Metro</td>
<td>Triage, treatment and transport of injured.</td>
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<td>Sheridan Fire</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Metro Fire</td>
<td>Communications assistance, logistics assistance, dispatch assistance, and triage, treatment and transport of injured.</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Metro Fire Protection District</td>
<td>Operations advisory, triage, treatment and transport of patients, Chaplain assistance and PIO assistance.</td>
<td>7 units</td>
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</table>
Prepared by the Littleton Fire Department

MEDICAL TRIAGE AREAS AND PATIENT STATUS
Identifying the Deceased

Waiting outside for the bomb squad and the SWAT teams to declare the school building safe were various people, including Jefferson County Coroner Dr. Nancy Bodelson and Sheriff’s Investigator Kate Battan, lead investigator for the case.

Earlier Tuesday evening, the Coroner, Sheriff Stone, District Attorney Dave Thomas and several victim advocates had met with the families of students still missing. Each family had been asked to write down information about their child – the age, hair and eye color, what the student wore to school that day, if she or he had obtained a driver’s license, and any other characteristics that might help in the preliminary identification of the deceased.

Families were provided a special phone number to the Coroner’s Office should they need to speak to the Coroner or her staff. Contact was also possible through the Sheriff’s Office victim advocates. In Jefferson County, the coroner generally provides official identification and death notification. Dr. Bodelson told the families they should not expect to hear from her office until a positive identification had been made.

While waiting for the school to be secured, Bodelson and Battan searched through a copy of the 1998 Columbine High School yearbook. They were looking for photographs of the missing students -- in preparation for entering the crime scene. The command post declared that, due to the continuing searches and safety concerns, no investigators would be allowed into the building until the following morning.

When the coroner and the investigators entered the school early Wednesday morning, there was tremendous pressure to identify the deceased and notify the families as quickly as possible. Throughout Wednesday, the coroner and an expanded team of coroner investigators completed their scene investigation, removed the bodies and personally transported them to the coroner's office in Golden.

While the crime scene was being processed, DA Thomas and Denver District Attorney Bill Ritter decided to proceed with a preliminary death notification to each family still waiting for confirmation. On Wednesday afternoon, they told each family that, based on current information obtained by the authorities, their child or spouse was likely among the fatalities.

Each Columbine fatality required a positive identification and an autopsy. That effort started late Wednesday night with each person being officially identified and the families notified. Fingerprints were used for most of the identifications.
Four additional forensic pathologists, from Boulder, Denver, and Arapahoe counties, were asked to help so that the autopsies could be completed as quickly as possible. By Thursday afternoon, all autopsies were completed, the cause of death determined in each case and the bodies released to the mortuaries designated by the families.

Information about each case was kept confidential, shared only with limited law enforcement personnel and the individual families. However, a general media statement acknowledged that, from the preliminary investigation, all the deaths were the result of gunshot wounds. Two deaths were “consistent with self-infliction.” Thirteen autopsy reports have been sealed by the court.
Sheriff’s Office Communications Center

On April 20, 1999, six people were on duty in the Jefferson County Communications Center, which had been moved to its new location just two weeks earlier. Four dispatchers, one supervisor and one emergency response specialist were staffing four radio and three telephone positions. The center manages communications traffic for all county departments, five law-enforcement agencies and 11 volunteer fire departments.

Initial 911 Reports

The first reports of the Columbine High School shootings were received in the communications center at 11:19 a.m. At that time, a citizen called 911 about an explosion in a field on the east side of Wadsworth Boulevard between Ken Caryl and Chatfield avenues.

A dispatcher transmitted the information to Deputy Paul Magor, who was patrolling in the area. Four minutes later, dispatch received a report of an injury at Columbine High School.

At 11:25 a.m., a caller from inside the school’s library phoned 911.

In the next 40 minutes, dispatch received 31 emergency calls from people inside and outside the school relating information about the Columbine incident. The information was often sketchy and conflicting. Calls reported numerous gunmen in different locations throughout the school with varying types of weapons. Dispatchers had no time to verify the reports coming at them. They disseminated all the information received back to the command post and to the deputies on scene.

Community and Media Calls Begin

By 11:32 a.m., local media learned of trouble at Columbine High School and began contacting dispatch for more information. Calls from national and international media quickly followed, and, by midnight, the center had taken 339 calls from news organizations worldwide.

Other jurisdictions were relaying reports of the incident as well, and it was apparent that a major event was unfolding that would require a countywide, multiagency response.

To help coordinate those efforts, Capt. Ray Fleer, Lt. Dennis Potter and Lt. Jeff Shrader of the Sheriff’s Office arrived at the communications center. While they coordinated communications and logistics with the county, cooperating agencies and officers on site, the dispatchers continued to take incoming calls.
On his way to the high school, Sheriff John P. Stone called Commissioner Pat Holloway and informed her of the initial reports. She relayed the information to County Administrator Ron Holliday, who hurried to the communications center with staff from the county’s Public Information and Emergency Management departments. They were later joined by Holloway and Commissioner Rick Sheehan, and the five helped answer media calls and released county resources as needed.

Given the worldwide interest in the story, the communications center needed international calling capabilities. Communications Director Randy Smith coordinated that process and ordered extra phone batteries and supplies for people in the field.

**Staffing Increased & Command Bus Dispatched**

By 11:40 a.m., Dispatch Manager Barb Farland and Supervisor Cindy Cline had been paged to join Supervisor Karen Vitgenos in helping the staff field calls. Off-work dispatchers also heard of the incident and volunteered to work. By early afternoon, two people were staffing each radio and phone position, and the center had almost four times its normal staffing level. A technician from the local phone company, U.S. West, arrived on his own so he could help in case technical problems developed.

More and more officers were responding to Columbine High School, and the Sheriff’s mobile command bus was sent to handle on-site communications. The bus arrived by 12:39 p.m., and it carried a team of three dispatchers with it.

Once the bus was on scene, it became the communications center for the incident command post. As a mobile communications unit, the bus is equipped with the same radio capabilities as the main center at the Sheriff’s Office. The dispatchers in the bus handled communications among the SWAT teams and other on-site personnel and with headquarters.

**Call Load Peaks at 200 Times Normal Level**

For the next three days, dispatchers were put on mandatory 12-hour shifts. Other law enforcement agencies loaned their dispatchers to assist with the crisis, and a victim advocate/peer counselor was available to help dispatchers deal with the trauma.

For the next week, the stream of calls continued. Hundreds of reporters and citizens phoned simply to get updates about the event. At the peak of the crisis, the communications center handled almost 200 times its normal call load for a weekday. On April 20 alone, the staff took:

- 31 calls on 911 from 11:19 a.m. to 12 p.m.
- 88 calls on 911 from 12 p.m. to 1 p.m.
- 114 calls on 911 from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m.
During the busiest hour that day, dispatchers took 181 calls on the county’s non-emergency number as well. Although cell-phone technologies have since changed, at the time of the Columbine shootings, 911 cell calls were received on the county’s non-emergency number. Dispatch also managed radio traffic for other law enforcement incidents, fire and emergency medical calls and daily county business.

The staff answered every 911 call during the crisis, and the center experienced no technical difficulties.
The Victim Services Response

When reports of shots fired at Columbine High School were heard, forces were immediately rallied to provide counseling and crisis intervention to the school’s students, parents and faculty.

Leading the initial response was the Victim Services Unit of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office under the direction of Karen Joyce-McMahon, coordinator. Also assisting in coordinating the victims services response was Kim Slaughter, director of the Victim/Witness Unit, First Judicial District Attorney’s Office.

Typically, the victims assistance unit of a law enforcement agency closely follows the officers responding to an event. Within minutes of the first 911 call, the Sheriff’s Office Victim Services staff and volunteers were alerted. Joyce-McMahon and counselor Danielle Rice arrived on scene at approximately 12:15 p.m. They were assigned to Columbine Public Library. By 12:45, two additional JCSO counselors, Paula Kittay and Beverly Wiese, responded to Leawood Elementary School.

Additional mental health workers, victim advocates and volunteers from numerous agencies also responded to the sites where students and families were congregating. At least 150 counselors from law enforcement victim services agencies responded to the scene.

The protocol for the Sheriff’s Victim Services staff is to check in first with a deputy or investigator on scene and, at the request of the investigator, talk with a victim one-on-one. Their initial role is to help the victim feel safe and secure and to encourage the person to talk about what he or she just went through.

The procedure at Columbine was somewhat different because of the magnitude of the crisis. Some of the students arriving at Columbine Public Library had talked to an investigator but many had not. Panicked parents were also arriving at the library in desperate search of their child.

During those first hours, the primary focus for Victim Services counselors was working with families who couldn't find their children, and students who needed to contact their parents.

Posting lists was the primary method of communicating with families about the status of their children. The names of the students congregating at either Leawood Elementary or Columbine Library were collected and posted at both sites. But in the midst of such chaos, the lists were incomplete and caused great frustration and anguish for the parents. To complicate the procedure exponentially was the fact that children also had fled to individual homes, surrounding
businesses and nearby parks. As lists were compiled, attempts were made to fax them to the different sites where students and parents were congregating.

Additionally, advocates sat in on interviews with investigators, placed calls to hospitals to obtain lists of the injured and arranged transportation for families needing to get to a hospital. Advocates also tried to provide as much information as possible to families regarding what was happening with law enforcement.

As the day wore on, the collection point for students and parents shifted entirely to Leawood Elementary. The public library was closed at 6 p.m. and the victim services unit moved all staff to the elementary school.

At this point, authorities knew there were fatalities but they did not know the actual number of deceased or their identities. Families remaining at Leawood who had not found their family member were asked to fill out information sheets about their missing loved one – name, age, identifying marks, clothes worn to school that day and if they possessed a driver’s license (for fingerprints).

All information sheets were passed on to the Jefferson County Coroner’s Office to help in its identification process of the bodies. The victim advocates ended up with 16 information sheets but only 12 deceased students and one teacher. Some students, originally determined to be missing, returned home the following day.

At least two advocates were assigned to each family with a missing child/spouse. Advocates were also sent to the hospitals to support the families of the injured. The advocates stayed with the families for as long as they were needed, then continued to be accessible 24 hours a day by pager. All advocates left Leawood Elementary at 2 a.m. Wednesday morning, but by 4 a.m. many were called back to be with the families “who just couldn’t stay at home.”

The advocates also maintained an information feed from the Coroner's Office so that information could be communicated to the parents as soon as it became available. By mid-day Wednesday, tentative death notifications were made to the families. A few hours later the Coroner’s Office contacted each family with the official death notification.

Most of the advocates stayed with their assigned family through the victim’s funeral. Some of the advocates were “on loan” from other agencies and had to return to their regular duties. Other jurisdictions were able to commit their people for a longer period. With assistance from COVA, a statewide non-profit organization committed to addressing the needs of crime victims, advocates were able to provide many additional services to the families. Through funerals and beyond, COVA was able to access donations for airline travel, rental cars, hotels and more. In the first few weeks, advocates were able to meet many of the needs of families thanks to their assistance.

Several hours after the news of Columbine spread throughout the community, people began
congregating in “safe places.” According to the mental health professionals, the students of Columbine needed first to connect with their families, and then they wanted to be with their friends and other students. Victim Services worked with other agencies, including COVA and the Jeffco Center for Mental Health, to provide staffing at these safe havens.

Several phone numbers, including JCSO Victim Services Unit, JCMH and COVA, were given to the community as main numbers for mental health assistance and concerns. These numbers were shared via the television, newspapers and public information lines and people responded. Calls came from people not only in the community but also around the country needing to talk about the event and their own emotions. The center also received a tremendous number of calls from mental health professionals across the country volunteering to help, including offers of assistance from the three states where the latest school disasters had occurred. U.S. President Bill Clinton offered a team of national crisis counselors who had assisted following the Oklahoma City bombing.

**Crime Victim Compensation**

In addition to helping with the first days of crisis intervention, a priority of the DA’s Victims/Witness Unit was to alert every Columbine student, teacher and staff member of their right to crime victim compensation.

Crime Victim Compensation is a fund available through the DA’s office to victims of crime “who have been physically or emotionally injured.” The money in this fund comes from fines assessed against persons convicted of a crime. It is available to help victims pay for medical expenses, mental health therapy, lost employment and burial expenses.

The money is distributed through a Crime Victims’ Compensation Board. On the Friday following the Columbine shootings, the board decided that every student and staff member was eligible for victim compensation and authorized a “streamlined process” be implemented to handle the Columbine applications.

A special application was developed and three separate cover letters written to those eligible – one for families of deceased victims, one for injured victims and one for everyone else. Families of the deceased and injured had their applications given to them in person by the victim advocates assigned to them. The rest, over 2,000 applications, were mailed.

**Columbine Families Contacted**

Given the decision to treat all students, faculty and staff of Columbine as primary victims, and taking into account information obtained in debriefings and through crisis calls to their offices, Victim Services began to recognize a need for all families of Columbine to be contacted. It became evident that the tragedy had seriously impacted the entire student body, as well as the staff of Columbine High School. Victim Services Unit staff began looking for a way to make
contact with every student and staff possible. Initially, Victim Outreach Information took the lead in this undertaking. At the same time, The Sheriff’s Office worked to hire additional staff for the Victims Services Unit so that its efforts could expand out beyond the initial 38 families to offer services. On May 12, 1999, the first advocate was hired by JCSO to work on the project.

Columbine Connections Established

On April 20, mental health responders, including victim advocates, began meeting to coordinate services provided to the community. The end result was the establishment of the Mental Health Unified Management group.

A priority of the cooperative Mental Health Unified Management group was the establishment of a facility in the Columbine area. The goal of Columbine Connections was to provide a space for counseling and victim services as well as activities and education for students, families, and community members over the summer and into the next school year. Columbine Connections is a cooperative effort between the Sheriff’s Office and the Jefferson Center for Mental Health, the First Judicial District Attorney’s Office, Foothills Park and Recreation Department, and Parents and Communities Coming Together. As advocates were hired through JCSO, they began staffing this center, originally housed out of a temporary facility. Columbine Connections opened its doors for business on July 1, 1999. The Sheriff’s Office hired four victim advocates and a supervisor to staff the victim services part of Columbine Connections through June 2000. At that time, the original Victim Services staff will again take on the full responsibility for victims of the Columbine shootings.

Other Services Provided

The normal role of the Sheriff’s Victim Services unit is crisis intervention. Advocates work with people on scene or immediately following a trauma, helping them to get through the initial crisis and then refer them on to mental health if they need longer-term counseling. In 1998, the Sheriff’s Victims Services unit served approximately 2,000 victims of crime. On April 20, 1999, the unit worked to respond to at least that number of victims, their families and the community.

A year after the tragedy, the staff continues to respond to the needs of those impacted. Within the first few months, Victim Services staff assisted with walk-throughs for the students and families when they went through the high school before the start of school and were on hand for crisis intervention when school began in August. Donations continued to pour in from all over the country. Boxes were piled up on every inch of available space and spilling out into the hallways. Advocates acted as delivery people, taking numerous donations, checks and information to families.

The Victim Services Unit also identified the need to enlist the help of volunteers in making outreach calls. The response to their request for volunteers was enormous. They received over 100 phone calls for 12 volunteer positions. These volunteers received intensive training on how
to respond to high profile mass tragedy, crisis intervention skills, vicarious trauma and the logistics of placing calls.

Within days of the shootings, JCSO and the DA’s Office contracted with two consultants experienced in mass tragedy to assist in providing services. To date, they continue to work with these consultants.

Advocates continue to be involved with families of the injured and deceased, serving as liaisons with the Sheriff’s Office and other agencies and offering support as needed.

Agencies and organizations that provided assistance during and after the Columbine tragedy include victim advocates and volunteers from the following:

**AGENCIES**

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<tr>
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<td>Littleton Police Department</td>
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<td>Castle Rock Police Department</td>
<td>Longmont Police Department</td>
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<td>Clear Creek County Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>Sheridan Police Department</td>
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<td>Colorado State Patrol</td>
<td>State Court Administrators Office</td>
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<td>Commerce City Police Department</td>
<td>Thornton Police Department</td>
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<td>Denver District Attorney’s Office</td>
<td>Westminster Police Department</td>
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**ORGANIZATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boulder County Crisis Intervention Team</th>
<th>Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Victim Outreach Information (VOI)</td>
<td>Colorado Organization for Victim’s Assistance (COVA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wings Foundation</td>
<td>Women in Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>The staff of Leawood Elementary</td>
<td>The staff of Columbine Public Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>Numerous professionals from private practice</td>
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Students Reunited With Parents at Leawood

The Columbine students who had escaped the school on the east side were taken through the backyard of a residence across the street and to a driveway where school buses were waiting to transport them to Leawood Elementary School. The Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office SORT team placed a deputy on each bus to provide security for the students' short trip to the school.

The buses dropped the students at the gymnasium entrance adjacent to the faculty parking lot on the east side. Students were brought in through the gym, across the stage and into the back band room where they were identified and quickly interviewed for any information they could provide about the incident. Denver Police Department's homicide unit and a Jefferson County Sheriff's investigator conducted most of the interviews inside the elementary school.

A list of the students who had been evacuated to Leawood was being put together by the Denver Police Department, the victim advocates and the school staff. School personnel created a spreadsheet with the names and printed an updated version every 15 minutes. The list was posted on the door for anxious parents collecting at the school. As information became available, another list provided names of students confirmed as being at the Columbine Public Library.

Leawood's gymnasium served as the assembling area for parents of children who were verified as having been evacuated to Leawood. Parents waited in the gym while authorities interviewed their student. SORT helped to direct those parents waiting to be reunited with their
child. They also assisted in keeping the media out of the school building at the request of the school administration.

As the afternoon wore on and no more buses were arriving with evacuated students, the gym became a collecting point for the parents with a child still missing. SORT continued to maintain the perimeter security while victim advocates stayed with the families and Red Cross provided food and drinks.
County Departments Offer Support

County Placed on Alert

April 20, 1999, started promisingly in Jefferson County. Early that morning, community leaders had gathered at the fairgrounds for the Good News Breakfast, which is held each year in honor of good works being performed throughout the county.

At one table, Jefferson County Administrator Ron Holliday talked to Sheriff John P. Stone about their meeting scheduled in the afternoon to discuss emergency management issues. Nearby sat two of the county commissioners, representatives from the school district and other community leaders. The event gave them a chance to celebrate positive happenings and programs in the county.

A single phone call placed just before noon dispelled the positive mood, however. It was 11:53 a.m. when the phone rang in the commissioners’ office. Sheriff Stone was calling for Patricia B. Holloway, then chairman of the Board of County Commissioners. He was en route to Columbine High School, he told her, where shots had reportedly been fired. Holloway promised whatever support the county could offer and then informed Holliday, Commissioner Rick Sheehan and County Attorney Frank Hutfless about the situation. They, in turn, placed all county departments on alert.

As a former county commissioner, Stone had seen the county respond to wildfires, floods and other disasters. He was familiar with county capabilities, but no one knew what this situation might require. As it turned out, the Columbine response drew on more county resources than had any other disaster, and numerous departments would be asked to provide support to the Sheriff's Office in the following days. That initial alert set in motion a countywide response in which departments worked individually and in conjunction with one another to meet a wide range of needs.

County Commissioners Request Emergency Funding

It is difficult to define the commissioners' role in responding to a massive crime. The county sheriff is in charge of leading the law enforcement response, but the commissioners can play an important support role.

In the case of the Columbine shootings, the three-member Board of County Commissioners released county resources as needed, helped represent the county to the community, made
policy decisions and procured emergency funding. Their role grew as the days wore on, when the focus shifted from the initial response to helping the community address its loss.

On April 20, 1999, two of the three commissioners were in town attending to normal county business. Commissioner Michelle Lawrence was out of town, but she was quickly contacted and informed of the crisis. Over the next five days, she received two briefings a day and held regular conference calls with her colleagues.

After alerting staff about the shootings, Holloway began making calls to cancel the commissioners' meetings. She and Sheehan then hurried to the Sheriff's communications center to offer support and learn more about the situation.

Shortly thereafter, Sheehan drove to the school. Columbine High School is located in his district, and he personally knew families who would be affected by the crisis.

Holliday and the county staff at the sheriff's communications center were asked to help field media calls from around the world. Within minutes of the first 911 reports, news organizations began calling, and dispatchers needed others to take media questions so they could concentrate on reports from the school and the forming command post.

In addition, dignitaries and elected officials called to offer their condolences and assistance. Mayor Watson of Austin, Texas, phoned Commissioner Holloway to express his support and announce that his city had postponed the opening of its new airport the next day. Mayor Giuliani of New York called her to offer the assistance of its crisis team and emergency management staff. Then at 5:33 p.m., U.S. President Clinton phoned Holloway to relay his sympathy and pledge whatever resources the county might need, including the help of a national team of crisis counselors. Holloway fielded calls to the White House for the next two weeks on a daily basis, sometimes as often as three times a day.

By the next day after the shootings, the commissioners joined the county and Sheriff's Office staff at the Columbine Public Library, which had been selected as a media command center because of its close proximity to the school. As chairman of the board, Holloway fielded many of the calls from other elected officials. Meanwhile, Sheehan focused on a community-wide planning effort to meet residents' overwhelming mental health needs. He also accompanied the sheriff to local hospitals, where they visited injured students and their families.

As the initial response ended, the commissioners began working with Gov. Bill Owens and his staff to plan a memorial service for Sunday, April 25. As the county's representative, Holloway spoke at the service and then joined Vice President Al Gore in the procession to the memorial site.

The next day, Lawrence returned and met the other commissioners at the media center. The commissioners and county administrator worked with representatives from the school district, District Attorney's Office, Sheriff's Office and Jefferson Center for Mental Health to draft a
unified request for funding assistance. Lawrence personally delivered the request to the Governor's Office, and, on May 4, the governor handed out checks totaling $1 million. Of those monies, $500,000 went to the school district, and $125,000 went to fund mental health services. The remaining $375,000 went to Jefferson County to offset response costs.

**County Administrator Directs County Support Efforts**

Within moments of hearing about the Columbine shootings, County Administrator Ron Holliday gathered coordinators from the Public Information and Emergency Management departments and headed to the sheriff's communications center.

During the next several hours, he answered media calls, helped sort through the growing offers of assistance and mobilized key county departments. By midnight that evening, Holliday had met with representatives of the primary responder agencies—the Sheriff's Office, school district, and Jefferson County—to decide how to handle the public information effort.

The spokesman for the Sheriff's Office, Deputy Steve Davis, was holding hourly news conferences for reporters on site, but hundreds more reporters were calling the communications center. They wanted breaking news, maps, interviews and background information about the county—and they wanted it right away. It was clear that a phone bank and central media command center were needed to help with the media response, but the communications center could not accommodate such a large operation.

The planning group decided on Columbine Public Library as an alternative site. Once that decision was made, Holliday placed a call to Library Director William Knott and asked for use of the facility. Knott promised not only the full support of the library and its board, but also the personnel to assist at the library as needed.

The most pressing need at the library was to set up a bank of phones with one central number for media calls. With the help of John Zacrep, associate director of the library’s automated resources, an initial emergency phone system was in place before any staff arrived early Wednesday morning.

In the next several days, Holliday would make sure that all agencies working at the media command center had the resources they needed. At the same time, he kept communication flowing between those working on site and those serving back at the government campus. He also answered media calls and worked with the elected officials to coordinate efforts with state and federal agencies.

As the crisis unfolded, more agencies and dignitaries arrived to offer assistance. Holliday was instrumental in accommodating U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno's visit and planning the memorial service spearheaded by Gov. Bill Owens. When Vice President Al Gore announced he would speak, Secret Service agents arrived to plan security for the Vice President's visit. In preparing for these events, Holliday worked with the various agencies to assign tasks, allocate
resources and address unexpected problems.

**Emergency Management & Facilities Supply Necessities**

When the county administrator headed to the sheriff's communications center, he brought Judy Peratt with him. A 23-year veteran of emergency management, Peratt had helped the county respond to numerous disasters, including the Buffalo Creek fire and subsequent flood, winter storms and hazardous materials spills.

Peratt is coordinator of the Emergency Management Department, and she was immediately asked to help fill the needs of victims, media representatives and first responders. Food was requested, as were portable toilets, water, shelter, heaters and other necessities. The sheriff's command post near the school also needed buses to transport students who were being evacuated from the school. In addition, street barricades and security personnel were later needed to keep a curious public at a safe distance.

Peratt contacted the local Red Cross and Salvation Army offices first and asked them to provide nourishment and water for those on scene. An officer from the Salvation Army arrived by 12:30 p.m. on April 20 and immediately called in a mobile kitchen, which set up near the command post. By 1:30 p.m., the Red Cross had staffed its mass feeding vehicle and sent it to the command post and nearby Clement Park, where media, students and families were collecting. Throughout that first night, the Salvation Army fed 350 to 400 people from its canteen and then served hot breakfast for 200 the next morning. The nonprofit also provided blankets, dry socks and clothing for those on scene.

Both groups would stay on site as the response efforts continued. The Red Cross served more than 12,000 meals by the time it demobilized on April 30. The Salvation Army maintained its presence until May 1, by which point the group had served 15,000 meals and provided close to 300 blankets or pieces of clothing to victims and responders.

As April 20 wore on, weather conditions worsened, and snow was in the forecast for the next few days. Some kind of cover would be needed to provide shelter for the media and emergency public information officers at Clement Park. The easiest source for tents was the National Guard, but first the county had to make a request for tents through the Colorado Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The director of that office, Tommy Grier, made the formal request to the Colorado National Guard on behalf of Jefferson County.

Meanwhile, an overwhelming surge of calls had jammed phone lines and left those on scene scrambling for ways to communicate. In response, Arapahoe County sent 20 hand-held radios to the command post, and Peratt asked the amateur radio association to be on standby to provide backup communication if needed. The Red Cross sent radio communicators to the scene as well to help students contact their parents. US West erected temporary towers, commonly known as COWS (Central Office on Wheels) which expanded the capability for more phone lines. Immediately recognizing the need for more capacity, US West erected the first
tower in Clement Park on Tuesday, April 20, to aid in the emergency response communications. A second COW was constructed the next day outside the library communication center.

During the Columbine incident, law enforcement officers discovered bombs around the perimeter of the school and in the parking lots. The Sheriff's Office ordered residents to evacuate the neighborhoods south of the school. Dispatchers notified the residents, who were asked to go to a nearby shopping center, where deputies and victim advocates greeted them. Peratt learned that local hotels were offering rooms for evacuees as well as victims' relatives and friends arriving from out of town. She passed that information along so those groups would have warm, private accommodations for the night.

By April 21, temperatures had plummeted, and Peratt called Jefferson County Facilities Director Lee Suttie and asked him to find propane heaters to warm the tents that had been erected at Clement Park. Suttie delivered heaters and also additional tents for use outside Columbine Library. The tents were available in case reporters stormed the media center looking for shelter from the weather.

Over the next several days, Peratt fielded offers of help from individuals and agencies across the country. One of those groups, the Colorado Restaurant Association, recruited its membership to provide food for those working in the communications center at Columbine Public Library. Albertson's and other nearby food suppliers donated goods as well, and Peratt coordinated the offers and ensured workers were fed.

Suttie and his staff helped with that effort and also began preparing for the visit of U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno. Suttie learned of Reno's visit at 10 a.m. on Thursday, April 22. The attorney general was scheduled to visit the government campus at 1:30 that afternoon, and the slushy spring weather was evolving into a full-blown snowstorm.

Suttie went directly to the District Attorney's Office to discuss security for the visit. The Golden Police Department was providing street and traffic control, while the Sheriff's Office was handling interior and access security. The most important step, however, was to empty the government campus of all employees and their vehicles so law enforcement could secure the area. The county helped that effort by calling a “snow day” and sending all non-essential employees home by noon.

Over the next few weeks, local agencies came together to meet the mental health needs of the Columbine community. The Facilities Department joined in by helping to locate an appropriate building for a Columbine resource and counseling center in south Jefferson County. Suttie worked with representatives from United Way, the Governor's Columbine Task Force, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Victim Services Unit, the District Attorney's Victims/Witness Unit and the Jefferson Center for Mental Health to secure a facility. They eventually selected the Ascot Center, which is located on Bowles Avenue in south Jefferson County. Over the next few months, the center evolved into a longer-term facility that included a community meeting room,
conference room, reception area, drug and alcohol abuse treatment area, youth drop-in center and resource library. It also has private counseling rooms and offices for administrative support.

**Technical Staff Fills Information Needs**

The county's Technical Services Division, which included the Network Services and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) departments, was among the first to join the support effort. In response to the shootings, the two departments equipped a media command center and investigative center and produced more than 600 separate aerial photographs and maps.

Early the morning of April 21, the county administrator placed a call to Technical Services Director John Loyd. Columbine Public Library was being converted into a media command center, Holliday reported, and televisions and other services were needed. Loyd drove to the county administration building, picked up televisions and delivered them to the library. The director and the Network Services staff then worked with US West to set up another phone bank, which would be used in case a second emergency sparked another media onslaught.

As April 21 wore on, Loyd noticed that the cell phones being used from the library weren't working. The media and responding agencies had simply exhausted the cell phone capacity in the area, and people at the library were unable to receive or place calls. The problem was a serious one, because the media line alone could not handle the call load. To help address the problem, Loyd contacted U.S. West and asked them to install a temporary tower outside the library. The cell phone capacity quadrupled once the task was complete, but it still couldn't meet the demand.

Help soon arrived from AirTouch, which, through its emergency program, delivered 100 digital cell phones to the personnel at the school site as well as at the communications center. According to an AirTouch spokesperson, the digital system uses a narrower band and higher frequency than the analog system and thus provides up to 10 times more capacity. The company loaned the digital phones for as long as they were needed and charged nothing for the equipment or airtime.

The county's technical staff also helped set up workstations at the public library for school district employees and volunteers. Network Services coordinated the acquisition of necessary technology, particularly Internet access for all workstations and a T-1 link, which is a large capacity carrier that allows for multiple communication lines.

By that point, Network Services was also busy setting up an investigative center at the county administration building. By Friday, April 23, secured office space had been set aside for the 80 investigators assigned to the Columbine Investigative Task Force. Network Services equipped the area with 39 phone lines, 40 personal computers, a special e-mail group, a group site on the county's network system and network user IDs. Investigators also had their own printers, fax machines, photocopiers and TV/VCR units.
Meanwhile, the other department within the Information Technology Division—the Geographic Information Services Department (GIS) —worked around the clock to meet the staggering demand for maps and aerial photos of the school and the surrounding area. The GIS Department is well known in the county as a source of accurate, detailed maps, satellite imagery and high- and low-altitude aerial photographs.

In the initial hours of the crisis, the school district had given dispatchers a rough floor plan of the school. By midnight, reporters wanted copies as well, and GIS obtained plans of the upper and lower levels of the school and delivered copies to Deputy Steve Davis for him to distribute to reporters.

Requests for more detailed maps and aerial shots flooded in the next day. Fortunately, American Reprographics Inc. donated an aerial photo of the school and surrounding area that had been taken just eight or nine days earlier. By then, GIS had obtained detailed construction and remodeling plans of the school from the district's facilities department. Taken together, the images gave reporters and officers a detailed picture of the area.

Because of its success in providing initial maps and floor plans, GIS was asked to serve as a liaison between the school district and FBI. The FBI needed many precise, detailed maps for the investigation and the construction of a three-dimensional model of Columbine High School. The school district provided more than 800 pages of maps and drawings, which the GIS staff used to collect data for the FBI. After hours of study, GIS was able to report such details as the exterior and interior wall elevations and building angles of Columbine High School. That information was turned over to the FBI to create detailed diagrams and graphics of the school and campus.

Later, GIS would help the FBI again by contacting local television stations to obtain raw video
footage of the unfolding crisis. Taken from news helicopters, the footage allowed investigators to pinpoint the movement of law-enforcement, fire and rescue and emergency medical personnel. Some of that footage was never aired because its live broadcast could have endangered responders, but the images provided valuable information for investigators.

By Thursday, April 22, GIS was helping yet another federal law enforcement group—the Secret Service. Once Vice President Al Gore and his wife announced they would attend the Sunday memorial service, the Secret Service called to request maps and imagery of the area. GIS contracted with an agency to fly over the site and take updated photos. Working with those images, the Secret Service was able to estimate building heights, number of floors per building and high and low points of the surrounding landscape. Color photo enlargements and line-of-site images also gave them information about possible vantage points for snipers.

Throughout the following days, GIS was on constant call. To protect sensitive information, the staff produced many images late at night when the administration center was empty. All told, the department closed for only one hour between Tuesday afternoon and Friday evening. By the time the investigation ended, GIS had provided images for the Sheriff’s Office, the school district, the media, the Governor’s Office, the Secret Service, the FBI, the Colorado State Patrol and the Jefferson County administration. The staff produced more than 600 separate images for the Columbine incident, which ranged in size from 11 x 17 inches to 4 x 6 feet.

Public Information Department Aids Massive Media Response

One of the departments immediately called into action on April 20 was the county’s Public Information Department, which supports the commissioners and all departments under the county administrator.

Upon hearing of the shootings, Kathi Grider of the Public Information Department reported to the Sheriff’s communications center to help answer media calls. Over the next 24 hours, she helped establish the media command center, coordinated efforts with other agencies and the elected officials and continued to answer media calls.

While Grider worked at the communications center, the rest of the Public Information staff fielded calls at the office and then reported to Columbine Public Library the next day. The staff supported the Sheriff’s Office on site for the next two weeks by answering calls on the media line, helping to plan the Sunday memorial service, updating the county web site, responding to citizen inquiries and supporting the elected officials.

The staff was part of a 35-member team that handled the public information response to the Columbine shootings. Public information officers from the county’s Open Space Department, Health & Environment Department, the public library and the school district stepped forward to help, as did public information officers from state government and numerous fire, police and emergency medical organizations.
Road and Bridge Provides Resources

Sheriff John Stone, having been Jefferson County commissioner for 12 years before his election to Sheriff, knew the people and the county resources the would be available to him for the Columbine response. One of his calls on April 20 was for heavy road equipment available from the Road and Bridge Department – a loader, a blade, and maybe a big dump truck. The equipment might be needed to provide a protective screen for law enforcement people assaulting the school or for the removal of debris later on.

The Road and Bridge Department’s South Shop is located about six miles southwest of the school, south of C-470 off Kipling Parkway. Road and Bridge staff drove the blade, loader and truck to “no man’s land” on Bowles Avenue, a safe distance north of the incident at the school and of the media staging area in Clement Park. Although a front end loader from a private construction firm was used to provide cover for Williams’ Jeffco SWAT team as it moved to the west side of the school and made entry into the cafeteria, the county’s equipment also was readily available if needed.

In addition to heavy equipment, a request came for traffic control assistance on April 20. Several county Road and Bridge employees delivered two lighted arrow boards and set up the cones, barricades and boards at key locations to divert traffic away from the high school site. They also stayed to serve as flaggers.

As the days wore on, Road and Bridge continued to assist by removing snow from the streets and providing fuel for sheriff’s vehicles. Equipped with pickups and 55-gallon drums, employees delivered gasoline and diesel for patrol cars and a generator. The supplies were delivered twice a day for three months until the investigation at the site was completed.
SORT

Special Operations Response Team

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Special Operations Response Team (SORT) is a tactical team that deals primarily with high-risk incidents that occur within the detention facility and during high-profile court cases. SORT members also are trained in crowd control and have assisted the Jeffco SWAT team in instances requiring their expertise.

SORT’s team of 12 was paged by the Sheriff’s Detentions Division at 12:30 p.m. to respond to the Sheriff’s Office headquarters in Golden where they would gather their gear and equipment. The team was deployed to Leawood Elementary School, located about three-quarters of a mile to the east of Columbine High School, where the high school students were being evacuated and where concerned parents were gathering to find their teen-aged children.

The media had been asked to help facilitate reuniting students with their parents by announcing that parents should go to either Leawood Elementary or Columbine Public Library northwest of the school. The SORT team assisted the school personnel in handling the large number of parents arriving at the elementary school, either to be reunited with their high school student or to pick up their elementary school child as requested by the school administration.

SORT members worked with the Denver police in evacuating the high school students to Leawood. The Columbine students who had escaped the school on the east side were taken through the backyard of a residence across the street and to a driveway where school buses were waiting to transport them to the elementary school. SORT placed a deputy on each bus to provide security for the students’ short trip to Leawood.

Leawood’s gymnasium served as the assembling area for parents. SORT helped to direct those parents waiting to be reunited with their child. They also assisted in keeping the media out of the school building at the request of the school administration.

As the afternoon wore on and no more buses were arriving with evacuated students, the gym became a collecting point for the parents with a child still missing. SORT continued to maintain the perimeter security while victim advocates stayed with the families and Red Cross provided food and drinks.

The Jefferson County Critical Incident Team arrived at Leawood and was given an area in the
north portion of the building to interview the law enforcement officers involved in the shootings at the high school. The Critical Incident, or “shoot,” team collected each officer's firearms and took their statements. SORT assisted by bringing each officer through a back hallway of the school in an attempt to keep him out of the direct vision of the families still waiting.

Members of the SORT remained at the elementary school until the last of the families left and went home, and then helped the school faculty lock up and secure the building. For the next nine days, SORT would assist in providing perimeter security at Columbine High School.
Critical Incident Debriefings

Within half an hour after the initial shootings, a police psychologist was positioned at Columbine High School to begin critical incident debriefings.

The History of Debriefings

A common procedure for law enforcement agencies and fire department, debriefings simply give employees a chance to discuss their reactions to a traumatic event. Trained counselors typically lead debriefing sessions for both groups and individuals.

The practice of debriefing first responders started after the Vietnam War, said police psychologist Lottie Flater of Nicoletti-Flater and Associates, who works with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office. Because the war was so controversial, returning soldiers seldom discussed their combat experiences. As a result, many developed post-traumatic stress disorder, which is characterized by anger, depression, insomnia, substance abuse or a host of other mental and emotional effects.

To help employees avoid those problems, the Sheriff’s Office encourages officers to undergo a debriefing if they have participated in a traumatic event of an unusual nature.

Debriefing the First Responders

On April 20, 1999, Flater and her associates debriefed individual officers, SWAT team members and school resource officers. Psychologists frequently work with employees in groups so they can share reactions or ask each other questions about what happened. The people involved in a group debriefing usually worked together during the crisis.

While the police psychologists worked with those who had been on site, a victim advocate came to the Sheriff’s Communications Center to debrief dispatchers.

All Employees Share Reactions

In the case of the Columbine shootings, the agency offered debriefings to all employees—not just those who responded to the incident. Those who handled other work while the crisis unfolded needed to be able to ask questions about the shootings, understand what their co-workers had experienced and express their own reactions to the event as well, Sheriff John P. Stone decided.
So, on June 1 and 2, 1999, the Sheriff’s Office held several debriefings for employees who wanted to participate. A four-person group from The Counseling Team in San Bernardino, Calif., which handled part of the Columbine debriefings for the FBI, flew out to lead the session.

Over the course of two days, employees gathered at Columbine High School and walked through the building. During the tour, they heard an overview of the response efforts and the results of the investigation thus far. The goal was to help employees fit their own work into the larger effort and also learn what tasks co-workers had performed.

After the overview session, employees split into groups to discuss their reactions to the incident and the continuing media coverage. About half of the 600 employees in the Sheriff’s Office participated. Individual follow-up sessions were available for employees who wanted them.
The Investigation

Even as the events unfolded inside Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, investigators began their investigation of the shootings. Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Directed Investigations Unit Sergeant Randy West arrived at the school at about 11:45 a.m. and was briefed by the incident commander, Lt. David Walcher. Investigation Division Lt. John Kiekbusch arrived minutes later and began to establish an investigation command post in the Clement Park parking lot near the incident command post. After consulting with Sgt. West, Kiekbusch assigned Investigator Kathleen “Kate” Battan as lead investigator.

By noon, the majority of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office investigators were on scene interviewing the fleeing students and faculty who provided vital information on what was occurring inside the school and who might be involved. This information was passed on to the incident commander to be relayed to the SWAT teams searching the school. Several investigators remained at the Sheriff’s Office headquarters in Golden to assist with warrants and interviews taking place at the headquarters. Investigation Division Captain Daniel Harris coordinated information exchange with the school district and other agencies.

Search Warrants

It was soon apparent that Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris were being named as possible suspects in the shootings at Columbine High School. Investigators and patrol officers were sent to secure the Klebold and Harris residences in order to preserve any evidence until search warrants could be obtained. When investigators arrived at the Klebold residence they contacted Thomas and Susan Klebold, the parents of Dylan and his brother, Byron. Also present was a family friend who had been staying in their guesthouse. A second team of investigators arrived at the Harris residence and contacted Wayne and Kathy Harris, the parents of Eric. A family friend was also at the residence. Investigators walked through the residences to ensure that no one else was present and discovered incendiary devices in both homes. The occupants were evacuated and bomb technicians were immediately dispatched to both homes. Meanwhile, the investigators at the school were giving critical information from their interviews to investigator Kate Battan who, in turn, telephoned headquarters and dictated search warrants for the Harris and Klebold homes. A Jefferson County judge subsequently signed the warrants, and the searches were conducted on both homes. Searches of both suspects’ residences were in progress before the bodies of the two killers were found inside the school.

Interviews
Lt. Kiekbusch phoned Arvada and Lakewood police investigation commanders and requested assistance in interviewing victims taken to the metro area hospitals. Investigators were to obtain information on the injured students and to preserve and collect any evidence. Interviews were conducted with those injured students who were able and vital information on the suspects was obtained. Throughout the day investigators from nearly all the metro area law enforcement agencies arrived at Columbine High School and assisted in interviews, searches, and tracking down known and possible associates of Harris and Klebold. This activity continued for the next three days.

Investigation Planning

On Friday, April 23, 1999, over 100 investigators met in the band room at Columbine High School and shared the critical information each had obtained during the previous three days. Over 500 preliminary interviews were reviewed which named several critical witnesses, associates of Harris and Klebold, background information on the Trench Coat Mafia, and any indications of involvement by others.

On Sunday, May 2, 1999, Sheriff Stone and Undersheriff Dunaway conferred with several key investigators, including Lt. Kiekbusch and investigators from other jurisdictions, to discuss the information currently known and to plan the direction of the investigation from that point. The discussion ultimately led to the development of a multi-jurisdictional task force that would investigate the incident, an organization that would become the Columbine Investigation Task Force. Undersheriff Dunaway assigned Kiekbusch to direct the investigation.

Over the weekend, Capt. Harris helped secure space in the County's administration building for the task force operations. Clerical support was provided by the FBI, the ATF and the Sheriff's Office. Forty computers were installed for report writing, Internet searches and criminal history searches. The FBI “Rapid Start” automated tracking software was installed on several computers to assist in tracking leads. Rapid Start required every lead that came into the task force to be written on a lead sheet, entered into the computer, assigned a number and then given to an investigator to follow up. The investigator would complete the assignment, and only after the written report was turned in, was the lead closed. The Rapid Start program ensured that every lead was followed up and duplicate leads were kept to a minimum. The task force completed over 3,900 leads in addition to the initial 500 interviews.

At the onset of this investigation it was apparent that no one agency could effectively handle the number of leads, interviews and evidence analysis which this case required. Approximately 80 investigators from a dozen city, county, state and federal law enforcement agencies formed the Columbine Task Force.

Investigation Objective

The main objective of the investigation was to determine exactly what occurred at Columbine
High School and to determine whether anyone else participated in the shootings, assisted in the planning or had prior knowledge of what Harris and Klebold did on April 20. Another objective was to interview every student, faculty member and employee of Columbine High School and determine where each individual was at the time of the shootings and what they witnessed. The investigation also gathered background information on Harris and Klebold, the Trench Coat Mafia and their activities.

Seven teams were formed to deal with specific areas of the investigation. Each team identified critical witnesses who provided significant information or witnessed the actions of Harris and Klebold on April 20, 1999. Summaries were then prepared detailing those critical witnesses.

- The Threats Team, led by Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Sgt. JJ Webb, focused on the threat of additional violence that began pouring in within hours of the shootings. They responded to all threats in the metro area and provided assistance to other law enforcement agencies who were experiencing threats of copycat crimes.

- Running parallel to this were Internet investigators that followed up on all Internet threats.

- The Associates Team, led by Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Don Estep and FBI Special Agent Mark Holstlaw, identified and interviewed all friends and associates of Klebold and Harris. Some of the associates submitted to polygraphs and had their computers searched.

- The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Team was led by Special Agents Marcus Motte and Matthew Traver. This team traced the weapons and bomb components, used by Harris and Klebold.

- The Outside Team, led by FBI Special Agent Mike Barnett and JCSO Investigators Jack McFadden and Cheryl Zimmermen, determined the activities of Harris and Klebold the morning of April 20 as well as interviewing all of the witnesses who were outside during the shooting.

- The Cafeteria Team, led by FBI Special Agent Rich Price and Denver Police Department Sergeant Calvin Hemphill, interviewed all the witnesses in the cafeteria and determined when the two incendiary devises were placed there.
The Library Team, led by Arvada Police Detective Russ Boatright, FBI Special Agent John Elvig and JCSO Investigator Diane Obbema, interviewed all survivors in the library and established a “second by second” sequence of events.

The Computer/Internet Forensics Team, led by CBI Agent Chuck Davis, conducted all the forensic evaluations and searches on the many computers, floppy discs and compact discs belonging to Harris, Klebold and other individuals. This team also identified and evaluated various Internet sites used by Harris and Klebold and many Internet sites that formed after April 20 by those sympathetic to Harris and Klebold.

Complementing these teams was a Documentation Team, led by Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Sgt. Chris Tomford, who organized and indexed all the reports according to where each witness was on April 20. Many of these same reports were organized according to background information on Harris, Klebold and their associates. Initially, there were many duplicate reports in many different books so that the reports could be quickly located. At the conclusion of the investigation, all the duplicate reports were removed and all the information was cross-referenced. Gateway provided computers, scanners and software with a sophisticated database. The reports will be scanned into the database so that the information contained in the reports can be quickly located by making a simple query.

Working alongside these investigation teams was the Crime Scene Team, led by Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office crime lab supervisor Chris Andrist, which was actually a group of teams composed of members of different agencies and specialties. Each of the seven teams had experts in blood spatter, firearms/ballistics and general crime scene, and each team was assigned a specific area of the school for crime scene processing.
As the investigation came to a conclusion, a timeline was compiled detailing all the significant activities and events which occurred on April 20, 1999. This is the timeline used as a basis for this comprehensive report. The information for the timeline came from many different sources to include witness interviews, written reports, videotapes, 911 calls, law enforcement and medical radio traffic, evidence, ballistic reports and autopsy reports.

Although the investigation into the shootings at Columbine High School reached conclusion in January 2000, the case remains open in the event that any new information comes to light.
Findings of Outside Events

The Outside Team was led by FBI Special Agent Michael Barnett and assisted by JCSO Investigators Jack McFadden and Cheryl Zimmerman. They were assigned the task of identifying any additional suspects involved in the shooting, pre-bomb activities, and outside witnesses. There were 16 investigators assigned to this team for varying terms based on availability. Six hundred and seventy-one (671) leads were assigned to this team, which included a portion of the interior classroom interviews.

Critical Witnesses

Ninety-one critical witnesses were identified as having witnessed significant events such as movements and actions of Harris and Klebold. Eighty-three of those witnesses were not injured and the remaining eight were victims. Two of the injured were just inside the school however, they were injured from outside and therefore included in the outside summary. Critical witnesses included students, school employees and adult citizens who observed something outside the school.

Suspect Identification

Identification of the suspects ranged from personal acquaintances to selection from photographic line-ups. Additional identifications were made based on physical descriptions coupled with observation of known actions of the suspects. The witness information was broken into three chronological time segments being “immediately before,” “during,” and “after” the incident. Based on witness statements, evidence, ballistic reports and the totality of the investigation, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold were determined to be the only two individuals apparently involved in the shootings at Columbine High School.

Victims

Those victims wounded outside the school as a direct result of Harris and/or Klebold were identified as follows:

1. Richard Castaldo
2. Sean Graves
3. Lance Kirklin
4. Michael Johnson
5. Mark Taylor
The deceased were identified as follows:

1. Rachel Scott
2. Daniel Rohrbough

Observations of Witnesses

Throughout the investigation there were many witnesses who had common perceptions and misperceptions of the events during the shooting.

- When the shooting began, many witnesses believed it was a senior prank.
- Time was distorted.
- Many witnesses described events in detail but had difficulty recalling the chronological order of the events.
- After the shootings many witnesses compared accounts of what had occurred and were influenced by each other, resulting in multiple interviews for clarification.

The inaccuracy of some media reports influenced witness statements.

Chronological Outside Witness Summary

The following is a chronological account of what is believed to have occurred outside of Columbine High School on April 20th, 1999, based on statements of witnesses, ballistic evidence and autopsy reports.

April 20, 1999 was one of the first warm, sunny days of the spring. Many students were taking advantage of the spring day by eating their lunches outside, relaxing on the grassy areas around the school building. The first series of gunshots, fired toward the west doors, struck Rachel Scott and Richard Castaldo, who were seated outside, eating their lunch on the north side of the library. Rachel died from the gunshot wounds. Richard was critically injured, receiving multiple gunshot wounds.

Harris took off his trench coat and laid it on the ground near the top of the shortly after he began shooting. Klebold wore his black trench coat the entire time they remained outside.

The gunmen then turned their attention to outside the cafeteria and started shooting down the incline toward the bottom of the stairs. Harris rested his gun on the chain link fence at the top of
the steps and fired at students below. Daniel Rohrbough, Sean Graves, and Lance Kirklin had just stepped outside through a side door of the school cafeteria. One of them wanted to go to the “smoker's pit” just off campus for a cigarette and the other two friends were accompanying him. Glancing in the direction of Klebold and Harris, the friends noticed two students with what looked like guns. Their first thoughts were that the guns were paint ball guns and part of a Senior Prank Day. They did not think anything was wrong. They thought it was a joke.

The three walked out the northwest side entrance from the cafeteria, heading up the dirt slope between the steps and the cafeteria wall toward the gunmen. Harris and Klebold started shooting before the boys got halfway up the hill. All three were injured.

Five students were sitting behind a few small pine trees to the west of the top of the stairs. They stood up to run when the two suspects fired gunshots in their direction. Students Michael Johnson and Mark Taylor were struck by these bullets. Johnson was able to reach the outdoor athletic storage shed where he took cover with others. Taylor fell back to the ground, unable to flee with the others.

Klebold went back down the stairs to the area outside the cafeteria and shot Rohrbough, killing him instantly. He then shot Kirklin at close range.

Graves was able to drag himself back down to a cafeteria doorway in an attempt to get back inside. He lost all strength and ended up half in and half out of the door, propping it open with his body. Klebold, who had just shot Rohrbough and Kirklin, stepped over Graves, now playing dead in the doorway. That probably saved his life. The gunman briefly went into the cafeteria, holding his weapon in what some described as a “ready-to-fire” sweeping motion. He did not shoot but looked around and then walked back outside and returned to the top of the steps.

Teacher Dave Sanders gets kids out of cafeteria

While Harris and Klebold were shooting from the top of the stairs, teacher William “Dave” Sanders heard the initial commotion going on outside. Walking into the cafeteria from the teachers’ lounge, he saw students beginning to react to the events outside the cafeteria windows. The actions on the cafeteria videotape show students standing up, looking outside, and, based on subsequent interviews, said they were wondering and asking each other, “What’s going on? Is this a senior prank? Are they filming a movie?” (Some of the kids knew Harris and Klebold were active in a video class).

Sanders and school custodians Jon Curtis and Jay Gallatine realized there was a danger. On the videotape, the teacher and the custodians can be seen in the cafeteria directing the students to get down. Students begin to hide under the lunch room tables and then, realizing the danger, the students exit in mass up the stairs from the cafeteria to the second level.

By the time Klebold stepped over Graves and briefly walked into the entrance of the cafeteria with his guns, most students had evacuated. Others were hiding under tables or had sought
refuge in the school pantry, the refrigerator or kitchen area. Because Sanders had instructed the kids to hide or get out, the cafeteria appeared to be empty.

Klebold turned around and walked back outside, stepping over Sean Graves, and joined Harris back at the top of the stairs. The gunmen continued shooting their guns, lighting pipe bombs and throwing them into the senior parking lot or onto the school roof, while shooting toward the ball fields where students were fleeing.

More shots fired outside the school

Meanwhile, Harris continued shooting down the stairs. Anne Marie Hochhalter was shot as she stood to run toward the cafeteria from where she was seated with friends at the curb by the senior parking lot. A friend dragged her away from the gunfire to the cafeteria wall. He left Hochhalter near the building and ran into the parking lot, hiding behind vehicles in the senior lot. From here he heard someone yell, “This is what we always wanted to do. This is awesome!” Hochhalter was the last one shot outside the school.

From the onset and continuing throughout the outside shooting, both suspects were seen lighting and throwing explosive devices onto the roof, into the parking lot and toward the grassy hillside. One suspect was seen taking four bombs from inside his coat and throwing them. The witness also observed a gun attached to a gun strap that hung to his side. Others saw bombs taken from a box or bag at the gunmen’s feet.

The gunmen threw a pipe bomb in the area where Hochhalter had originally collapsed. The bomb exploded. Additional gunshots were fired toward the ball fields where students were fleeing. This time, no one was injured.

It’s now 11:25 a.m. Only four minutes have passed.

Most of the students having lunch outside had escaped to safer areas, and there was not much else to shoot at outside the building. Harris and Klebold turned toward the west entrance and fired their weapons into the school as they walked toward the entrance.

The west entrance has two outer and inner sets of doors with glass windows that were shattered by the bullets from the killers’ guns.

Teacher Patricia Nielson was on her way outside to tell the shooters to “knock it off,” thinking the weapons were toy guns and that a video production was being taped. Nielson suffered abrasions to her shoulder, forearm and knee from the flying glass.

Student Brian Anderson was with a friend in a hallway of the school when they heard explosions and screaming and were told by a teacher to get out. They ran to the west doors but when they exited the interior set of doors and were in the air-lock approaching the exterior doors, Anderson saw Harris shoot through the glass doors and was injured by flying glass.
fragments as the door shattered.

Both Nielson and Anderson had the opportunity to flee, despite their injuries, when Harris and Klebold were distracted by the arrival of community resource officer Deputy Neil Gardner. Gardner had just pulled up in the lower senior parking lot of the school with the lights on his patrol car flashing and the siren blaring.

Nielson and Anderson fled to the school library. Nielson, hiding under the front counter, called 911. Anderson sought refuge in the magazine room.

Harris, just outside the double west doors, turned at the arrival of Deputy Neil Gardner. From there, he exchanged gunfire with Gardner.
Findings of the Cafeteria Events

The Cafeteria Team was led by FBI Special Agent Rich Price and assisted by Denver Police Department Sergeant Calvin Hemphill. The team was assigned the task of identifying and interviewing all students, faculty and school employees that were in the school cafeteria before, during and immediately following the shooting. The purpose of the interviews was to specifically identify witness locations and proximity to others within the cafeteria, identification of students sitting with other students, identifying what they witnessed, and their exit out of the cafeteria once the shootings began. The cafeteria team consisted of 27 investigators for varying terms based on availability. A total of 751 leads were assigned to the cafeteria team, which included areas in close proximity to the cafeteria.
The Evidence Response Teams (ERT) of the FBI, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office drafted detailed diagrams of the cafeteria depicting and identifying cafeteria tables. These diagrams assisted in identifying where students were located within the cafeteria. Investigators used the diagrams to have students mark their location and their escape from the cafeteria once the incident began. This method of identifying student location with diagrams and subsequent interviews assisted in corroborating witness statements.

Over 400 backpacks (shown below in the auditorium) were initially recovered in the cafeteria and helped the investigators identify students believed to be present in the cafeteria
when the incident began. School records also provided student and faculty information as to scheduled lunch periods and class schedules. Witness interviews resulted in identifying those students who did not leave their backpacks behind.

Critical Witnesses

There were 488 individuals inside the cafeteria when the shootings began. Fifty-one of those were identified as critical witnesses. Critical witnesses are those who actually saw a gunman, saw a victim get injured or saw duffel bags inside the cafeteria which may have contained explosive devices. The majority of critical witnesses inside the cafeteria were positioned along the west side, adjacent to the windows of the cafeteria which face the events occurring outside.

Suspect Identification

Identification of the suspects ranged from personal acquaintances to physical descriptions of Harris and Klebold. Witnesses observed Klebold and Harris with weapons, explosives or both. No one other than Harris and Klebold were identified as being involved in the shootings.

Observation of Witnesses

The majority of the cafeteria witnesses observed events that were occurring outside and those events are addressed in the Outside Events Summary. Other critical witnesses in the cafeteria recall seeing a large blue duffel bag in the cafeteria where the partial detonation subsequently occurred. Other witnesses remained in the cafeteria and observed Harris and
Klebold enter from the upstairs library hallway and shoot at the duffel bag. These witnesses ultimately left the cafeteria after the partial detonation.

There was no one injured in the cafeteria as a direct result of Harris and Klebold’s actions.
Hallway Events - Part 1

The hallway events were compiled after reviewing reports of those students and staff who were in the hallways when the shootings at Columbine High School began. The purpose was to identify the chronological movements of the gunmen throughout the school.

Critical Witnesses

Twenty-six witnesses to significant events, which occurred in the hallways, particularly the actions of Harris and/or Klebold and their movements, were identified. Some of these witnesses observed events from classrooms and others were in the hallways as the events unfolded. There were also witnesses who were in the cafeteria when the shootings began; however, they quickly left the cafeteria and observed events elsewhere. The hallway critical witnesses are comprised of two teachers, one secretary, one Campus Supervisor and 22 students.

Two of those witnesses, Stephanie Munson and Dave Sanders are also victims.

Suspect Identification

Two suspects were identified as being present in the hallways of Columbine High School that day.

Of the 25 living witnesses, eight positively identified Dylan Klebold as the person they saw in the school hallway. Klebold was seen either in possession of a weapon, shooting a weapon, or was in the area where gunfire or explosions were heard. Nine additional witnesses described seeing a suspect who matched Klebold's description.

Of the same 25 witnesses, five positively identified Eric Harris as the person they saw in the school hallway. Harris was seen either in possession of a weapon, shooting a weapon, or was in the area where gunfire or explosions were heard. Seven additional witnesses described seeing a suspect who matched the description of Eric Harris.

Summary of Events Which Occurred In the Hallways

The following is a chronological account of what is believed to have occurred in the hallways of Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, based on statements of witnesses who were in the hallways and classrooms during the incident as well as ballistic evidence.

Class was in session for those students who did not have the first lunch period so there were not many people out and about in the school. Up to this point, the entire situation had taken
place outside and no one inside the school, other than in the cafeteria, yet realized there was a problem.

A student standing near the library entrance saw Brian Anderson, injured by glass and shrapnel from the shattered west doors, stagger south down the hallway in front of the library. She also saw teacher Patti Nielson run into the library’s main entrance before she herself decided to run. The student ran to teacher Dave Sanders who was at the top of the cafeteria stairs. Sanders told her to get downstairs.

Student witnesses who entered the north main hallway from adjoining classrooms saw Klebold and Harris standing just inside the school’s west main level entry doors. Both suspects, they recalled, were armed with guns. Students reported seeing Klebold fire a semi-automatic weapon toward the students to the east and south down the library hallway. Witnesses heard bullets hitting lockers and hard objects in the hallway as they ran for cover.
Student Stephanie Munson came out of her physics lab and was walking down the technology lab hallway to the photo lab in the north main hallway. She was shot as she ran through the main lobby and out the double glass doors at the school’s main entrance.

A student in the gym hallway observed Klebold and Harris walking east down the north hallway. Both were firing weapons to the east. And both were laughing.
A student who was in the counseling hallway saw students in the north hallway running east through the lobby. Klebold was running behind them, but came to an abrupt halt near a bank of phones at the entrance to the main lobby area.

Yet another student, on the telephone with her mother, glanced up in time to see the sleeve of a black trench coat shooting a TEC-9 towards the main entrance of the school. She dropped the phone and hid in a nearby bathroom until she could no longer hear any activity in the hallway. The gunmen, she assumed, had turned around and gone back the other way. “Mom, there’s a shooter in the school. Come pick me up,” she whispered through the phone to her mother before escaping through the east doors to the outside. Her mother’s cell phone bill showed this call was made between 11:23 a.m. and 11:26 a.m. and lasted 3.8 minutes.

Klebold was last seen running west down the north main hall in the direction of the library.

While Klebold was running towards the library hallway, teacher Dave Sanders had come up the stairway from the cafeteria to the south main hall in an effort to direct as many students as possible to safety. One student ran with him up the stairs and to the right north in the hallway in front of the library. The student running alongside Sanders stated that she saw Klebold standing by the west doors holding his gun with both hands. He began shooting a “rapid firing black gun” in their direction, and they both turned around and ran back toward the stairway.

As Sanders was starting to turn the corner from the library hallway, he was mortally wounded. Ballistics cannot positively identify the bullets or the weapon used to shoot Sanders. Evidence indicates that both Klebold and Harris at some point fired their weapons south down the library
Sanders was able to crawl to the corner of the Science hallway where a teacher helped him into one of the science classrooms. A group of students, including two Eagle Scouts, Aaron Hancey and Kevin Starkey, gathered around him, tending to his injuries and administering first aid.

In the meantime, Harris and Klebold walked up and down the library hallway, randomly shooting and detonating explosives. There was no one in this hallway anymore. Everyone had either ducked into classrooms to hide, barricading themselves behind locked doors and uprighted tables, or had run out the east exits of the school and across the street to safety at Leawood Park. Others escaped to the music room or choir room. Still others hid in the auditorium. They may have been in different places but, for the most part, all were hidden.

Investigators later scrutinized a 911 call made from the school’s library. From the tape, the investigation shows that Harris and Klebold spent almost three minutes in the library hallway randomly shooting their weapons and lighting and throwing pipe bombs. They threw two pipe bombs in the hallway and more over the stairway railing down into the cafeteria.

Investigators believe that at this point, the gunmen no longer had a definite plan in mind. Their diversionary bombs secretly placed in the Wadsworth greenbelt were not successful and did not divert attention away from the school for any measurable amount of time. The massive propane bombs placed in the cafeteria did not explode. The police arrived on scene much sooner than the killers anticipated. They had been shot at and they were not sure what to do next.

According to the investigation, the murders that took place in the library were not planned. The library was never mentioned in any of the plans or earlier writings of the gunmen.
Findings of Library Events

The Library Team was led by Arvada Police Department Russ Boatright and assisted by FBI Special Agent John Elvig and JCSO Investigator Diane Obbema. There were three additional investigators assigned to this team for varying terms based on availability. The library team was given the responsibility of investigating the events which transpired in the Columbine High School library on April 20, 1999. In order to accomplish that task, the library team conducted detailed interviews with surviving victims and witnesses. In conjunction with the victim/witness interviews, the library team utilized the 911 tape, physical evidence collected at the scene, ballistic reports, medical reports and autopsy reports to determine the sequence of events as they occurred in the library. In addition, the team consulted with the Jefferson County Coroner and various pathologists to assist in determining the suspects' actions while in the library.

Critical Witnesses

The library team determined there was a total of 56 people present in the library at the time the suspects entered. Of the 56 people present, four were faculty/staff (all female), while the remaining 52 individuals were students. In terms of the 52 students, 24 were male, 28 were female. Students were of various grades and ranged in age from 15 to 18. All of the witnesses in the library were determined to be critical, as all of them observed movements and actions of Harris and Klebold.

Suspect Identification

Only two suspects were identified as being responsible for injuring or killing those present in
the library. The two suspects were identified as Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. There were no discrepancies regarding that issue. Harris was identified as being responsible for injuring seven people while Klebold injured six people. Both were responsible for injuring one of the individuals. Harris was responsible for killing five students; Klebold killed two. Together Harris and Klebold killed an additional three students.

**Victims**

In respect to those present in the library, 12 received injuries of varying degrees while 10 received fatal injuries. The injured were identified as follows:

1. Jennifer Doyle
2. Steven Eubanks
3. Makai Hall
4. Patrick Ireland
5. Mark Kintgen
6. Lisa Kreutz
7. Nicole Nowlen
8. Kacey Reugsegger
9. Jeanna Park
10. Valeen Schnurr
11. Danny Steepleton
12. Evan Todd

The deceased were identified as follows:

1. Cassie Bernall
2. Steven Curnow
3. Corey DePooter
4. Kelly Fleming
5. Matthew Kechter
6. Daniel Mauser
7. Isaiah Shoels
8. John Tomlin
9. Lauren Townsend
10. Kyle Velasquez

**Observations of Witnesses**

Throughout the investigation there were many witnesses who had common perceptions and misperceptions of the events during the shooting.

- Initially heard popping sounds which did not create any concern (some students thought they were hearing construction noises).

- During the initial phase of this incident, witnesses believed the suspects were engaging in a senior prank.

- The belief they were hidden from view as the suspects entered the library.

- The inability to estimate the number of gunshots during the course of the incident.

- Inability to distinguish between the gunshots and explosions.

- Distortion of time.

- The belief the suspects were enjoying themselves during the incident.

- Impaired observations or recall at the point the suspects came within close proximity of their location.

- For those who were injured (even slightly), the belief they were the last one shot (impaired recall after being injured).

- The belief "playing dead" would discourage additional violence.

- The belief they were one of the last people to leave the library.

- Many of victims/witnesses were able to recall various details of the incident but had difficulty recalling the events in chronological order.

- It was evident the media had an impact on witness' statements. Students would watch or read coverage of the Columbine shootings and make conclusions based on some of the impressions presented by the media rather than from their own perceptions. Those problems usually were rectified during the interviews.

**Chronological Library Witness Summary**
The following is a chronological account of what is believed to have occurred inside the Columbine High School library on April 20, 1999, based on a conglomerate of witness statements. The library team did not conduct an investigation related to the suspects' activities after leaving the library. Additionally, the team did not conduct any investigation into the deaths of Eric Harris or Dylan Klebold.

Normally, the school library at Columbine was much more crowded than it was on April 20 and students could have trouble finding a table at which to sit. But on this day, there were empty chairs. Because of the nice weather, many students had opted to be outside instead.

At approximately 11:20 a.m., students and teachers in the library began to hear what was described as popping noises coming from the northwest outside area of the school. Witnesses also described hearing what they later believed were gunshots and explosions inside the school. Some of the witnesses described hearing those sounds emanating from the cafeteria or commons area, in addition to directly outside the library.

Teacher Patricia Nielson, already injured, ran into the library and called 911. In between telling the dispatcher what was happening, she screamed at the students that there were students with guns and for everyone to get under the tables. Nielson knew they had nowhere to go. The last time she saw the gunmen, they were outside (near the emergency exit from the library) and they were heading inside the hall that led to the library.

In reflecting back, many of the students in the library, like so many in the school that day, initially thought the commotion they were hearing was a senior prank. As the realization hit that real bullets were being fired, they followed Nielson’s orders and got under the tables. Almost all the students initially thought that by getting under the tables they were hidden from the gunmen’s view. They were not.

Teacher Peggy Dodd was in the library when she looked out the window and saw Klebold “standing on the hill, just shooting.” She recognized him as a student in one of her computer
classes the previous year and remembered him as a troublemaker who hacked into computers and wore tall “Nazi” boots and an overcoat. According to Dodd, Klebold was holding a weapon with both hands and, using a sweeping motion, was pointing it toward the south parking lot.

Dodd also recalled seeing teacher Dave Sanders running down the hallway to the north in front of the library. He motioned with his hands that they should stay in the library. Sanders, at that time, did not appear wounded.

Nielson hid under the front counter just inside the door and several times she peeked over the counter to ensure the students were hidden under tables. By then, Harris and Klebold were in the hall directly outside the library shooting their weapons and throwing pipe bombs. Harris threw a lit device, which some students described as resembling “dynamite,” in a southerly direction. Moments later there was an explosion in the hall directly outside the library. Smoke was pouring into the library and fire alarms began to wail.

**Suspects Enter the Library**

At 11:29 a.m. the gunmen entered the school library yelling “Get up!” Some witnesses reported hearing one of them yell, “Everyone with a white cap or baseball cap, stand up.” Others reported hearing, “All jocks stand up. We’ll get the guys in white hats!” When no one stood up, a witness heard one of the gunman say, “Fine, I’ll start shooting.”

![Monitoring equipment](image)

Harris fired shotgun rounds down the length of the front counter. Evan Todd, crouched behind a copier stand, was injured by flying wood splinters.

**The gunmen then walked through the library toward the west windows.** Student Kyle Velasquez was the only student not hiding under a desk or table. Instead, he was sitting at the north computer table and was shot by Klebold as he walked by him to the windows.

Harris and Klebold set down their backpacks, filled with ammunition and Molotov cocktails,
on one of the computer tables and approached the library windows. Harris was down on one knee shooting out the west library windows toward law enforcement officers and fleeing students. Klebold subsequently positioned himself next to Harris and fired out the window as well. At this point, Klebold took off his trench coat.

Also at this point, teacher Patricia Nielson, who initiated the 911 call from the library, dropped the phone and no further communication with the dispatcher occurred.

Klebold shot toward table 15 hitting Daniel Steepleton, Makai Hall and Patrick Ireland. As Ireland was attempting to administer first aid, he was shot again.

Meanwhile, Harris killed Steven Curnow, hiding under the south computer table, and wounded Kacey Reugsegger, crouched next to Steven.

Harris walked over to table 19 where he bent down and saw two frightened girls. He slapped the table top twice, said, “Peek-a-boo,” and fired, killing Cassie Bernall. After shooting Cassie, Harris made a comment about hitting himself in the face. Investigators believe Harris broke his nose as a result of the “kick” from the shotgun when he bent to fire under the table.

He then turned to Bree Pasquale who was sitting on the floor because there was not enough room under the nearby table. Harris asked her if she wanted to die. As the girl pleaded for her life, she observed blood flowing from his nose. She later said that Harris seemed disoriented for a moment but was able to refocus when Klebold called his attention to table 16 under which two boys were hiding. One of the boys, Klebold announced, was black. Bree also recalled Harris laughing and saying, “Everyone’s gonna die” and “We’re gonna blow up the school anyway.”

Harris and Klebold stood on opposite sides of table 16. Klebold, standing on the east side of the table, was heard making a racial comment and began grabbing at Isaiah Shoels in an effort to pull him out from underneath the table. Harris fired under the table, killing Isaiah. Klebold fired under the table as well, killing Matthew Kechter.

Harris threw a small CO₂ cartridge south which rolled under table 15. Makai Hall grabbed it and threw it further south away from everyone where it exploded. Witnesses next described Harris as moving south in the library to the west bookshelves where he jumped up on the shelves and began shaking them back and forth while swearing. He then walked between the bookshelves where witnesses lost sight of him. Witnesses did report hearing books being shot in the area near the west set of bookshelves shortly after Harris walked into that area.

Harris and Klebold left the west area of the library and walked east toward the entrance.

Klebold shot out the display cabinet near the front door before he fired toward table 1, injuring Mark Kintgen. His attention then turned to table 2 and he fired under that table. The first shot fired injured Valeen Schnurr and Lisa Kreutz. Walking beside the table, Klebold proceeded to fire as fast as his gun would shoot, killing Lauren Townsend.
While Klebold was at table 2, Harris stopped near table 3 under which two girls were hiding. He looked under the table and, upon seeing them, simply said, “Pathetic,” and walked away.

Valeen, who was critically hurt, began to cry, “Oh God, help me.” Klebold, who had shot her, came back and taunted her about her belief in God. He then walked away.

Harris was seen stepping toward table 6 and firing under the table, injuring both Nicole Nowlen and John Tomlin. Tomlin came out from under the table and Klebold shot and killed him.

Harris walked around table 6 and shot and killed Kelly Fleming, who was near table 2 where three students had already been shot. He then fired under table 2, again hitting Lauren Townsend and Lisa Kreutz, and wounding Jeanna Park as well.

Harris and Klebold left the library's east area and entered the center section, reloading their weapons at table 13.

Harris, noticing a student under table 11, told him to identify himself. The student, who was an acquaintance of Klebold, identified himself and asked Klebold what he was doing. Klebold replied, “Oh, just killing people.” The student asked if Klebold was going to kill him. Klebold told him to get out of the library, which he did.

While standing north of table 11, Harris shot under table 9, killing Daniel Mauser.

Both then shot under table 14, injuring Jennifer Doyle and Austin Eubanks and killing Corey DePooter. Corey was the last killed. He was killed at 11:35.

Klebold and Harris walked north toward the main counter of the library. Harris threw a Molotov cocktail toward the southwest side of the library.

The gunmen went behind the counter and had a confrontation with Evan Todd, who had moved under the counter after being injured. The gunmen taunted him and discussed whether or not to kill him. They walked away instead and Klebold fired back into the “kitchen” area of the library, striking a television.

Gunmen Leave the Library

Harris and Klebold were heard talking about going to the school’s commons area. Klebold picked up a chair, threw it on top of a computer terminal on the main counter under which Nielson was hiding, and the two walked out of the library’s main entrance into the hallway. It was 11:36. Only 7 ½ minutes had passed, the time it took the gunmen to shoot and kill ten people and wound 12 more. There were a total of 56 people in the library. The gunmen had enough ammunition to kill every single one of them, but they didn’t.

When the gunmen left, the library was filled with smoke and the fire alarms were blaring. The students’ ears were ringing, the injured were moaning, and yet almost all of them described it as eerily quiet. The gunfire had stopped. The gunmen’s taunts and laughter had stopped.
No one wanted to look at each other. No one knew if the gunmen would come back and finish what they started. No one wanted to face the reality of what they had just witnessed. Slowly, they began to move, not all at once as a group, but one by one or in small groups of two or three. They moved when their fear of staying became bigger than their fear of moving.

The Living Escape from the Library

All of the students and teachers who left the library went through the emergency exit, which leads to the west entrance where the gunmen first entered the school. They ran to the safety of the waiting patrol cars and armed deputies who could give them protection and lead them to safety.

The kids gave the deputies an important fact. The gunmen were not in the library anymore.

A short time later Nielsen, who had initiated the 911 call from the library, crawled into the break room ("kitchen") and hid in a cupboard. Library technician Carole Weld and assistant Lois Kean remained hidden in the television studio. Teacher Peggy Dodd was hiding in the periodicals room. All four remained in the library until they were evacuated by SWAT.

Patrick Ireland, who slipped in and out of consciousness slowly made his way to the west window and fell out into the arms of SWAT at 2:38 p.m. Lisa Kreutz, the last of the wounded, was rescued when SWAT entered the library at 3:22 p.m. Lisa was being transported to Denver Health Medical by 3:37 p.m.
Hallway Events - Part 2

From the library Harris and Klebold went into the science area. Witnesses described the two as looking through the windows of some of the classrooms’ locked doors, making eye contact with some of the students, yet doing nothing of any consequence.

A teacher reported seeing Klebold and Harris in the Science hallway, stopping in front of the chemical storage room just east of the Science Room where she was hiding with wounded teacher Dave Sanders and students. Several witnesses said the suspects were shooting into empty rooms and taped a Molotov cocktail on the storage room door. The device caused a small fire in the storage room. The gunmen did not appear to witnesses to be overly intent on gaining access to any of the rooms. Their behavior now seemed directionless.

The suspects left the science area and went down into the cafeteria together at 11:44. The cafeteria videotape recorded Harris kneeling down and resting his rifle on the stair railing and firing several shots, possibly at one of the large 20-pound propane bombs. From his actions, investigators determined that Harris knew where the bomb was located and in what duffel bag. Photos of the cafeteria show duffel bags and backpacks scattered all over, yet Harris seemed to know exactly where the bombs were. He apparently shot at the one, presumably in an attempt to make it explode. It didn’t.

The videotape also recorded Klebold walking directly over to the same bomb after Harris’ attempts to detonate it failed. The tape showed Klebold inspecting it and fiddling with something on the floor.

The suspects took a moment for a drink of water, drinking from water bottles left behind on the lunch tables by students as they fled the cafeteria.

Klebold then stood back and lit something, possibly a CO2 cartridge or a pipe bomb, and threw it at their propane bomb. They left the cafeteria as the bomb was detonated.
The videotape showed a partial detonation of the bomb and a fire at 11:46. The bomb was attached to smaller containers of flammable liquids that possibly were ignited by the device thrown by Klebold. That explosion caused the fire in the cafeteria that, in turn, set off the fire alarm and the sprinkler system. These events were caught on the cafeteria’s security cameras.

The large 20-lb propane bomb and the second complete bomb/duffel bag beside a nearby table did not explode.

Harris and Klebold were in the cafeteria about two and one-half minutes. They walked back up the stairs and to main office area to the east. A lengthy 911 phone call made by a school secretary and an unarmed school security officer from the main office reported shots fired in the office, into the ceiling and in the art hallway to the north between 11:53 a.m. and 11:55 a.m.

According to the Sheriff’s Office dispatch tape, law enforcement officers on the east side of the school reported noises and shots coming from the school’s northeast side at 11:53.
Klebold and Harris' movements continued to be random. They returned to the cafeteria at 11:56 a.m. Their images, captured once again on the cafeteria’s security cameras, show a defeated posture. The bombs did not explode, the sprinkler system put out the fire caused by the gasoline and fuel explosion, and the damage seemed to be minimal compared to their original plan. The videotape shows the suspects standing in the cafeteria, then walking back towards the kitchen area for less than 30 seconds and then back up the stairs to the second floor at precisely 12:00 noon.

Klebold and Harris returned to the library where they fired through the library windows at law enforcement officers and paramedics outside the school. Shots were fired between 12:02 and 12:05 p.m. After that, no gunshots attributed to the gunmen were heard.

At this point, the only survivors in the library were Lisa Kruetz, Patrick Ireland, Patti Nielson and three other employees hiding in back rooms of the library. The survivors were unable to pinpoint any specific times they heard gunfire and could not tell the difference between the suspects' gunfire and SWAT's cover gunfire. Because of the cover fire occurring throughout the rescues, the witnesses were unable to pinpoint when Harris and Klebold killed themselves.

Investigators believe, however, that Harris and Klebold killed themselves shortly after they came back to the library, shortly after they shot at law enforcement and paramedics through the library windows.

At 12:08 p.m., a smoke alarm on the ceiling of the school library is activated. The smoke alarm is above the area where the bodies of the suspects are later found. A small fire from a Molotov cocktail presumably activated the alarm. The “cocktail,” lit by one of the gunmen, was placed on a library table. Evidence shows that when the glass bottle holding the cocktail got hot enough to break, the liquid inside the device spilled and started a small fire. A thorough investigation by a CBI arson investigator determined that there was evidence on the table and around the gunmen’s bodies indicating that the gunmen took their own lives before the fire occurred on the table. Additionally, the small fire from the Molotov cocktail is the only event that can be attributed to the fire alarm going off at 12:08 p.m. in the same area.

The Coroner’s findings reported that Klebold and Harris’s deaths were consistent with self-inflicted gunshots. Each died of a gunshot wound to the head.
The Trench Coat Mafia & Associates

On April 20, 1999, eyewitnesses to the shooting at Columbine High School tentatively identified Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold as two of the gunmen. There were also unconfirmed reports of a third, and possibly more, shooters involved. The identities of Harris and Klebold were later confirmed after their bodies were found in the Columbine High School library. Both died of apparent self-inflicted gunshot wounds.

Early intelligence information gathered at the crime scene from witnesses referred to Harris and Klebold’s involvement, or membership, in a group at Columbine High School commonly known as the Trench Coat Mafia (TCM). A number of Columbine students and faculty were interviewed as the events at the school unfolded on April 20 and many claimed to be familiar with the TCM and its members.

Associates Team Created

The Associates Team, led by Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Don Estep and FBI Special Agent Mark Holstlaw, had the responsibility of identifying all associates of Harris and Klebold. Included in the identification were any members, past or present, of the TCM.

Once identified, all members and associates were to be interviewed and investigated by the associates team. The goal was to determine if any other person may have participated or conspired with Harris and Klebold in the preparation or carrying out of the events of April 20 or any related crime. The team was also assigned to identify anyone who had any prior knowledge that Harris and Klebold were planning the shootings.

Twenty-one individuals were initially identified as TCM members. These initial 21 provided pertinent information regarding the origin and membership of the Trench Coat Mafia and their associates. Some of these individuals also provided specific information about Harris and Klebold and how they related to the other members in their social circle.

From these interviews, 20 additional individuals were identified as associates of Harris and Klebold, and several others were identified as acquaintances. In addition, the associates team identified any friends or co-workers of Harris and Klebold in order to obtain background information on the activities of the two.

After conducting numerous interviews, the associates team determined each identified person’s relationship to Harris and/or Klebold. Some appeared to have had only a peripheral or minimal relationship with the shooters. Close associates of Harris and Klebold and the Trench Coat Mafia primarily consisted of friends within Columbine High School. Others were initially associated with the group only because they were friends of an alleged TCM member. Several individuals were identified as associates because they worked at Blackjack Pizza with Harris and Klebold or socialized with them outside of Columbine High School.

The Trench Coat Mafia

Although the investigation identified Harris and Klebold as being “members” of the TCM, it appears that the Trench Coat Mafia was a loose, social affiliation of former and current Columbine High School students with no formal organizational structure, leadership or purpose such as that typically found in traditional juvenile street gangs. Contrary to reports following the Columbine shootings, there is no evidence of affiliated Trench
Coat Mafia groups nationwide.

The origination of the title “Trench Coat Mafia” is not clear. It appears that some of the early group members had begun wearing black trench coats or dusters to school. A common characteristic used by Columbine students to initially identify TCM members was the black trench coats. That type of dress, combined with members being viewed within the school population as “outcasts,” led to the creation of the name, either by the members themselves or by someone outside the group.

Many of the TCM members also participated in playing video games, such as Doom, and producing videos together for school projects.

A number of those interviewed related that members of the TCM (individually and as a group) were often harassed by student athletes (“jocks”).

The TCM appears to have had cliques or small subgroups, not much different than most other social groups in a high school setting. Harris and Klebold had a few close associates in the TCM, but overall were not described as having any particular influence or leadership roles within the Trench Coat Mafia. Their friends and associates described them as often wearing the same black dusters which they wore during the shootings on April 20.

Photographs appearing in the high school’s 1998 yearbook were obtained, identifying those in a group photo as TCM members. Additionally, the 1999 senior class photo (taken in March 1999) reflected several of the same members posing as if they were pointing weapons at the camera. Neither Klebold or Harris appear in the ’98 TCM photograph, but they are a part of the senior class photo in which they are pretending to be firing weapons.

**Associates of Klebold and Harris**

Close to 100 individuals had some connection to Harris or Klebold and were included in the investigation. A few had only a passing acquaintance with Harris or Klebold or simply had a mutual friend but did not associate with Harris or Klebold personally.

The associate team ultimately identified 22 of these individuals as those most familiar with Harris and Klebold, their background and their activities.

Those determined to be close associates of Klebold or Harris were asked to give background information on the TCM and the two gunmen. Where appropriate, the individual may have had property searched, either because of a court-ordered search warrant or a consensual search.

Thirteen computers belonging to these associates were searched and evaluated for evidence of prior knowledge; however, no such evidence was found. Only two of the 13 searches required warrants; the remaining searches were done by the consent and cooperation of the individual.

Of the associates requested to submit to polygraph examinations regarding prior knowledge or assistance in the actual crime, only three refused. Two of those refused on the advice of their attorneys. Although three of the main associates retained attorneys, all three continued to cooperate with investigators. In fact, most of the 22 individuals identified by the associate team were cooperative and agreed to additional interviews to clarify inconsistencies in their previous statements. These 22 were interviewed a total of 71 times.

Some individuals knew of Klebolds' and Harris’ interest in building pipe bombs and had actually seen a few pipe bombs or CO₂ cartridge devices they made. However, all denied recognizing any indications from...
either Klebold or Harris that they were planning the Columbine murders. Nor were comments indicative of Klebold’s and Harris' intentions reported.

**Gun purchases**

The investigation revealed that a friend, Robyn Anderson, accompanied Harris and Klebold to a gun show in late 1998 since she was of legal age to buy a firearm. At the gun show, 18-year-old Anderson purchased two shotguns and one rifle for the two killers. Those same guns were later used in the Columbine killings.

Anderson denies any prior knowledge of their plans. No law, state or federal, prohibits the purchase of a long gun (rifle) from a private individual (non-licensed dealer). Because of this, Anderson could not be charged with any crime. If Anderson had purchased the guns from a federally licensed dealer, it would have been considered a “straw purchase” and considered illegal under federal law to make the purchase for Harris and Klebold.

The State of Colorado has a specific statute prohibiting anyone from providing or permitting a juvenile (under 18) to possess a handgun. Mark Manes sold his Intratec, model TEC-9, 9mm pistol to Klebold for $500. He also purchased two boxes (100 rounds) of 9mm ammunition for Eric Harris the night of April 19. Manes was charged with one count of unlawfully providing or permitting a juvenile to possess a handgun. Manes was also charged with one count of possession of a dangerous or illegal weapon because he had gone shooting with Klebold and Harris in March 1999 and had shot one of their sawed off shotguns.

Manes entered a plea of guilty to the charges and, on Nov. 12, 1999, was sent to the Colorado Department of Corrections for six years on the first charge and three years on the second charge, to be served concurrently.

Phillip Duran, who worked with Harris and Klebold at a local Pizza establishment, allegedly introduced them to Manes and allegedly was involved in the brokering of the TEC-9 for Harris and Klebold. He was charged with unlawfully providing or permitting a juvenile to possess a handgun as well as a charge of possession of a dangerous or illegal weapon. He was also charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Duran’s trial is scheduled for June of 2000. If Duran is convicted of all three counts, he could be sentenced up to 12 years to the Colorado Department of Corrections.

Both Manes and Duran deny any knowledge of Harris and Klebold’s plans.

**“Splatter Punks”**

On the afternoon of April 20, three male subjects were contacted by Jefferson County Sheriff's deputies near the school in Clement Park and detained for questioning. The three were dressed in black clothing, which matched the known description of the shooters, and were spotted in an unsecured area close to the crime scene. These individuals, who were not Columbine students, identified themselves as the “Splatter Punks,” and said that they had shown up at Columbine High School mainly out of curiosity.

The images of the three being contacted and detained by law enforcement authorities were aired live on local television stations and raised numerous questions from the community about their involvement in the crime. After initial questioning, the three young men were released the same afternoon and re-interviewed at length on April 24. It was determined that they had no known affiliation with the TCM and, shortly thereafter, were cleared of any involvement.

**A third shooter?**
Despite the supporting evidence, both from ballistics and eyewitness accounts, that only two people, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, were the gunmen on April 20, 1999, seven eyewitnesses remain firm in their account of another person with a gun that day.

Numerous witnesses reported the gunmen were wearing black trench coats when they were seen outside the school. Some described them as having huge belts on their waists. One witness said both coats were somewhat closed and it looked like they were hiding something underneath because they looked very bulky. The taller one, many claimed, was wearing a black baseball cap backwards with a “B” emblem on it.

After the initial shots were fired, Harris took off his trench coat, revealing a white T-shirt underneath. This act of discarding his coat caused some confusion and speculation about the number of gunmen involved. Many witnesses initially believed that a third gunmen existed because they saw a person in a white T-shirt either holding or shooting a gun.

One student witness described seeing two males, wearing trench coats, shooting guns. The witness ran away from the gunmen across the parking lot. When he turned around to look back, he saw a gunman with a white T-shirt throwing a bomb and assumed a third person was involved in the activity. During the initial investigation, Harris’ discarded trench coat was found lying in the dirt at the top of the hill.

The cafeteria videotape, that first recorded Harris in the cafeteria at 11:44 a.m., showed him in a white T-shirt and black cargo pants. Klebold took his trench coat off in the school library. He wore a black T-shirt underneath.

Both gunmen also wore utility belts and harnesses with straps that went over the shoulders like suspenders. The harnesses were equipped with ammunition pouches that allowed each gunman to carry extra shotgun shells, CO2 cartridge devices, matches, and other supplies. Some witnesses described their attire as bulletproof vests or suspenders.

Others Investigated

- Initially, many witnesses identified a previous student of Columbine High School as being the taller of the two shooters. This individual is similar in appearance and dresses in the same style clothing as Klebold. He was an acquaintance of Harris and Klebold and had been a member of the Trench Coat Mafia during the 1998 school year. He dropped out of school in January 1999 and was working full time in April 1999.

  This individual was interviewed extensively as was his family and neighbor who provided an alibi for him. He gave consent to search his home and his computers. A timeline was compiled showing this individual’s whereabouts between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. on April 20, 1999.

  The actions described by these witnesses and attributed to this individual have been shown, through other witnesses as well as ballistic evidence, to be the actions of Dylan Klebold. Those witnesses who identified this individual as a shooter have been re-interviewed and, when appropriate, shown the timeline as well as still photographs from the cafeteria videotape showing the shooters. In most cases, the witnesses recognized Klebold as the person they saw on April 20. However, three witnesses continue to believe that the former student was the shooter they saw.

- Witnesses to the events of April 20 identified another past student of Columbine High School as being seen at the school that day and assumed that he was involved. This individual was also a previous
member of the TCM and was acquainted with Harris and Klebold.

Investigators learned that this individual was at home with his family when the media announced the initial reports of the shootings. He then went to the Columbine Public Library with his mother to pick up his sister who had been inside the school library when the shootings began.

This individual consented to a search of his home and allowed investigators to take his computer for analysis. He also successfully passed a polygraph. After re-interviewing those who had identified this individual, all determined that they had mistakenly identified him as being at the school.

- Other witnesses identified one of the shooters as a student who was a TCM member and close friend of Harris and Klebold. He had attended morning classes at Columbine High School on April 20 but left the school after his third class at 10:20 a.m. He went to a grocery store and then to a friend's house to play video games.

When the student learned from newscasts that Harris and Klebold were being named as the gunmen at Columbine High School, he contacted the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office to provide background information on them.

Because this individual was quickly identified as a close associate of the shooters, patrol deputies immediately picked him up and took him to the incident command post at Columbine High School. Arrangements were made to have the student transported to the Sheriff's Office so an in-depth interview could be conducted.

The image of this student being led to a patrol car in handcuffs caused many to assume his involvement and guilt. The student was interviewed several times to clear up inconsistencies and answer additional questions. A detailed timeline was compiled providing his whereabouts on April 20 and he successfully passed a polygraph. His computer was also searched and no evidence implicating him of having knowledge or participation in the shootings was found. One witness continues to assert that this student was involved.

- A few witnesses identified one other Columbine High School student and TCM member as a shooter. Although this student was at the school earlier in the day, he left prior to the shootings to have lunch with several friends who provided an alibi for him. One witness continues to believe this student was involved.

- Only one associate of Klebold and Harris had personal contact with Harris moments before the gunmen killed 12 of their classmates and one teacher. This person was the only student the killers allowed to leave the school prior to the murders.

Conclusion

The Columbine Task Force investigation concluded that evidence indicates that no one, other than Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, participated in the shootings at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999. Additionally, there is no known evidence that anyone, other than Harris and Klebold, assisted in the planning or had any prior knowledge of that plan.
Findings of the Threats Team

On April 26, 1999 the Columbine Task Force was developed and teams of responsibility were designated to handle different aspects of the investigation. One of the teams was the Threats Team. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Sergeant Richard Webb led this team.

The team’s responsibility was to immediately respond to critical incidents and threats, which were fed into the investigation command post through a variety of sources. Immediately after the shooting on April 20, the command post received numerous reports of additional attacks that were to occur at other schools in the metro area as well as schools outside the state. Each of these incidents was followed up to assure each report was resolved. It is important to mention that many threats and problems that arose in the aftermath of the Columbine shootings were not reported to or handled by the Columbine Task Force. The majority of these incidents, nationwide, were followed up by the jurisdiction in which they occurred.

Of particular note, three other school shootings occurred shortly after the Columbine shootings. The first was in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on April 23; the second was in Taber, Alberta Canada on April 28, and the last was in Conyers, Georgia on May 20, 1999.

Summary

The Threats team followed up on 256 leads, resulting in eight arrests. Two arrests were the result of bomb threats at two local high schools and one arrest was for manufacturing bomb components at another local high school. Another arrest was made of an individual trespassing at Columbine High School while it was still a crime scene. A Columbine High School student was arrested for inciting destruction of life and property after threatening to “finish the job” and another individual was charged with disorderly conduct after making several statements about blowing up his former high school. Two arrests were made in Canada for uttering threats towards a high school in Ontario.

Additionally, the leads investigated by the threats team resulted in 11 students being expelled from local schools for making inflammatory and inappropriate statements which alarmed staff and/or students.

As the investigation continued, additional evidence was obtained which indicated Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris had identified numerous individuals who they had disliked for a variety of reasons. The names were found on computer generated lists, in Harris’ 1998 yearbook and referenced in videotapes made by Harris and Klebold.
The names of these 67 individuals were compared to those injured and killed at Columbine to determine if they were victims. Only one was actually injured. He suffered injuries to his hand and knee.

Other responsibilities of the threats team were to respond to bomb threats at other schools, threats of additional assaults, suspicious activity, threats to witnesses, and individuals believed to have prior knowledge of the shooting. The threats team also followed up on Internet threats which were reassigned by the Computer / Internet Team.

After the shootings at Columbine High School, many individuals from across the nation claimed to be associates or members of the Trench Coat Mafia (TCM). The task force had already determined that the TCM was a loose group of individuals who were current or past students of Columbine High School. The small group of friends had been given the name in 1998 and was not a gang as commonly defined. The Associate Team investigated those individuals who were actually associated with Harris and Klebold and the threats team followed up on those individuals who were most likely not associates of the TCM.

During the first three weeks after the shootings, numerous bomb threats were called in to schools within Jefferson County. The command post was also notified of other bomb threats to schools within the state as well as nationwide. Several of these threats claimed association with the Trench Coat Mafia; however, no connection was found in any of the threats.

In October 1999, Sheriff's deputies initiated a threat investigation after a Columbine student reported hearing another juvenile claim that he intended to attack the school. As word of the threat spread, many students decided not to attend school the day of the planned attack. Investigators interviewed the juvenile suspect and collected evidence that led to the filing of felony criminal charges with the District Attorney. The juvenile case has since been concluded.

Also in October, threatening communications were sent to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office and Columbine High School. An Assistant United States Attorney brought federal charges against Arthur Leon Thomas of Houston, Texas, who was interviewed and admitted to writing and mailing the two threat letters as well as sending a threatening internet message to an individual in Broomfield, Colorado. In January of 2000, Thomas appeared in Denver federal court and entered a plea of not guilty. Thomas is scheduled to appear on May 4 in a hearing for a change in his plea.

Another internet threat was made to a Columbine High School student by a Florida man. Michael Ian Campbell of Cape Coral, Florida, was charged with one count of transmitting a threat in interstate communications and was subsequently arrested. He pled guilty in Federal District Court on February 9, 2000 to the same charge. Campbell was sentenced on Friday, April 28, 2000 to 4 months in Federal Prison, and 3 years of probation after release from prison. Campbell was banned from using any Internet or electronic messaging service.

Lead break down for the Columbine Task Force Threats Team
79 leads were generated from lists recovered during searches of the Klebold and Harris residences. Some were titled “shit” lists and others were merely lists of handwritten or typed names. All of the individuals were interviewed but none could provide investigators with definite reasons why their name would appear on one of the lists. Some of the individuals had been asked out by Harris and had declined. That was their only interaction with him. Others did not know Harris or Klebold except in passing.

11 leads were generated from references made in videotapes recovered pursuant to a search warrant. Each of these individuals claimed to have once dated, or been asked out by, Harris. However, they did not report any known hostility with Harris.

15 leads were generated from Harris’ yearbook recovered during the search. All of these individuals were graduates of the 1998 class and could not explain why they were targeted.

24 leads were followed up on to determine if a particular individual had association with the Trench Coat Mafia. None were.

40 leads were generated due to reports of suspicious activity. Many citizens contacted the task force about students who were believed to be capable of violence or acting and/or dressing inappropriately in light of the shootings. Example: someone walking in a neighborhood mall with a trench coat and “acting suspicious.”

33 leads were generated on reports of additional threats to schools.

8 leads were generated on reports of threats to witnesses. These threats were to known members of the TCM or associates of Harris and Klebold. None were found to be valid.

21 leads were generated on reports of individuals who had prior knowledge of the shootings at Columbine High School. No one was found to have such knowledge.
17 leads were followed up regarding bomb threats to schools. These threats resulted in schools being evacuated and classes disrupted. No actual explosive devices were ever located but arrests were made in some cases.

- 8 leads were turned over to the threats team from the Computer team involving threats of additional activity or claimed association to TCM.
Crime Scene Investigation and Evidence Collection

Late Tuesday afternoon of April 20, crime lab personnel for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office met with representatives from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to begin planning the details for the thorough processing and reconstruction of the crime scene at Columbine High School. Of utmost importance was to maintain the integrity of the scene and ensure the ability to reconstruct the events of April 20.

It was decided that teams would be formed to include experts in the field of blood spatter, firearms and ballistics, and general crime scene processing. Teams would be comprised of personnel from different agencies, including experts from CBI, FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office, and Arvada, Wheat Ridge, Denver, Greenwood Village, Thornton and Littleton Police Departments.

All teams would have at least one person from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office assigned to them. This individual would take custody of the evidence collected from the teams and then transport the evidence to the temporary evidence vault located on scene. This was done to maintain the “chain of custody” of the evidence.

Because of the number of bombs still in and around the high school that first day, all forensic team members were told to clear the scene around midnight and to return by 6 a.m. the following morning.

On April 21 an initial walk-through team consisting of Sheriff’s Office Sergeant Randy West, Lead Investigator Kate Battan, Incident Commander Lt. David Walcher, Jefferson County Coroner Dr. Nancy Bodelson, and lab supervisor Chris Andrist entered the scene to gather information for the identification of victims and the briefing of the forensic teams as to conditions inside the school.

After the initial walk-through, two teams of forensic specialists were assigned to enter the school and take initial photographs and videotape the interior. Each team separately documented the scene with video and photos to avoid any equipment malfunction problems.

At about noon, a meeting of all forensic personnel was held to assign individuals to various teams and appoint team leaders. Seven teams were created and each team was assigned an area to process.
| Team 1 - East Side of Library: | Team Leader Barry Goetz |
| Team 2 - West Side of Library: | Team Leader Thomas Griffith |
| Team 3 - Hallway in front of Library, Cafeteria: | Team Leader James Crippin |
| Team 4 - Science Area, South Main Hallway: | Team Leader Robert Lloyd |
| Team 5 - Main Entry, West Entry, North Main Hallway: | Team Leader Barbara Ray |
| Team 6 - Exterior of School, Cafeteria: | Team Leader Carl Schlaff |
| Team 7 - Administrative Area: | Team Leader Gary Hoffman |

Team leaders were responsible for ensuring their teams followed standard guidelines for crime scene investigation and assigned individual tasks to team members.

Processing of the scene involved collection of numerous evidentiary items such as casings, bullets, bomb fragments and the examination of bullet or projectile holes for ballistic reconstruction. Teams 1 and 2 examined over 140 bullet or projectile holes for reconstruction. They collected more than 160 projectile/fragments and over 60 casings or spent shotgun shells. The teams reconstructed events for 10 of the victims and both suspects.

Team 3 reconstructed over 10 ballistic events, examined more than 50 explosive related items and documented two areas. In the cafeteria they examined and identified more than 400 backpacks. Team 4 examined over 50 bullet or projectile holes for reconstruction and collected more than 40 projectile/fragments along with over 15 casings or spent shotgun shells. They reconstructed events for one of the victims, and documented and examined over 1,000 backpacks located in the science, math, and social studies areas.
Team 5 examined over 140 bullet or projectile holes and collected more than 60 projectile/fragments and 30 casings or spent shotgun shells. Team 6 collected over 150 casings or spent shotgun shells, and reconstructed events for two victims. Upon completion of the exterior of the school, they documented and processed the cafeteria area along with Team 3.

While forensic teams worked on their designated areas, the ATF K-9 teams continued to clear the school, checking for bombs that might be located in lockers, backpacks, rooms, and vent units.

Throughout the crime scene processing, daily briefings of all forensic personnel were held each morning. All information was reported to the coordinator/facilitator for the crime scene and, in turn, reported to Lt. John Kiekbusch of the Sheriff’s Office Investigation Division.

The evidence team, comprised of Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office personnel and led by team leaders Deputy Al Simmons, Vicky Spelman, and Sgt. Pat Woodin, set up an evidence collection area on the east side of the high school’s main entrance. A portable evidence vault was brought to the scene for the storage of items as they were collected. Tables staffed by investigators were set up with heat sealers, markers, and evidence tags. Each forensic team was assigned a series of evidence numbers from the booking team. Each piece of evidence was photographed, measured, assigned a number, sealed, and logged to become part of the more than 10,000 items collected and 10,000 photographs taken.

The crime scene investigation began April 21, 1999 and continued into June. On June 15, Columbine High School, with the exception of the library, was turned over to the Jefferson County R-1 School District. The entire school was turned over to the school district on July 12, 1999 for the repair of damages done to the building by the events of April 20.

Federal and state agencies assisted in the examination and analysis of the evidence collected. Firearms evidence and latent print processing was accomplished by CBI. The

Explosive evidence was examined and processed by the ATF. The FBI assisted with the crime scene documentation, particularly in the creation of a three-dimensional model (shown below) of the school library and cafeteria areas. They also produced event by event diagrams of the events of April 20. Photos of both of the projects are contained in this report.
Dylan Bennet Klebold

Dylan Bennet Klebold was born in Denver, Colorado on September 11, 1981. He was the second child of Thomas and Susan and the brother of Byron, three years older. As a boy, he was in the Boy Scouts and was a pitcher on his Little League team. His parents told investigators that Dylan was a gentle boy and never gave any indications of a violent nature.

Klebold attended Normandy Elementary School in Littleton, Colorado, for first and second grade and then transferred to Governor’s Ranch Elementary School where he was part of the CHIPS (Challenging High Intellectual Potential Students) program for gifted and talented children. Klebold’s parents told investigators he was somewhat sheltered at Governors Ranch Elementary and believed his transition to Ken Caryl Middle School was a little difficult for him because he was so quiet and shy. However, his parents thought the transition from elementary school to middle school is difficult for many adolescents and therefore they were not unduly concerned. During his earlier school years, he played T-ball, baseball and soccer.

While at Columbine High School, Klebold became active in school play productions and operated the lights and sounds. He was involved in video productions and Columbine High School’s Rebel News Network. Klebold also became a computer assistant at school and helped maintain the school computer server. He also built his own home computer.

According to Thomas and Susan Klebold, their son was extraordinarily shy and did not have a girlfriend but did socialize with different groups of friends. He and his group of friends were interested in video games, midnight bowling and fantasy football leagues.

Klebold had few close friends other than Eric Harris. Klebold’s nickname was VoDKa with his initials capitalized. His friends generally described him as shy and quiet and somewhat of a follower. In most accounts, he was a typical teenager with an interest in video games, movies, computers and spending time with groups of other teenagers. According to friends, nothing in his behavior gave clues of what he and Harris were planning.

Tom Klebold told investigators that, as far as he knew, Dylan never showed any fascination with guns. The Klebolds indicated that their son had dreams of being a computer science major and had been accepted at the University of Arizona. In fact, the Klebolds drove to Arizona with Dylan on March 25, 1999 to pick out Dylan’s dorm room. The Klebolds spent four days driving to Arizona and back to Colorado with their son and saw nothing unusual with his behavior or demeanor.

On January 30, 1998, Klebold and Harris were arrested after breaking into a vehicle in Jefferson County. In April 1998, they were both placed in the juvenile diversion program offered...
by the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office. As part of the program Harris and Klebold were required to pay fines, attend anger management classes, counseling and complete community service. Once they successfully completed the diversion program, all charges were dropped and they were released from the program on February 9, 1999.*

After the tragedy at Columbine High School investigators searched for answers to why Klebold opened fire on his classmates and teachers. Although no clear-cut answers were found, there were clues. Investigators spoke with friends and teachers of Klebold who described him as a “nice, normal teenager.”

But there was another darker side. Klebold left behind glimpses of his thoughts in the form of notes jotted down in a day planner, a 1997 journal and writings in a math notebook and a yearbook. Klebold and Harris also left videotapes behind articulating many of their thoughts and plans.

On the cover of Klebold’s 1997 journal is written “Fact: People are so unaware…well, Ignorance is bliss I guess…that would explain my depression.” Klebold began his journal on March 31, 1997 during a point he described as “a weird time, weird life, weird existence.” He described not fitting in, being depressed and generally hating his existence and hating his life. He talked about suicide. In another entry in 1997 he wrote, “I swear – like I’m an outcast, & everyone is conspiring against me…”

During one period Klebold’s tone briefly changed and he described his “first love.” It appeared that this was an unrequited love. Throughout his journal, Klebold named several girls he “loves” but he did not indicate that he ever actually spoke to any of them. He even went so far as to write letters to one girl but it appears he never sent them because they remained in his journal.

Again in 1997 Klebold wrote that he wanted to die. He mentioned getting someone to buy him a gun so he could kill himself. In November of 1997, Klebold described getting a gun and going on a killing spree.

In Klebold’s 1997/1998 academic day planner are what appear to be random thoughts and poems. One entry simply said, “The lonely man strikes with absolute rage.”

In April of 1998, at the end of their junior year, Harris and Klebold received their copies of the Columbine High School 1998 yearbook. A full year before their rampage Klebold made four entries in Harris’s yearbook. One such entry referred to “the holy April morning of NBK (Natural Born Killers).” Another entry says in part “killing enemies, blowing up stuff, killing cops!! My wrath for January’s incident will be godlike. Not to mention our revenge in the commons.” The January incident Klebold referred to is believed to be his arrest for breaking into a vehicle on January 30, 1998. The Columbine cafeteria is also called the commons.

In Klebold’s notebook, along with his math homework, were eight pages of writings and drawings that appeared to be written the day before April 20. One part began, “About 26.5
hours from now the judgement will begin. Difficult but not impossible, necessary, nervewracking & fun. What fun is life without a little death? It’s interesting, when i’m (sic) in my human form, knowing i’m going to die. Everything has a touch of triviality to it.”

There were a few more pages of drawings and writings included in the notebook. Klebold’s last entry was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Walk in, set bombs at 11:09, for 11:17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leave,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive to Clemete Park. Gear up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get back by 11:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park cars. set car bombs for 11:18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get out, go to outside hill, wait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When first bombs go off, attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have fun!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eric David Harris

Eric David Harris was born April 9, 1981 in Wichita, Kansas, to Wayne and Kathy Harris. He had a brother, Kevin, who was three years older. Wayne Harris was in the U.S. Air Force and moved his family many times during the course of his career. In 1983 the Harris family moved to Dayton, Ohio; in 1989 they moved to Oscoda, Michigan, and in 1992 the Harris family moved to Plattsburg, New York. Wayne Harris retired from the Air Force, and in July of 1993 the family moved to Littleton, Colorado. Eric went to Ken Caryl Middle School where he met Dylan Klebold.

Wayne and Kathy Harris told investigators that, as a child, Harris played soccer and baseball, and by the 7th and 8th grades developed an interest in computers. Harris was also interested in baseball cards, computer games and videos. His parents said that their son was content to be by himself but also had close friends in high school. While attending Columbine High School, Harris became involved in video productions and the school’s Rebel News Network as well as the school’s computer labs. Harris went by the nickname “REB.” This may have been short for “rebel,” which is also the name of the school mascot.

On January 30, 1998, Harris and Klebold were arrested after breaking into a vehicle in Jefferson County. In April 1998, they were both placed in the juvenile diversion program offered by the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office and were required to pay fines, attend anger
management classes, counseling and complete community service. Once they successfully completed the diversion program, all charges were dropped and they were released from the program on February 9, 1999.*

As part of the diversion program, Harris wrote a letter of apology to the victim. In the letter, Harris apologized and explained how disappointed he was in himself for his actions. It seemed to be a sincere, heartfelt letter from a young man who had made a mistake. Harris also wrote a paper on anger management and how to control his anger.

On March 18, 1998, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office took a “suspicious incident” report from Randy Brown, stating that his son, Brooks, had received death threats from Harris. These threats were reported to have been contained in Harris’ web pages. On his web pages, Harris also allegedly wrote about making and detonating pipe bombs and using them against people. Brown requested that he and his family remain anonymous in making the report for fear of retribution, particularly to his son.

The information was reviewed by Sheriff’s investigators; however, Harris’ web site could not be accessed nor could reports of pipe bomb detonations be substantiated. Because of Brown’s request to remain anonymous, Klebold and Harris were not contacted. Further investigation was initiated but no additional information was developed.

Because of the routine nature of the report and investigation, the former Jefferson County Sheriff, Ronald Beckham, was not informed of the report at the time. The District Attorney, subsequent to April 20, was provided with information from Harris’ web pages. After reviewing the report, the DA offered the opinion that, based upon the information in the report to law enforcement, there would have been insufficient basis to legally support a request to obtain search or arrest warrants.

Harris and Brooks Brown later reconciled their friendship and, on April 20, 1999, Harris allegedly told Brown, immediately prior to the shootings, to leave the school “because he (Harris) liked him (Brown).”

During the spring of 1998, Harris began his journal and wrote about how much he hated mankind and how much he loved his anger.

Harris’ journal began in April 1998, and he wrote about how much he hated the world and his belief that he and V (Dylan Klebold) were different because they had self-awareness. Harris wrote, “I will sooner die than betray my own thoughts, but before I leave this worthless place, I will kill whoever I deem unfit…” He documented that he wanted revenge against anyone who he perceived had ever wronged him.

In October 1998, Harris wrote that someone was bound to ask, “What were they thinking?” He answered, “I want to burn the world, I want to kill everyone except about 5 people… if we get busted any time, we start killing then and there…I ain’t going out without a fight.”
Harris also talked about choices and the fact that he chose to kill. He went on to say, “It’s my fault! Not my parents, not my brothers, not my friends, not my favorite bands, not computer games, not the media, it’s mine.” In another entry he stated, “I’m full of hate and I love it.” There was only one journal entry in 1999 and in it Harris evaluated his and Klebold’s preparations, to include their weapons and bombs. He ended by writing, “I hate you people for leaving me out of so many fun things.”

In December 1998, Harris wrote that he would have been a good Marine, that “it would have given me a reason to be good.” Whether Harris truly wanted to be a Marine or if he used this as an excuse to avoid planning for a future he would never have is unknown. Harris did apply for enlistment in the Marine Corps, but the medication he was taking disqualified him.

In Klebold’s 1998 yearbook, a year before they went on their rampage, Harris wrote, “God I can’t wait till they die. I can taste the blood now - NBK” (Natural Born Killer) “You know what I hate? …MANKIND!!!!…kill everything…kill everything…” Harris also drew a gunman standing amongst a sea of dead bodies with a caption, “The only reason your (sic) still alive is because someone has decided to let you live.”

Harris also wrote in his own 1998 yearbook. He wrote on the photographs of almost every student words such as “worthless”, “die”, and “beat.” As he continued through the yearbook, he simply put X’s on those students who he did not like. Very few photos were not marked.

In Harris’ 1998/1999 academic day planner were lists of things to buy and “things left to do.” On the page for Mother’s Day 1999 Harris wrote, “Good wombs have born bad sons.”

An undated piece of notebook paper was recovered showing a diagram of the Columbine High School cafeteria with two X’s next to the pillars. Alongside the diagram was a timeline of how many people were in the cafeteria just prior to and during the first lunch period.

Just as Klebold had a written itinerary for April 20, Harris had one as well. On a piece of paper from his day planner he recorded the plans for the day. The entry follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5:00</td>
<td>Get-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:00</td>
<td>meet at KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:00</td>
<td>go to Reb’s house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:15</td>
<td>he leaves to fill propane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I leave to fill gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:30</td>
<td>Meet back at his house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00</td>
<td>made d. bag set up car</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9:30 practice gearups

Chill

10:30 set up 4 things

11: go to school

11:10 set up duffel bags

11:12 wait near cars, gear up

11:16 HAHAHA

Investigators will never know exactly when Harris and Klebold verbalized to each other their hate towards others and their desire to kill. However, it is clear from his journal that Klebold had those feelings as early as 1997, and Harris began expressing his thoughts in his journal in April 1998. It is also apparent from their cryptic yearbook messages to each other that they had already begun their plans for the Columbine shootings by April 1998 -- a full year earlier.

There were also many common themes throughout their writings. Harris and Klebold both wrote of not fitting in, not being accepted and their lack of self-esteem. They reflected on natural selection, self-awareness and their feelings of superiority. They plotted against all those persons who they found offensive – jocks, girls that said no, other outcasts or anybody they thought did not accept them. Most of those teens were unaware that they had ever offended Harris or Klebold.

Harris and Klebold left behind videotapes documenting many of their plans, their activities and their philosophies. One of the tapes was almost two hours long and taped on three separate occasions in March 1999. The second tape, about 22 minutes in length, was shot on two separate occasions on April 11 and 12, 1999. The third tape, 40 minutes long, was taped on
eight separate occasions from early April 1999 to the morning of April 20, 1999. Harris and Klebold taped a tour of Harris’s bedroom and showed off their weapons and bombs. They recorded each other conducting dress rehearsals and they taped the drive in Harris’s car to buy supplies needed for their plans.

While talking to the camera, Harris and Klebold laughed at how easy it was to make other people believe what they wanted them to. They talked about how “evolved” they were and how they considered themselves to be “above human.” They said they were going to be successful because they were going to die and stressed that they had been planning the Columbine shootings for over eight months, before all the other school shootings had occurred.

Klebold and Harris both talked on camera about the rage and anger that had built up for years and declared they would destroy the world if they could. Harris asserted that, “There is nothing that anyone could have done to prevent this. No one is to blame except me and Vodka.” He went on to say that their actions were “a two man war against everyone else.”

There were also indications that Harris and Klebold initially planned the shootings to occur on April 19. They specifically mentioned Monday and another time said, “Today is the 11th, eight more days.” They never articulated why they chose the day they did and never mentioned that April 19 was the anniversary of Waco, Texas or the Oklahoma City bombing. They never verbalized that they even knew April 20 is Adolph Hitler’s birthday.

Harris and Klebold seemed to have lived two lives. Their friends and family described them as normal teenage boys. Others described them as outcasts. But they left behind evidence of a much darker and sinister side. This darker side was an aspect they apparently shared only with each other.

There was also evidence that Harris and Klebold had little concern for the welfare of their friends and the siblings of their friends, many of whom were in the cafeteria and library on April 20. In fact, they mention nonchalantly that some of their friends might die and casually point out that their families would be devastated but justified it by saying, “War is war.”

* The Juvenile Diversion Program

The Juvenile Diversion Program is an alternative to prosecution for first-time offenders in the juvenile justice system. When a case is reviewed by a deputy district attorney, he may make a decision to offer a deferred judgement and sentence through the courts with supervision through Diversion. This offer is made if:

1. the juvenile accepts responsibility and show remorse for the offense;
2. the offense is non-violent and does not involve the use of a weapon;
3. the juvenile and his parents want to make reparation to the victims and the community;
4. there are no prior adjudications.

The term of a deferred adjudication is 12 months. Diversion policy allows for an early termination from diversion on cases that do
not involve drugs, burglary, or assault. Cases can be dismissed early if:

1. there have been no new offenses or law enforcement contacts;
2. all contract items have been completed;
3. juveniles have not had any "hot" scans indicating drug or alcohol use;
4. school reports are average or above with no reports of discipline problems.

Prior to any termination the diversion officer gathers information from parents, school and runs a record check. The case is staffed with the full diversion team.

Early termination is unusual because most diversion cases do not meet all of these criteria. An estimated five per cent of cases are terminated before the 12-month period.
How they were equipped that day

KLEBOLDWEAPONS

HARRIS WEAPONS
Klebold and Harris in cafeteria
Klebold and Harris drove onto the Columbine High School campus April 20, 1999, armed with four guns, several knives and numerous explosive devices.

Klebold was dressed in cargo pants, a black T-shirt that said “Wrath,” and a black trench coat. Underneath his coat was an Intratec TEC-DC-9, 9-mm semi-automatic handgun attached to a strap slung over his shoulder. His cargo pants had large pockets that later allowed him to partially conceal a Stevens 12-gauge double-barrel shotgun, particularly since the barrel had been cut down to approximately 23 inches.

Harris, also wearing a black trench coat, wore a white T-shirt underneath that said, “Natural Selection.” He had a Hi-Point 9-mm carbine rifle on a strap hidden under his coat. Harris pulled a Savage – Springfield 12-gauge pump shotgun from one of the bags the gunmen carried to the top of the hill. Again, both its stock and barrel were cut off, reducing the measurement of the entire gun to 26 inches.

Only two shots can be fired from a double-barreled shotgun before the shooter must reload by breaking the barrel open, manually inserting two new rounds, and closing the gun. A pump shotgun can be fired as fast as the gunman can pump and shoot. It shoots much faster than the double-barreled type because spent shells are ejected and a live shell manually slides into place. A gunman can shoot five rounds with the pump shotgun before the weapon must be reloaded.

Harris fired 25 times with his shotgun, 21 in the library, four inside the school, and none outside. Klebold fired his shotgun 12 times, six in the library, four inside the school, and two outside.

In the videotape that shows the gunmen practice shooting at Rampart Range, both are shooting their sawed-off shotguns. It seems clear that they’re still getting used to them. Their hands are bleeding because they’ve sawed off so much of the gun. The recoil from the weapons is substantial – and quite painful for a gunman to shoot repeatedly.

Harris shot his 9-mm carbine rifle 96 times, 13 in the library, 36 inside the rest of the school and 47 outside. His weapon of choice in the library was his shotgun.

Klebold shot his TEC-9 55 times, 21 inside the library (that was his weapon of choice), 31 inside the rest of the school, and three times outside.

Both gunmen also carried numerous knives, but they did not use them on April 20. They both had match strikers taped to their forearms, presumably to be used to easily light their bombs.

Klebold wore a black glove on his left hand; Harris wore the matching glove on his right hand.

Both wore utility belts which held pouches filled with shotgun shells. Their cargo pants contained CO2 bombs and clips of 9 mm bullets for their guns. They also carried a backpack and a duffel bag filled with bombs.
**Shots Fired by KLEBOLD and HARRIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shotgun Rounds</th>
<th>Harris</th>
<th>Klebold</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9MM Rounds</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total FIRED</strong></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>67</td>
<td><strong>188</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

188 Shots Fired by KLEBOLD and HARRIS

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U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno Arrives in Colorado

On April 21, a plane carrying U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno touched down in Colorado.

In the hours following the shootings, Reno had contacted U.S. Attorney Tom Strickland to discuss making federal resources available for the Columbine investigation. On April 22, Reno met at Light of the World Church, which sits within five miles of Columbine High School, and received a briefing on the case.

At the meeting with Reno were Strickland, Sheriff John P. Stone, Undersheriff John A. Dunaway, District Attorney Dave Thomas, State Attorney General Ken Salazar and Deputy Attorney General Don Quick, and representatives from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Investigations Unit, Littleton Fire Department, the FBI, ATF and other agencies within the U.S. Department of Justice.

Dunaway and Kate Battan, lead investigator for the Columbine case, gave an overview of the investigation and response efforts and then answered questions. Reno later traveled to the county government campus to view the weapons and other pieces of evidence.

Before leaving the church, however, Reno met with the families of the victims. She then drove to the 1st Judicial District Attorney's Building in Golden and met with about 300 representatives from the first-responder agencies.

In a press conference that followed, Reno expressed her appreciation for the work the first responders had done and promised her support for the ongoing investigation. As a result,

Some federal funds and personnel were made available. ATF and FBI investigators served on the multiagency Columbine Task Force, and the two organizations assisted with ballistics, videotape and other kinds of evidence analysis. The Colorado Attorney General's Office provided an investigator.

Since then, the FBI has worked with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office and other jurisdictions in which multiple school homicides have taken place to gather information about those crimes. The data is being compiled to develop psychological profiles of school killers and help law-enforcement agencies refine their prevention and response tactics.
District Attorney’s Response

Written by Pam Russell, Public Information Officer, District Attorney’s Office

In the first few minutes after hearing that shots had been fired at Columbine High School, District Attorney Dave Thomas and Assistant District Attorney Kathy Sasak began piecing together information in an attempt to determine exactly what was happening in south Jeffco. Contact was made with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office and the DA’s office began monitoring television coverage that began at about the same time.

Eric Harris was soon named as being one of the shooters by some of the students who had fled the high school. Sasak and the DA’s staff immediately began accumulating information from their files, through the Juvenile Assessment Center and the Sheriff’s Office. Sasak discovered that Eric Harris had been on the DA’s Diversion Program and that he had a co-defendant, Dylan Klebold. She and the staff quickly gathered as much information about Harris and Klebold as was possible and made it available to the District Attorney who had responded to the scene.

Official information about the incident was slow in coming and sketchy based on the size of the crime scene and the emergency response, the number of potential victims and the difficulties involved in securing the school to make it safe for law enforcement and emergency service providers to enter. Within the first hour, the DA’s staff knew only that shots had been fired, that there had been explosions, that there was possibly a shooter on the roof of the high school, that there were at least two gunmen, and that there were injuries.

District Attorney Thomas and Chief Deputy District Attorney Mark Pautler arrived at the high school scene within an hour of the initial report of shots fired and explosions.

The prosecutor’s role in any homicide is typically to provide legal advice at the crime scene. It quickly became clear that due to the magnitude of the situation, normal activities would be overtaxed and people would step into roles above and beyond what would ordinarily be part of their standard operating procedure.

An office command center was set up in the district attorney’s office with links to District Attorney Thomas, who was at the command post near Columbine High School. The office command center was headed by Sasak and manned by the public information officer, the chief investigator, a chief deputy district attorney and other staff. Two deputy district attorneys went to the Sheriff’s Office to review prepared search warrants for the Harris and Klebold residences.

Throughout the first day, April 20, the command post at the District Attorney’s Office was in constant contact with DA Thomas at the scene. Information being reported on television from...
interviews with students and teachers who had been inside the high school was provided to the crime scene command post. Records on the two suspects were pulled. Resources, including investigators, victim witness specialists and diversion counselors were dispatched to the scene as needed. Pautler was assigned to the investigative command post to review all warrants and answer legal questions.

Increasing demands were placed on prosecutors to communicate with the community and to provide information to the families of the victims. Up until 7:30 a.m. on April 21, only SWAT teams and bomb squads had been inside the school. Officials had descriptions (physical and clothing worn) of students who did not return home the previous evening. They did not have a solid count on the deceased within the school. At 7:30 a.m., members of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and the county coroner did a walk-through and were able to tentatively identify the 15 bodies at the school. District Attorney Thomas developed a relationship with many of the families beginning on April 20, and on April 21, did five death notifications based upon tentative identification in the school.

**Investigative Assistance**

By 12:45 p.m., April 20, four DA investigators arrived at Columbine High School. By 2:30 p.m. eight more arrived following a request for additional assistance. The 12 investigators who responded to the high school remained on the case throughout the next two weeks. Their primary responsibilities were to interview students and witnesses. From April 20 through June 4, nine investigators were assigned to the incident on a full-time basis. Overall, investigations spent 2,941.75 hours working on the case. This includes 397.75 hours of overtime.

**Victim Assistance**

On April 20, Kim Slaughter, director of the District Attorney’s Victim Witness Assistance Unit, and three victim witness specialists went to Leawood Elementary School to help with victims and families. Slaughter worked with Karen Joyce-McMahon, coordinator of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Victim Services Unit, and Steve Siegel, a Denver representative of the National Organization of Victim Assistance Crisis Response Team, to design a plan of action to respond to victim needs.

The District Attorney’s Victim Assistance Unit worked in conjunction with the Sheriff’s Office Victim’s Assistance Unit, the Jeffco Center for Mental Health, and other service providers from the first day. The agencies came together to act as a coordinated team focused on the victims’ needs during and following this tragedy.

Immediately following the incident, the Crime Victim Compensation Board decided to make all 2,052 students, faculty, staff and their immediate families eligible for Victim’s Compensation. The first priority for the DA’s Victim Assistance Unit was to notify each of the 2052 of his or her rights to these funds. The office created a cover letter, a simplified application form and with the
help of the school district (mailing labels), Kinkos and the Post Office, it mailed to all 2052 on the Friday following the incident. To date, 609 applications have been received and $393,145 has been paid to providers and victims.

By April 24, the Mental Health Incident Management Group had been established. The victim services providers were also arranging a series of debriefings for law enforcement, DA and other emergency services first responders. The next project, which began at essentially the same time, was the creation of a victim services office and mental health facility to be located in the Columbine area.

Case filings

There have been two primary and two secondary criminal cases filed as a result of the incident. In each case, victim witness specialists are assigned to each of the 38 families most directly impacted by the shootings. These include the families of the 13 deceased and 25 injured students, faculty and staff of Columbine High School. The Victim Witness Specialists notify and coordinate with the families at each court appearance of defendants named in these actions.

The first of the two primary cases that were filed by the Sheriff’s Office was against Mark Manes. Manes, 22, was arrested on May 3, 1999 for selling the TEC 9 semi-automatic, assault style handgun to Harris and Klebold. He was also charged with possession of an illegal, dangerous weapon, the sawed off shotgun. On August 18, 1999 he pled guilty to both counts and on November 12, 1999 was sentenced to a total of six years in prison. In sentencing Manes, Chief Judge Henry Nieto addressed the intent of the statute concerning “Providing or Permitting a Juvenile to Possess a Handgun,” saying that it was designed to prevent handguns from getting into the hands of young people who sometimes make impulsive, immature decisions. In spite of Manes’ plea for leniency (based on the fact that he did not know what the pair intended to do) Judge Nieto stated that had Manes known what Harris and Klebold intended, a different crime would have been committed with much more serious repercussions. He asked the 35 families in the courtroom not to focus their anger at this young man, but to direct that energy towards a memorial to those slain by taking a stand against violence in our society.

The second of the Sheriff’s primary cases filed was against Philip Duran, charged with the same two counts as Mark Manes for his alleged role in the sale of the TEC 9 and for possession of the sawed off shotgun. Duran pled not guilty on January 20, 2000 and a trial date is set for June 6, 2000. On March 3, Duran was charged with a third count, contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Harris and Klebold worked with Duran at a restaurant and allegedly met Mark Manes through him. Harris and Klebold met Manes at a gun show and made inquiries about the TEC 9. On January 23, 1999, Klebold went to Manes’ house, gave him $300 as a down payment and took possession of the weapon. Approximately two weeks later Klebold and Harris allegedly gave the remainder of the money to Duran to deliver to Manes.
Faye Ralene Holt of Arvada, was arrested and charged with providing a false report of explosives after she, allegedly, phoned in a bomb threat to Pomona High School on April 28, 1999. She pled not guilty to the charge against her. (She was convicted on April 7, 2000, of making a bomb threat to the high school and her sentencing is scheduled for May 25.)

Gary Sowell, an employee of Hugh M. Woods, was charged with false reporting for providing false information to authorities regarding the sale of the propane tanks used on April 20. His jury trail is pending.

The Healing Fund

The Healing Fund was the first major fund to be set up to aid the victims and the community after the Columbine shootings. It was created by the Mile High United Way (MHUW) and other community-based interests on April 20, 1999. The fund ultimately raised and distributed 4.5 million dollars. Because of a prior relationship with MHUW and his visibility in the community, District Attorney Thomas was asked to co-chair the fund. A portion of the fund is still being distributed based upon victims needs through the Colorado Organization of Victim Assistance.

Columbine Connections

While law enforcement and emergency service providers from over a hundred agencies worked frantically at the scene, mental health and victim service providers began to design a facility to provide the necessary resources to victims and to the community during and following this mass tragedy. One of the results is Columbine Connections. This resource center provides mental health and victim services to anyone in the Columbine community as well as a teen center, S.H.O.U.T.S. (Students Helping Others Unite Togethe Socially), that provided students a safe, healthy environment where teens could hang out and heal.
The Media Response

The News Crews Arrive

Although other school homicides have received intense media coverage, the response to the Columbine shootings dwarfed anything that had come before. As President Clinton remarked, the event “pierced the heart of a nation” and held the country in spellbound horror.

The public has an intense interest and the media a responsibility to report about an incident of this magnitude. Managing the media presence and meeting the corresponding information demands required significant county resources, however, and became an important part of the emergency response.

On April 20, news crews were in nearby Boulder, Colorado, anticipating developments in the Jon Benet Ramsey murder investigation. As word of the Columbine shootings spread, the media immediately shifted from Boulder to south Jefferson County. Somewhere between 400 and 500 reporters were on scene at the height of the media coverage. With them came 75 to 90 satellite trucks and up to 60 television cameras. At least 20 of the television crews arrived from other countries.

The reporters on scene placed only a fraction of the media calls the county received. Given the scale of the media interest, the county called on many agencies and organizations to help with the public information effort. All told, more than 35 employees from the county and elsewhere assisted with this aspect of the emergency response.

Emergency PIOs on Site

The main spokesman for the tragedy was Sheriff’s Deputy Steve Davis, who had been the public information officer (PIO) for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office for slightly more than a year. Davis called into Dispatch at 11:32 a.m. and arrived on scene shortly thereafter, yet two or three local news crews had already beaten him there.

Operating from the incident command bus, Davis worked with public information officers from the various first-responder agencies. He filled the key role of spokesman during the following days, while the other PIOs helped him track hundreds of calls and pages from local, national and international reporters. During the opening hours of the crisis, Davis dictated a press release to a West Metro Fire & Rescue PIO, who sent the bulletin from her office. Meanwhile, two other fire department PIOs helped Davis set up a staging area where the media could get information and pictures without interfering with the response efforts.
At 1:30 p.m., Davis gave his first press conference. He held subsequent briefings each hour for the first two days after the incident. Those hourly news conferences, which were held at the Clement Park staging area, allowed reporters to confirm information and hear about new developments in the investigation.

Between the hourly briefings, Davis obtained updates from the command post, organized new information and checked to see what questions reporters wanted answered. The other PIOs were working in shifts as his assistants, and they scheduled his interviews, answered routine media questions, gathered lists of new questions and acted as a buffer between Davis and the media.

Without their assistance, Davis would have been quickly overwhelmed by the demands on his time. The Columbine story was covered around the clock, and the demand for new information was constant. In the first two days alone, Davis did 134 on-camera interviews in addition to his hourly briefings. Sheriff John P. Stone and other law-enforcement officials were equally sought after by the media.

After several 20-hour days, Davis received help from Sgt. Jim Parr, who had filled the Sheriff’s PIO slot before Davis. As the crisis wore on, Parr served as the back-up, on-camera spokesman. Davis started work at 4 a.m., and then Parr came in at noon. The two worked together for several hours to insure they were dispensing consistent, accurate information, and then Davis would go back to his office for a few hours and then home to sleep. Meanwhile, Parr took over the reigns as spokesman for the late afternoon and evening.

**Unified Media Command Center Established at Columbine Public Library**
While Davis and the emergency public information officers dealt with reporters on site, other media outlets began phoning the dispatch center. The calls came within minutes of the first 911 reports, and dispatchers were desperately looking for people to handle the media so they could focus on the unfolding crisis at the school.

By noon, K. Ann Grider of the county’s Public Information Department arrived at the dispatch center with County Administrator Ron Holliday and Emergency Management Coordinator Judy Peratt. The three took over the PIO function there and corroborated what little information they could during the opening hours.

The high media interest was immediately evident. By 11:33 a.m., local media had contacted dispatch asking for information about the shootings; by 11:42 a.m., the first national news organization had called. Soon news helicopters were flying over the school, and other media figures—including Jay Leno and Larry King—were calling to request interviews with responding officers and Sheriff Stone. By midnight, 339 media calls had come into dispatch from more than 60 countries.

A meeting was held at the dispatch center shortly before midnight to plan the next step in coordinating the media response. At the meeting were public information officers from the school district and the county, representatives from the Sheriff’s Office, the county administrator, the county emergency management coordinator and two of the county commissioners. Also in attendance was the co-director of the Colorado-Oklahoma Resource Council, who had coordinated the media response during the Oklahoma City bombing trials that were held in Denver the previous year.

Everyone agreed that a coordinated response by the primary agencies involved—the Sheriff’s Office, the county, the District Attorney’s Office and the school district—could happen more easily if all parties shared a communications center. By working out of the same building, the agencies could share resources and check facts to keep misinformation to a minimum. The dispatch center, which had limited space, was obviously not an appropriate headquarters for a long-term media response.

Instead, the group chose the Columbine Public Library, which is located near the school just across Clement Park. The library was part of the county infrastructure, and it was reasonably equipped to handle an influx of media and staff.

Once the facility had been selected, Holliday placed a call to Library Director William Knott and asked if the library could be used as a media center. Knott and the Jeffco Public Library Board promised their full support and made employees available to assist.

By 1:30 a.m. on April 21, library, county and sheriff’s personnel moved in to set up computers, faxes, copiers, printers and televisions and establish a phone bank and Internet service. By 6 a.m. on Wednesday, the county had a fully functioning crisis communications center, and the phones began ringing. The county and Sheriff’s Office staffed the center immediately, and the
school district moved its public information officers and volunteers in the following Monday.

Over the next 2-1/2 weeks, thousands of reporters would call the communications center for assistance. Davis and his team of on-site PIOs continued to function as the primary information source, but sheriff's deputies and PIOs at the library provided what background information they could and helped connect reporters with appropriate agencies and people.

In addition, the library served as a daily meeting place where all PIOs would gather to coordinate information given out on site and over the media line. The facility also offered space for PIOs to research and prepare written materials as needed.

Several days into the crisis, the media number was broadcast to the public, and the phone bank was inundated with inquiries about where people could send condolence cards or go to donate money, gifts and services. The calls poured in from citizens around the world until the communications center was finally closed more than two weeks later.

**Media City Erected at Clement Park**

Before the communications center was ready, the media had set up at Clement Park for the first news conference. The 285-acre park is located adjacent to Columbine High School, and the media could transmit the briefings from there with the high school as a backdrop.

In addition, the park had hard-surface parking lots that could support satellite trucks. By early Wednesday morning, more than 60 trucks and auxiliary vehicles were on site, along with generators, portable lights, phone and fiber-optic hookups, tents, portable stages, food wagons, portable heaters and miles of cable strung throughout the park.

Since the media had already erected their equipment, it was pointless to move them. From that point on, Clement Park became the center of live coverage of the Columbine response and the location for all news briefings. Within hours, the park was transformed into a media city.

Although the county owns Clement Park, Foothills Park & Recreation District manages it. As the hours wore on, more and more media arrived on scene. They began spreading from the parking areas onto the grassy turf, trying to gain the best view of the school.

The damage to the park was compounded as the weather worsened. Within 24 hours, an ongoing battle with rain and snow began. The three weeks following the shootings were the wettest on record since 1900. Accommodations were made for the media, many of whom weren’t prepared for winter weather in April. Canopies and tents were erected for the first few days of briefings to protect both the spokespeople and the media from the freezing conditions.

The media did not fully vacate their encampment for more than three weeks, and, during that time, district staff provided utility hookups, sanitary facilities, snow removal, trash collection and crowd management assistance.
The Coverage Continues

From the earliest moments, the media became part of the crisis response. At a local level, the media were invaluable in helping to get information out to the community. Newspapers and television and radio stations dispersed the news, but they also announced phone numbers for hotlines and counseling services, phones numbers and addresses for donation centers and volunteer programs, and information about events, memorials and school-related issues. They even gave mental health tips to the Columbine and wider community as people dealt with their grief.

The media's main interest, of course, was in learning details about the crime, emergency response and subsequent investigation. Balancing the media's interest in obtaining information against the needs of the community and the investigation was a continuing challenge.

Davis provided as much detail as possible in his news conferences, but the facts remained sketchy during the opening hours of the crisis. Meanwhile, the media interviewed escaping students and teachers, contacted Columbine-area residents and searched the Internet for information about the suspects and the Trench Coat Mafia, an informal group the suspects had reportedly joined. On the suspects' web site, reporters discovered excerpts from Harris' journal, which the Sheriff's Office did not release as it was evidence in an ongoing investigation.

The media's proximity to the SWAT staging area also caused confusion. More than 1,000 law-enforcement and fire/rescue personnel responded to the scene. Many simply came on their own when they heard of the shootings on the radio, and they reported to the command bus, which was near the media staging area. Enough personnel were already in the school, so the extra SWAT officers were asked to wait while those inside the school finished their sweeps. Those extra officers were pictured on television, which created the erroneous perception that SWAT teams were making no effort to help students still in the building.

Other pieces of evidence the media wanted to have were the cafeteria videotapes and 911 audiotapes. The videotapes were not made public, but portions of a 911 tape were. Lt. Jeff Shrader and an investigator from the Sheriff's Office spent an entire night putting together excerpts from a recorded 911 call from the library, which was released the next day along with a brief timeline.

"I was asked why we didn't release the whole tape," Shrader later said. "First, there was an ongoing investigation. Also, we feel more compelled to be sensitive to the community than to satisfy the curiosity of the world. I did not want to release the portion of the 911 tape in which kids were killed."

As the initial crisis ended and the investigators began processing the crime scene, there was less news to report. After the Columbine Investigative Task Force was formed, investigators reported being followed by members of the media when they left the Administration Building to
conduct follow-up interviews. One member of the foreign press corps showed up on the doorstep of the investigation commander as he left for work early one morning. Other county employees reported individual media showing up in different departments at the county building. They were asking questions and looking for new angles for their stories.

But reporters also assisted in the investigation when they would obtain information that they felt might be of value to the investigation and made a point to forward the information to the task force.

Davis stopped holding daily briefings after the middle of the third week, but the media stayed. The first day back in his office after nearly three weeks on scene at the high school, Davis still received 361 pages and nearly 50 e-mail and phone messages in one hour.

Columbine remained the nation’s top story until Jesse Jackson went to Kosovo, John Elway announced his retirement from the Denver Broncos, and a deadly tornado struck Oklahoma City.
The Community Response

Psychologists have likened the Columbine shootings to a rock being dropped into a lake. Those nearest the point of impact felt the effects most profoundly, but the sadness rippled outward in ever-widening circles, touching people far beyond the county’s borders.

A Field of Memorials

The public grieving began almost immediately and increased as the days wore on. Clement Park, which sits adjacent to Columbine High School, was the center of the mourning. It became the site of literally thousands of informal memorials, as people from around the world came to leave signs of remembrance and support for the students of Columbine.

Foothills Park and Recreation District, which manages the facility, estimates that more than 200,000 people traveled to the park before the memorials were dismantled in May. The visitors left stuffed animals, crosses, angels, candles, bouquets, photographs, ribbons and numerous other items.

A pick-up truck and a small compact car, discovered the next day parked in a Clement Park lot by Columbine students, became memorials to two of the slain students. The vehicles were nearly unrecognizable as friends and strangers covered them with flowers and countless pictures, cards, letters and drawings in memory of the owners.

Mourners mingled with the media, which were set up at Clement Park to cover press conferences and response efforts at the school. The high volume of foot traffic and wet weather wreaked havoc on the park. The Foothills staff placed tents, plastic and more than 2,000 bales of straw around the memorials and grass to minimize the damage.

A Symbol of Grief and Remembrance

On the evening of April 20, local Red Cross leaders developed a plan to help the community show support for the people of Columbine. The Red Cross took silver and navy blue ribbons—the colors of Columbine High School—and twined them together with a pin. The group publicized the concept through the media and distributed more than 15,000 free ribbons through its Mile High chapter offices. One local business placed a giant reproduction of the symbol atop its skyscraper in downtown Denver.

Different groups designed various pins – with designs incorporating such symbols as Columbine flowers, 13 stars to represent the 13 victims, hearts with ribbons, and more ribbons.
Profits from the sale of pins were donated to funds for Columbine victims. Long after the memorial services were over, residents continued wearing the pins as a way to express their grief over the Columbine shootings.

Public Memorial Service

As citizens streamed to the park to remember the victims, state and local leaders began planning a public memorial service for Sunday, April 25. The ceremony drew more than 70,000 mourners, and millions more watched the proceedings on television.

Using the Columbine Public Library as a base, Gov. Bill Owens and his staff worked with the county, school district, Sheriff’s Office and City of Littleton to plan the event. At the request of local ministers, the event was held at 1 p.m. to allow residents to attend regular church services before coming to the community-wide memorial.

The most difficult task was finding a suitable site to handle the crowds. After considering several alternatives, the planning committee finally selected the Mann Theatre parking lot and front entrance at Bowles Crossing, a shopping mall just across the street from Clement Park and northwest of Columbine High School. The Governor’s Office worked with businesses in the area to close for most of the day and arranged for portable toilets, water, shuttle buses and volunteer help.

The next step was to choose speakers and performers for the service. Vice President Al Gore asked to participate, and countless celebrities and singers volunteered their services. Those selected represented a variety of faiths, musical genres and national, state and local communities.

The memorial included: the Arapahoe Road Baptist Church Choir; the Massed Pipes and Drums of Colorado; the Most Rev. Archbishop Charles J. Chaput, archbishop of Denver; Jefferson County Commissioner Pat Holloway; Superintendent Jane Hammond of Jefferson
Community

County Public Schools; musicians Michael W. Smith and Amy Grant; Mayor Pat Cronenberger of the City of Littleton; Pastor Jerry Nelson of Southern Gables Church; musician Phil Driscol; U.S. Vice President Al Gore; Columbine High School students Amber Burgess and Heather Dinkel; Pastor Franklin Graham; Gov. Bill Owens; Rabbi Fred Greensphan of Beth Shalom; and Columbine students Jonathan and Stephen Cohen, who performed a song entitled “Friend of Mine” that was written in memory of the victims.

Once the program was set, the planning committee turned its attention to other issues, such as security and traffic control. Many of the agencies involved in the preparations set up shop at Columbine Public Library, which was already in use as a communications center. Each group had space at the library and access to aerial photos provided by the county’s GIS Department. Some groups, such as the State Patrol and U.S. Secret Service, needed more extensive facilities and worked elsewhere.

The memorial service was over within a few hours, but residents stayed to express their grief. Among the mourners were General Colin Powell, the president of Ghana, several members of congress and countless other dignitaries who came to pay their respects.

A Continuous Outpouring

Meanwhile, the media information line at Columbine Public Library had been broadcast worldwide, and the lines lit up with calls. Young people called to cry, teachers phoned wondering how to talk to their students and strangers from across the nation asked where they could send cards or gifts. The deputies and public information officers referred them to grief counseling hotlines, donation centers and memorial funds. The school district had also set up a hotline staffed by volunteers, who took thousands of calls in the ensuing weeks.

The days passed, but the media stayed and the phone calls continued. Although Columbine Public Library serves 1,400 patrons on an average day, the library was used exclusively for the Columbine emergency response from Tuesday, April 20, until Friday, May 7, 1999.

The staff at the Foothills Park and Recreation District continued to maintain the memorials at Clement Park as well. Five weeks after the shootings, the district worked with the Colorado Historical Society to take down the memorials and begin preserving them for future museum displays.

Items from the informal memorial were removed and put in storage in a vacant building at the Denver Federal Center. The district staff provided all of the logistics and volunteer coordination for the removal of the memorial items, a process that took three days to complete with over 300 volunteers. Under the direction of the Colorado Historical Society the main focus for the memorial removal was to be sensitive to community needs and save as many items as possible, while recognizing the need to return the park to normal operations within a reasonable time frame. The inventory of items removed from the park included over 2,500 stuffed animals, 250
crosses, pictures, artwork, a new bicycle, and over 300 banners from all over the world. In addition, thousands of flowers were recycled into potpourri or mulch for planting beds.

A number of park and recreation agencies from throughout the Denver area stepped forward to help with the park cleanup. Their help was invaluable and, today, the park looks as it did...
before the shootings. But within the community it remains a symbol of ongoing grief.
The City of Littleton became famous for something that didn’t happen there -- the shootings at Columbine High School.

Columbine High School is in an unincorporated area in the southern part of Jefferson County, Colorado, while the City of Littleton is in Arapahoe County, Colorado. But because the high school and the surrounding neighborhoods use Littleton in their post office address, national and international media assumed the school was within the city.

The high school is served by the Littleton Fire Department through a contract with the Littleton Fire Protection District. Littleton firefighters were the first emergency medical personnel to respond to the call. Eight units and 36 personnel from Littleton Fire were on the scene until the last victims were removed. Several paramedics found themselves in the line of gunfire as they rescued the wounded from outside the school.

The Littleton Police Department, including its SWAT team, was among the first law enforcement agencies to respond when Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office called for mutual aid.

These facts added to the confusion as the media descended on Columbine and reported the events back to the world. In search of pieces to the Columbine story, members of the media called what they assumed to be official spokespeople – Littleton Mayor Pat Cronenberger and Public Information Officer Kelli Narde. They also called the historical museum, the city council members and Littleton schools, looking for information about Littleton, Colorado. Each Littleton contact tried to correct the confusion about the school’s location, as did their Jefferson County counterparts, but the media continued to reference Littleton in their stories.

The city graciously assisted as best it could, answering hundreds of media calls as well as assisting with the planning efforts for the Governor’s memorial service. The mayor even spoke at the service. She reiterated that while Columbine High School was not in the city of Littleton, boundaries did not matter and the citizens of Littleton joined the rest of the world in grieving for the students, their families, the teacher and the community.
Jefferson County Dispatch Center receives the first 911 call from a citizen reporting an explosion in a field on the east side of Wadsworth Boulevard between Ken Caryl and Chatfield Avenues. The explosion is actually a timed diversionary device. Two backpacks with pipe bombs, aerosol canisters and small propane tanks had been placed in a grassy open space three miles southwest of Columbine High School. Only the pipe bombs and one of the aerosol canisters explode but the explosion and subsequent grass fire are enough to get the attention of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office and the Littleton Fire Department. The bombs exploding in the field along Wadsworth Boulevard are intended to divert the attention of law enforcement away from what is planned to be a much more devastating scene at the school.
Bomb Summary

On April 20, 1999 the Jefferson County Bomb Squad responded to Columbine High School because of reports of explosive devices being used during the shooting rampage. Shortly after, a metro-wide “all call” was initiated requesting assistance from local, state and federal agencies.

Explosives Experts

Bomb squad technicians from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office conducted the investigation of the various explosive devices. They were assisted by bomb technicians from the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office, Denver Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). Approximately 33 people assisted in the bomb investigation. Sixteen were certified bomb technicians and the remainder were bomb-dog handlers, explosive recognition experts or evidence collection personnel from the FBI and ATF.

Diversionary Bomb

Prior to the shootings at Columbine High School, a diversionary bomb exploded on the greenbelt near the 7900 block of South Wadsworth Boulevard. The Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office was notified of the explosion at 11:21 a.m. The Littleton Fire Department responded and West Metro Fire Department Investigator Bill Maron completed the investigation. The investigation revealed that two backpacks containing explosive diversionary devices, built with multiple components, had been placed at this location by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. Only some of the components actually exploded.

The examination of the diversionary devices by bomb technicians provided immediate critical information about the sophistication of the devices and the possibility of motion activators attached to the bombs. That information was relayed to the command post, the SWAT teams and the bomb technicians responding to the scene at the high school.

Library

Beginning with an initial sweep of Columbine High School, the highest priority for removal of devices initially was given to the library so that the bodies of the deceased could be removed from the scene. Second priority would be given to the cafeteria and additional areas would be assessed. This plan was followed until two bombs, with timing devices attached, were found at 5:43 p.m. in two vehicles parked in the south student parking lot, a BMW belonging to Klebold and a Honda belonging to Harris.
As a result of these bombs, priority was changed with attention given first to the vehicles with the known timing devices. Bomb technicians, in bomb suits or using a remotely controlled robot, removed the bombs from these two vehicles in the school parking lot.

Before the school could be deemed clear and safe, every room, every storage area, every space on both levels of the 250,000-square-foot school was checked by bomb technicians.

A total of 1,952 student school lockers and 700 backpacks were checked for evidence of any type of explosive device. This process took approximately seven days from the time the incident began until the school was determined to be completely clear, thus allowing unrestricted access into the school by authorized personnel.

There were approximately 357 pieces of explosive evidence identified and collected. The bulk of this evidence was packaged and released on scene to ATF for additional testing and reconstruction as required.

**Detonation**

During the collection and handling of the explosives evidence Tuesday evening, one bomb and other devices within the bomb trailer were accidentally detonated. Two bomb technicians from the Arapahoe Sheriff’s Office were lowering a pipe bomb into the trailer when a striking match attached to the pipe bomb brushed against the trailer wall and ignited. The devices exploded within the confines of the trailer. At 10:40 p.m. April 20, the radio report of “officer down” stunned the entire law enforcement community responding to the Columbine incident. Thankfully, no one was hurt because the technicians were well trained and wearing protective bomb suits and knew to fall backward as they saw the spark from the device.

There were no injuries and no fatalities as a result of any bomb explosions.

**Explosive Devices**

The subsequent investigation revealed numerous types and amounts of “improvised explosive
"devices," or self-made bombs. A device that had more than one component was still counted as one so as not to confuse how many separate bombs there were. For instance, the large propane tank bomb in the duffel bag contained multiple components but was counted as one bomb.

All of the improvised explosive devices that functioned were located at Columbine High School with the exception of the two pipe bombs used as a diversion. There were additional unexploded devices located at Columbine High School as well as the vehicles and residences of Harris and Klebold. Below is a list of where all the devices were located:

### 30 EXPLODED DEVICES AT COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL

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<th>Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class/Halls</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cafeteria</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
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### 46 UNEXPLODED DEVICES AT COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL

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<tr>
<td>Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>Class/Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cafeteria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UNEXPLODED DEVICES IN KLEBOLDS' VEHICLE

- 12 explosive devices including components for a car bomb

### UNEXPLODED DEVICES IN HARRIS' VEHICLE

- 1 device

### UNEXPLODED DEVICES IN KLEBOLDS' RESIDENCE

- 6 explosive devices

### UNEXPLODED DEVICES IN HARRIS' RESIDENCE

- 2 explosive devices
SUMMARY

There were a total of 76 devices found at the school, two diversionary devices, 13 devices in the suspects' cars, and 8 more at their two homes or a total of 99 explosive devices.

The investigation determined that Harris and Klebold placed two 20-lb. propane tank bombs in the cafeteria the morning of April 20. Computer modeling substantiated by field testing indicated that had those two large 20-lb. propane bombs detonated with a cafeteria full of students, most would have been killed or severely injured by the resulting blasts and subsequent fireballs. There were approximately 488 students in the cafeteria at 11:17 a.m. on April 20, the time the bombs were set to detonate. In addition to the casualties caused by the explosions, the computer models demonstrated a strong likelihood of structural damage and partial collapse of the cafeteria and possible library above.

During a search of the Harris residence, three significant homemade videotapes were found. One tape, shot in 1999, includes a section in which Harris and Klebold video tape their “arsenal” at the Harris residence. The video shows about 21 pipe bombs of varying sizes. The video also shows CO₂ cartridge bombs, which Harris refers to as “crickets” and “grenades.” Harris says there are 29.

Another tape, made in April of 1999, includes Harris and Klebold discussing making bombs and mentions propane and napalm. In addition, a spiral bound journal was recovered from the Harris residence that contains reference to bombs. One such entry, dated April 3, 1999, reveals “...we have six time clocks ready, 39 crickets, 24 pipe bombs, and the napalm is under construction.” Another page that is not dated appears to be an inventory of bombs and indicates there are 53 of what Harris termed “crickets” and “super crickets” and 24 pipe bombs of different sizes.

Several leads were followed in an attempt to identify components and sources of the various devices and containers. Although some items were tracked through receipts, many items were found to be available at numerous retailers. In viewing the videotapes, there are indications of where some items were purchased. Additional information was found in Harris’ journal, a Day Timer, calendar pages, and a calendar taken from the Harris residence.
The bombs are placed in the cafeteria

Between 11:14 am and 11:22 am on April 20, 1999

There has been much public speculation that the bombs were brought into the school several days before April 20, possibly during the “after-prom” party held in the school the prior weekend. But the cafeteria videotape of April 20 tells a different story.

Each school day, a videotape records the activities in the school cafeteria. Four separate cameras, catching images from four different angles, are set up in corners of the cafeteria. Their primary purpose is to capture on tape any general mischief, food fights or other problems that can happen when 500 teenagers gather in one location. Because of the cameras’ locations in the cafeteria, there are a few blind corners that the cameras cannot “see” or record on tape.

The first tape of each day begins recording scenes around 7 to 8 a.m. For the most part, the cafeteria is empty in those first few hours except for a scattering of students taking advantage of the quiet study area during a free class period. The morning tape is replaced by a second around 10:30 or 11 a.m., shortly before the “A” lunch period begins at 11:15 a.m. and the activity in the cafeteria intensifies.

On Tuesday, April 20, the building custodian was behind schedule and was late changing the cafeteria videotape. At 11:14 a.m., he unlocked the door to the backroom where the recording VCR is set up. He hit the eject button, removed the morning videotape and inserted a new one. But the videotape to record both of the day’s lunch periods and on into the afternoon was one that was being recycled. It had to be rewound. While waiting for the tape to rewind, the custodian left the room to make a quick call home. He hit “record” on tape #2 at 11:22.

In the time between 11:14 when the custodian stopped the first videotape and ejected it from the VCR, and 11:22 when the second tape began to record lunchtime activities in the cafeteria, two large duffel/gym bags appeared beside two separate tables in the lunch room. In the eight minutes it took the custodian to eject the first videotape, rewind the second one and make a short phone call, the bags became visible.

The cafeteria tapes were sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lab in Quantico, Virginia, where they were enlarged and enhanced several times. The lab examined both tapes frame by frame. The quality of the tapes, even when enhanced, was poor. But lab experts are confident that in the first frames of the new videotape beginning at 11:22, two large shapes can be seen on the floor in spots that were empty at 11:14.
The building custodian noticed nothing out of the ordinary prior to the first lunch period. Besides changing the cafeteria videotapes, his daily routine included walking through the cafeteria after each class period looking for items left behind by students using the period to study. He felt certain that he would have noticed any large duffel bags or backpacks left in the area before lunch began.

(Note: **A glimpse into the mindset of Klebold and Harris** became clearer as investigators realized the extremely short period of time the suspects allowed between the time the bombs were placed in the cafeteria and the time set for them to explode – basically three minutes. Since the cafeteria videotape shows that the bombs were not beside the tables at 11:14 and the bombs were set to detonate at 11:17, little leeway was allowed for the two suspects to escape from the fireball they had planned.)

Investigators established that Harris and Klebold brought the bags containing the large propane bombs into the cafeteria and set them beside two cafeteria tables at the beginning of the first lunch period. The bombs were hidden in duffel bags so they easily blended in with the 400-plus backpacks strewn on the floor, under tables and chairs throughout the cafeteria. Most high school students carry some type of backpack. Two more bags brought in by one of their peers would not raise anyone’s suspicions.

Nearly 500 students were in the cafeteria that day. Investigators interviewed all of them at least once, but no one actually recalled either of the gunmen walking in with a duffel bag and setting them down near tables (**PP and QQ**) where the two normally sat with friends at lunch.

The bomb technicians discovered that the bombs were equipped with timers set to detonate at 11:17 a.m.

In some of Harris’ writing, investigators found references to the optimum times during the school day and the location to detonate the bombs in order to kill the greatest number of people. Those notes appear on pieces of scrap paper, on corners of his daybook, scribbly little notes written as he sat in the school cafeteria taking a count of the number of students in that location at a specific time. The bell announcing the end of class and the passing period for the next class period or “A” lunch rang at 11:10 a.m.

- At 11:10, Harris estimated 270 to 300 people in the cafeteria and makes a note of “heavy additions” and the “lines start.”
- At 11:11, he counted about 300 to 350 people in the cafeteria,
- At 11:12 to 11:13 between 350 and 450. He noted that at 11:14 to 11:15 there were over 500 students.

Klebold’s last entry in his school notebook gave a chilling timeline for April 20. “Walk in, set bombs at 11:09 for 11:17. Leave…” The two apparently determined that 11:17 a.m. was the most opportune time to cause the most damage and deaths. The timers on the propane bombs were set for 11:17.

Sometime before 11:17, Harris and Klebold placed the two propane bombs in the cafeteria, and went back out to the student parking lots to their respective cars. The belief is that they then would shoot any surviving students who were able to escape the fireball. Bombs in their cars were set to explode after those in the cafeteria.
Because of faulty wiring and poorly constructed devices, the two 20-lb. propane bombs did not detonate. And neither did the bombs in their cars.
Shown above are the components of the Incident Management System utilized for the Law Enforcement response which was closely coordinated at the scene in a single Command Post initially by Jefferson County Sheriff's Lieutenant Dave WALCHER.
Littleton Fire Chief Pessemier and Division Chief Burdick took over the management of the medical issues from their first arriving Battalion Chief, Ray Rayne. Medical concerns included setting up four triage areas, transporting the wounded, and coordinating a joint effort rescue of wounded students in an active situation with law enforcement personnel providing protective cover fire. They also made plans for any fire-related issues that might occur at or in the school. Their coordination was crucial due to the task at hand and the number of different agencies they managed by using the above management structure.
Shown above are the components of the Incident Management System utilized for the Investigation into the events at Columbine High School which was closely coordinated at the scene in a single Command Post by Jefferson County Sheriff's Office.
School Map / Parking Lots

- Senior Parking Lot
- Student Parking Lot
- Teacher Parking Lot

Key Areas at the School

Area Map

Go to the Table of Contents
A Neighbor Photographs Scenes of April 20, 1999

Students can be seen running from the school at approximately 11:35 a.m.
Between 11:30 am to 11:40 am deputies provide safety for injured and escaping students. (west side)

11:35 am to 11:44 additional deputies arrive and start to evacuate students to safety.

12:34 pm to 12:39 p.m. SWAT members attempt rescue at west doors.

Photos courtesy of Brian Pain taken from his residence on the south side of the school during the shootings at
Between 12:02 pm and 12:05 p.m. the powder smoke can be seen as Klebold and Harris shoot from the library windows at deputies and paramedics rescuing the wounded below.
Photos courtesy of Brian Pain taken from his residence on the south side of the school during the shootings at Columbine High School.
A Sniper on the Roof?

Man observed on roof – Thought to be possible sniper

Photo courtesy of Brian Pain taken from his home during the Columbine Shootings. The photo is taken on the south side of the school looking north at the science wing, cafeteria and library. The individual is first observed at approximately 11:36 am.
# Law Enforcement Agencies and Support Provided

## Responding to Columbine High School

### April 20, 1999

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<th>Agency</th>
<th>Primary Assignments</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Primary agency, first response, command post, perimeters, bomb technicians, evacuations, SWAT, investigations, public information, communications, victim advocates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams County Sheriff’s Department</td>
<td>Primary SWAT - second sweep, crisis negotiators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>Command Post, bomb squad, SWAT, crime scene technicians, investigations, traffic, perimeter, victim advocates</td>
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<td>Arvada Police Department</td>
<td>Investigations, Jeffco SWAT, Critical Incident Team, perimeters</td>
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<td>Blackhawk Police Department</td>
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<td>Boulder Police Department</td>
<td>SWAT – final sweep, victim advocates</td>
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<td>Boulder County Sheriff’s Department</td>
<td>SWAT – final sweep, paramedics, special service technicians, victim advocates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms</td>
<td>Crime scene technicians, bomb squad, bomb analysis, investigations, computer/internet forensics</td>
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<td>Central City Police Department</td>
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<td>Colorado Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td>Crime scene technicians, investigators, computer/internet forensics, evidence analysis</td>
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<td>Commerce City Police Department</td>
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<td>Denver Police Department</td>
<td>Command Post, SWAT, paramedics, traffic, perimeters, transportation of victims and witnesses,</td>
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<td>Agency</td>
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<td>Investigations, thermal imaging, victim advocates, on-call for Arapahoe and Jefferson County bomb squads</td>
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<td>Police Division</td>
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<td>Erie Police Department</td>
<td>SWAT - second sweeps (Part of Boulder County SWAT team)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td>Command Post, bomb technicians, hostage negotiator, investigations, SWAT, evidence response team, perimeter, computer/internet forensics, special projects</td>
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<td>First Judicial District Attorney’s Office</td>
<td>Investigations, Critical Incident Team, legal advisor, victim advocates</td>
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<td>Gilpin County Sheriff’s Department</td>
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<td>Greenwood Village Police Department</td>
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<td>West Metro Fire Protection District</td>
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<td>Perimeter, interviews, victim advocates, public information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat Ridge Police Department</td>
<td>Perimeter, Critical Incident Team, crime scene technicians, investigations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Fire/Emergency Medical Services Response

On April 20, 1999, Littleton’s Fire Engine 13 responded to a report of a weed fire and explosion on Wadsworth Boulevard, between Ken Caryl and Chatfield Avenues. A West Metro Fire District engine already was on scene and had extinguished the fire. A West Metro fire Investigator was en route to investigate the incident. Officers at the scene noted two small propane fuel containers and possibly fireworks on the ground in the area.

As Engine 13 responded to the weed fire, the crew heard other fire engine and rescue crews responding to Columbine High School because of gunshots fired and a possible explosion on the roof.

As units responded, requests for ambulances and a helicopter were initiated. A commander from the Littleton Fire District arrived on scene and assumed command, assigning all other fire and rescue units to stage away from the area. It became apparent this was an active situation and a command post was set up north of the school at the intersection of Leawood and Pierce streets. A call for all the command staff, additional rescues and engines, and additional ambulances was requested.

Those at the command post received reports of multiple victims with gunshot wounds, smoke in the school and a possible natural gas leak inside. With that additional information, Littleton’s command requested that a Fire Task Force be set up to the south of the high school at the intersection of Coal Mine and Pierce streets, and an ambulance staging area at the command post. At this point, a triage and treatment area was established on the west wide of Pierce Street, south of the command post, to receive the wounded, reported to be from 25 to 35.

The Chief of the Littleton Fire Department, William Pessemier, arrived on scene, assumed command of the fire response and established a unified command with the on scene Jefferson County Incident Commander, Lt. Dave Walcher.

The command post was notified that several victims were on the sidewalk outside the school cafeteria on the southwest side of the school. Two Littleton Fire Department Rescue units responded and rescued three victims, taking them first to the command post. All three victims were stabilized and transported to area hospitals.

Prior to leaving for the hospital, rescue crews notified the command post that the area was not secure, that there had been gunfire over their heads as the rescued the injured students and cover fire was supplied by the law enforcement officers in the area.
Several Police vehicles were transporting students from the west wide of the school to the south entrance of Clement Park at Yukon and Caley Streets. The Yukon/ Caley Division triage and treatment area was established with a Littleton Fire Department lieutenant in charge. One patient was transported by Air Life and several were transported by ambulance from this area.

A second triage and treatment area, the East Division, was set up on the east side of the school, after command was informed the remaining victims would be brought from inside the school to this location. The East Division was commanded by a Littleton Fire Department captain and transported several patients by ambulance to area hospitals.

The final triage and treatment area was located on the west side near the library. This area, commanded by a Littleton Fire Department captain, assisted as medical personnel entered the library to rescue and transport the only patient still alive. The patient was transported to a hospital by ambulance

Several agencies assisted with personnel and equipment during the incident. Units from West Metro Fire Protection District assisted with command functions, EMS staging, transportation of patients, treatment of patients, PIO functions and its chaplain assisted with families. Denver Fire Department assisted with the Fire Task Force. South Metro Fire and Rescue's Battalion vehicle was utilized as a communications vehicle. Columbine Ambulance Service, American Medical Response, Englewood Fire Department, Sheridan Fire Department, Rural Metro Ambulance Company, Pridemark Ambulance Company, Denver Health Ambulance, Air Life and Flight for Life were involved in the triage, treatment and transportation of patients.

A total of 12 Fire and EMS agencies responded with 10 pieces of fire apparatus, 46 ambulances, 2 helicopters, 25 staff personnel and one chaplain.

Littleton Fire Department's Deputy Fire Marshall, a bomb tech for Arapahoe County, assisted with identifying and defusing explosive devices, by entering the school with SWAT units during the second sweep of the school late that night.
Jefferson County is the largest county in Colorado with a population of 512,000 residents. It is governed by a three-member board of county commissioners.

The county, covering 777 square miles, lies on the west side of the Denver metropolitan area and extends from the eastern plains through the western foothills and into the Rocky Mountains. There are 11 cities and towns within Jefferson County and several unincorporated communities.
The Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, under the leadership of Sheriff John P. Stone and Undersheriff John A. Dunaway, serves 173,000 citizens in the unincorporated areas of the county. Founded in November 1859, the Sheriff's Office has 400 sworn deputies and 185 non-sworn employees who provide services to the community. Those services include:

- Patrol Operations
- Criminal Investigations

The JCSO Mobile Command bus housed the incident command post northeast of Columbine High School on April 20, 1999.
- Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and K-9 units
- Bomb Squad
- Community Resource Officers
- Detention and Court Services
- Communications Center
- Victim Services
- Support Services
- Community Relations
JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOLS

The Jefferson County School District provides services to the entire County consisting of 777 square miles with a population of approximately 512,000, and more than 88,000 students.

The School District operates:

- 92 Elementary Schools
- 18 Middle Schools
- 16 Senior High Schools
- 8 Charter Schools
- 8 Choice Schools
Columbine High School is located on the Eastern most portion of the County and has:

- Approximately 2,000 students
- 120 Teachers
- 20 Staff Personnel
- 75 Classrooms
- 25 Exterior Doors
- Large Gymnasium, Cafeteria, Library and Auditorium
- The school is almost 250,000 square feet

The high school opened in 1973 and was remodeled and expanded in 1994 and 1995. The layout of the school was drastically changed following the remodel, with clusters of classrooms and a new cafeteria and library added to accommodate the growing population in south Jeffco.

The lower level incorporates the cafeteria and food preparation areas, a teachers' lounge, the first level of a two story-auditorium, and a wing of primarily business, foreign language and special education classrooms.

The upper, main level houses the school's administration and counseling offices, the second level of the auditorium, the school library, an athletic wing and gymnasium, an art wing, and departmentalized areas for social studies, language arts, math, science and music, both vocal and instrumental.
The Littleton Fire Department operates 8 fire stations with 130 24-hour shift personnel. The Fire Department service area is 80 square miles.

The map below depicts the service area of the Fire Department in the City of Littleton (yellow), the Fire Protection District which resides in Arapahoe (right), Douglas (lower right), (contract with Highlands Ranch) and Jefferson County (left).

The population within the service area is nearly 200,000 people. The Fire Department operating budget is approximately $10,000,000.00 which is shared between the City of Littleton, the Littleton Fire Protection District and the Highlands Ranch Metro District.

Littleton Fire Department provides a full range of fire protection and emergency medical services to the community such as:

- Fire Suppression
- Emergency Medical Service
- Hazardous Materials Response
- Technical Rescue
- Dive Rescue
- Wildland Fire
The Fire/Emergency Medical Services Response

On April 20, 1999, Littleton's Fire Engine 13 responded to a report of a weed fire and explosion on Wadsworth Boulevard, between Ken Caryl and Chatfield Avenues. A West Metro Fire District engine already was on scene and had extinguished the fire. A West Metro fire Investigator was en route to investigate the incident. Officers at the scene noted two small propane fuel containers and possibly fireworks on the ground in the area.

As Engine 13 responded to the weed fire, the crew heard other fire engine and rescue crews responding to Columbine High School because of gunshots fired and a possible explosion on the roof.
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 am

11:19 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 13 - Harris and Klebold leave their vehicles and proceed to the top of the west stairs, near the west entrance of the school.
May 15, 2000

Dear Citizen:

The investigation of the shootings that occurred at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, has been completed. The conclusions of the investigation are contained in this report, which we now submit to our community.

What follows is the account of a spring day last year, when two Columbine students attacked their classmates and teachers with an arsenal of firearms and explosives. Within the span of 16 minutes, the gunmen had killed 13 people and wounded 21 others. A savage act of domestic terrorism, their crime is the deadliest school shooting in the history of the United States.

Because the shootings ravaged many lives, we feel an obligation, in the interest of public safety, to document the final moments of the deceased and provide the public with a shared understanding of that day. This report explains how the crime was planned and committed. It also describes the work of those who answered the call for help. By day’s end on April 20, the responders numbered nearly 1,000 and represented the entire law enforcement, fire and medical services community of metropolitan Denver.

In preparing this report, we have relied on the work of approximately 80 investigators from all levels of government. Under the direction of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, the investigators contacted students, teachers and others who might have information about the crime. In all, investigators completed more than 4,400 leads. They examined videotapes, 911 recordings, ballistic reports, medical and autopsy reports, and physical evidence collected at the scene and the conspirators’ residences.

Although the investigation approached conclusion in January 2000, the case remains classified as “open” in the event new information comes to light. To protect our ability to pursue this case further should the opportunity present itself—and to preserve the privacy of witnesses who are not yet in the public eye—we have excluded certain names and details from this report. Whenever possible, however, we have presented full documentation to provide a complete understanding of these events. We have chosen to present this report in CD-ROM format so that audio and video recordings may be included.
Among the significant findings of the 10-month investigation into the Columbine shootings are these:

1. Initial 911 calls included mention of a shooter on the high school roof. The man witnesses saw was an air conditioning repairman, who hid on the roof during the shootings. He was not involved in the crime.

2. The gunmen fired their first shots at about 11:19 a.m. and injured the last victim at 11:35 a.m. By shortly after noon, the killers, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, had died at their own hands.

3. The gunmen were in the library for 7 1/2 minutes. In that time, they shot and killed 10 people and wounded 12 more. They carried more than enough ammunition to kill all 56 people in the library.

4. Physical evidence does not indicate the presence of a third shooter. No known evidence suggests that anyone had prior knowledge of the killers’ plans.

5. Surveillance videotapes clearly demonstrate that two 20-pound propane bombs were placed in the cafeteria the morning of April 20, 1999, and not the night before as has been rumored. No bomb was hidden in the kitchen.

6. According to their writings and videotapes, the gunmen planned to kill far more people. Had the two bombs in the cafeteria functioned properly, all 488 people in the room may have died.

7. The murderers carried two 20-lb. propane bombs, all of the pipe bombs, CO2 bombs and other explosive devices into the school with them on April 20. They carried those devices in duffel bags and backpacks or in ammunition pouches strapped to their bodies. The remaining explosives were left in their cars.

8. In their yearbooks, videotapes, journals and computer files, Klebold and Harris listed 67 people they disliked for various reasons. Only one of those individuals was actually injured, and there is no evidence that he was specifically targeted on April 20.

9. Based on their writings, Klebold and Harris expected the bomb they placed south of the school near Wadsworth Boulevard to divert attention from the school for a longer period of time. The failure of the cafeteria bombs to detonate and the arrival of responding officers apparently caused the gunmen to re-evaluate their planned attack, since they had never listed the school library as a destination point.

10. On April 20, officers contacted suspicious persons near Columbine High School as well as friends and acquaintances of Harris and Klebold. Based on some media portrayals, many believed those persons had been arrested or were involved in the crime. In fact, all of those people were interviewed and released.

In addition to providing information about the crime and law enforcement response, this report acknowledges staff from numerous government, mental health and nonprofit agencies who came forward to serve our grieving community. In response to the shootings, our community has received unparalleled support from professionals throughout the nation and the Denver metropolitan area.

Upon receiving a briefing about the law enforcement response to this horrible crime, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno commented that these professionals had “shown the nation
and the world America’s finest in crisis.” We agree, and wish to express our deep appreciation for their assistance.

While this report establishes a record of the events of April 20, it cannot answer the most fundamental question—WHY? That is, why would two young men, in the spring of their lives, choose to murder faculty members and classmates? The evidence provides no definitive explanation, and the question continues to haunt us all.

While our community struggles with that question and grieves those who were lost, we remain united in one hope—that our nation shall never see anything resembling the tragedy at Columbine High School again.

John P. Stone
Sheriff

John A. Dunaway
Undersheriff
PRIMARY TIME LINE - April 20, 1999

11:10 am - 11:23 am

TIME LINE
- - - 11:10 AM
- - - 11:15 AM
- - - 11:18 AM
- - - 11:19 AM
- - - 11:21 AM
- - - 11:22 AM
- - - 11:23 AM

Cafeteria Video
- Janitor seen going to video room to change tapes. 11:14:36 AM
- Cafeteria Video

Dispatch Recordings
- Littleton Fire

Events Recorded on 911
- 911 Call

TV Coverage

EXPLOSION (Diversions)
- 911 Call in reference to an explosion on Wadsworth near Chatfield and Ken Caryl.
  11:15:00 AM - 911 Call Log

EXPLOSION (Diversions)
- 911 Call in reference to an explosion on Wadsworth near Chatfield and Ken Caryl.
  11:20:00 AM - 911 Call Log

Female Down
- 911 Call
  - 911 Call Reference A Girl down at Columbine High School.
    11:22:00 AM - 911 Call Log

DISPATCH RECORDINGS
- JEFFERSON COUNTY

VIDEO TAPE CHANGED
- Video tape changed by Janitor. Duffle bags are visible on tape.
  11:22:22 AM - Cafeteria Video

VIDEO TAPE CHANGED
- Video tape changed by Janitor. Duffle bags are visible on tape.
  11:22:22 AM - Cafeteria Video

DISPATCH RECORDINGS
- LITTLETON FIRE

STUDENT INCIDENT
- Students begin to notice something happening outside near the steps.
  11:22:22 AM - Cafeteria Video

JANITOR
- Janitor seen going to video room to change tapes.
  11:14:36 AM - Cafeteria Video
PRIMARY TIME LINE - April 20, 1999

11:46 am - 11:47 am

- **LARGE FIRE IGNITES**
  - **PARTIAL DETONATION OF THE DUFFEL BAG OCCURS.**
  - **ONE GALLON OF FUEL IGNITES.**
  - **11:46:03 AM**
  - **CAFETERIA VIDEO**

- **STUDENTS RUNNING**
  - **FOUR STUDENTS ARE OBSERVED RUNNING AND EXITING THE CAFETERIA THROUGH THE SIDE DOOR AFTER FIRE IGNITES.**
  - **11:46:25 AM**
  - **CAFETERIA VIDEO**

- **SUSPECTS LEAVE CAFETERIA**
  - **KLE BOLD AND HARRIS LEAVE THE CAFETERIA. HARRIS HAS A WHITE CUP IN HIS RIGHT HAND FROM WHICH HE WAS DRINKING. HE IS CARRYING HIS FIREARM UNDER HIS LEFT ARM.**
  - **11:46:26 AM**
  - **CAFETERIA VIDEO**

- **STUDENT OBSERVED**
  - **ONE STUDENT IS OBSERVED CRAWLING OUT OF THE CAFETERIA.**
  - **11:47:04 AM**
  - **CAFETERIA VIDEO**

- **DISPATCH RECORDINGS**
  - **LITTLETON FIRE**
  - **11:46 AM**
  - **JCSD DISPATCH TAPE**

- **DISPATCH RECORDINGS**
  - **JEFFERSON Cty**
  - **11:46 AM**
  - **JCSD DISPATCH TAPE**

- **EVENTS**
  - **RECORDED ON 911**
  - **EXPLOSION / GUNFIRE**
  - **GUNFIRE, SCREAMING, AND AN EXPLOSION CAN BE HEARD FROM A DISTANCE.**
  - **11:46:00 AM**
  - **911 CALL LIBRARY**

- **TV COVERAGE**

- **MEDIA COVERAGE BEGINS**
  - **LOCAL TELEVISION NEWS**
  - **BROADCAST INITIAL REPORT OF SHOTS FIRED AT COLUMBINE.**
  - **11:47 AM**
  - **MEDIA**
### PRIMARY TIME LINE - April 20, 1999

#### 12:20 pm - 12:26 pm

<table>
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:20 pm</td>
<td><strong>Cafeteria Video</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>12:21 pm</td>
<td><strong>Victim Transferred</strong> to Denver Health Medical Center: Fire Dispatch</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:22 pm</td>
<td><strong>Parents to Lenwood</strong> Dispatch Advises That Parents Are to Respond to Lenwood Elementary: Fire Dispatch</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:23 pm</td>
<td><strong>Rifle is Subject’s Automatic Gunfire by 2 or 3 Subjects:</strong> News Media</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:24 pm</td>
<td><strong>Witness Statement:</strong> Student Reports That One of the Gunmen Was Wearing a White Hat and Yelled “Shoot Em” News Media</td>
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<td>12:25 pm</td>
<td><strong>Sheriff’s Report:</strong> News School Jumps Out of Helicopter: Media Helicopter: News Media</td>
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<td>12:26 pm</td>
<td><strong>Injury Report:</strong> Media Reports That There Are Two Gunmen and 8 Victims: News Media</td>
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PRIMARY TIME LINE - April 20, 1999

12:44 pm 12:57 pm

12:44 PM - CAFETERIA VIDEO
12:44 PM - DISPATCH RECORDINGS - LITTLETON FIRE
12:44 PM - EVENTS RECORDED ON 911
12:44 PM - TV COVERAGE

12:45 PM - VICTIM TRANSPORTED - MINIALL TRANSFERRED TO LITTLETON HOSPITAL
12:45 PM - FIRE DISPATCH
12:45 PM - SWAT TEAM
12:45 PM - GUNFIRE
12:45 PM - SYNDICATION SUGGESTED THAT SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:45 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:45 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL

12:50 PM - VICTIM TRANSPORTED - NOBLE MOVEDEN TRANSFERRED TO LITTLETON HOSPITAL
12:50 PM - FIRE DISPATCH
12:50 PM - GUNFIRE
12:50 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:50 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:50 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL

12:53 PM - VICTIM TRANSPORTED - JUINUS BUBBINS TRANSFERRED TO LITTLETON HOSPITAL
12:53 PM - FIRE DISPATCH
12:53 PM - GUNFIRE
12:53 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:53 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:53 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL

12:57 PM - VICTIM TRANSPORTED - JENNIFER DOYLE TRANSFERRED TO LITTLETON HOSPITAL
12:57 PM - FIRE DISPATCH
12:57 PM - GUNFIRE
12:57 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:57 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
12:57 PM - SYNDICATION TAKESWAT TEAM TO SOUTH EAST SIDE TO CHECK HALL
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Harris and Klebold are not shown on every diagram, but rather only during the events that witnesses actually observed them.
11:19 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 am

11:19 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 14 - Harris and Klebold begin shooting towards the west entrance door, killing Rachel Scott and injuring Richard Castaldo.
11:19 - 11:23 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 16 - Additional shots are fired down the stairs toward the south parking lot and cafeteria injuring Daniel Rohrbough, Lance Kirklin and Sean Graves.
11:19 - 11:23 am
TIME LINE

April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 17 - Harris and Klebold shoot towards the grassy hill injuring Michael Johnson and Mark Taylor.
11:19 - 11:23 am
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 21 - Klebold steps over Sean Graves and briefly enters the cafeteria, then walks back outside. Klebold then returns to the top of the stairs and joins Harris.
11:19 - 11:23 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 22 - Harris shoots down the stairs hitting Anne Marie Hochhalter.
11:19 - 11:23 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 24 - Throughout the shooting outside, Harris and Klebold are observed throwing several explosive devices that land on the roof, parking lot and grassy hill.
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Harris and Klebold are not shown on every diagram, but rather only during the events that witnesses actually observed them.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 25 - Harris shoots toward the west doors as he walks toward them. Flying glass and shrapnel injures student Brian Anderson and teacher Patricia Nielson.
11:24 am

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:24 am

11:24 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 27 - Harris, inside at the west entrance double doors, exchanges gunfire with Jefferson County Sheriff’s Deputy Neil Gardner who has just arrived in the parking lot.
The following diagrams show the significant events and movements of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold on April 20, 1999. The witnesses to each event are shown as green dots. The injured are shown as yellow only during the event that caused the injury and return to green if they witnessed other events. The deceased are shown as red and convert to gray once that event has passed. Harris is shown as a red dot with the letter “H” inside it and Klebold is shown as a blue dot with the letter “K” inside it.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Harris and Klebold are not shown on every diagram, but rather only during the events that witnesses actually observed them.
11:25 - 11:29 am

11:25 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 30 - Klebold shoots east down the main north hallway.  Harris is looking south down the library hallway.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:25 - 11:29 am

11:25 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 33 - Harris and Klebold move east in the north main hallway, laughing and firing their weapons.
11:26 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 34 - Klebold shoots at fleeing students and injures Stephanie Munson.
11:25 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 35 - Klebold continues east in the hallway shooting towards the front east entrance.
11:26 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:26 am

11:26 a.m. (NOTE: **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 38 - Harris and Klebold are observed just inside the west entrance shooting south down the library hallway. William “Dave” Sanders is shot while turning the corner from the library hallway to the science area.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:27 - 11:29 am

11:27 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

   * Diagram 40 - Klebold runs toward the top of the cafeteria stairs while Sanders is still lying on the floor.
11:25 - 11:29 am (911 call from Patti Nielson)

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:25 - 11:29 am (911 call from Patti Nielson)

11:25 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 29 - Patricia Nielson runs into the library where she calls 911.  Brian Anderson staggers down the hallway toward the library.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 47 - As Harris enters the library he fires two gunshot rounds in a westerly direction with a shotgun. Evan Todd is hiding behind the copier stand and is injured by flying wood splinters.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 52 - Klebold stops at the west end of the computer tables while Harris continues to the south of the computer tables. At the computer tables, Harris gets down on his knee and begins shooting out the west library windows. Klebold subsequently positions himself east of Harris and kneels down and fires out the west window. Klebold then turns south firing his shotgun at table #15 injuring Daniel Steepleton, Makai Hall and Patrick Ireland.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 54 - Harris shoots Steven Curnow, killing him.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 66 - Klebold walks on the north side of the library moving in an easterly direction. Klebold continues moving east, stopping near the entrance to the library and shoots the display case.
11:29 - 11:36 am
EVENT SUMMARY
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 89 - Most victims and witnesses begin to leave the library exiting out the north door.
MEDICAL TRIAGE AREAS

At 11:30 am Jefferson County Patrol Deputy Rick Searle, on the upper grassy area on the southwest side of the school, is evacuating students who have taken cover behind Smoker and Taborsky’s patrol car. In three separate trips, Searle transports the students, including those wounded, south to a safe location at Caley Avenue and Yukon Street. Medical triage soon will be established at this spot. As soon as he gets back from his evacuation trips, he discovers even more students who have escaped the school and taken cover behind Taborsky’s patrol car.

PATIENT INFORMATION

- 4 TRIAGE AREAS
  - 160+ Patients Triaged for injuries

- PATIENTS TRANSPORTED
  - 10 Patients Transported in first hour
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>HOSPITALS USED</strong></th>
<th><strong>PATIENT STATUS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Patients to Swedish Hospital</td>
<td>4 Critical Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Patients to St. Anthony Hospital</td>
<td>6 Serious Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Patients to Littleton Hospital</td>
<td>3 Fair Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Patients to Denver Health</td>
<td>2 Good Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Patients to Lutheran Hospital</td>
<td>9 Treated and Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Patient to University Hospital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 24 Patients Transported
- 6 Hospitals Utilized
- 10 Patients transported in second hour
- Last 4 Patients transported by 3:45 pm
- 4 Critical Condition
- 6 Serious Condition
- 3 Fair Condition
- 2 Good Condition
- 9 Treated and Released
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 81 - Harris and Klebold move to the south and both shoot under table #14, killing Corey DePooter and injuring Jennifer Doyle and Austin Eubanks.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 84 - Klebold walks around behind the main counter from the west, while Harris walks around the counter from the east.
11:36 - 11:44 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 90 - After leaving the library Harris and Klebold go to the science area and throw an explosive device into an unoccupied storage room.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:36 - 11:44 am

11:36 - 11:44 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 92 - Harris shoots into science room 8.
DIAGRAM OF COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

11:44 am

DIAGRAM 94

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:44 am

11:44 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 94 - Harris and Klebold walk down to the cafeteria and Harris shoots towards the large explosive devise in an apparent attempt to detonate it.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:44 am

11:44 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 95 - Harris and Klebold both get something to drink and Klebold throws something toward the large explosive device. They both then quickly move toward the stairs leading to the upper level.
11:46 - 11:47 am

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:46 - 11:47 am

11:46 - 11:47 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 96 - As Harris and Klebold are walking upstairs there is a partial detonation of the explosive device.
11:47 am - 11:56 am

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:47 am - 11:56 am

11:47 a.m. - 11:56 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 97 - Harris and Klebold walk to the administrative offices located on the east side of the school shooting as they are going.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:56 am - 12:00 noon

11:56 a.m. - 12:00 noon  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 99 - Harris and Klebold return to the cafeteria and go back to the kitchen area briefly before going back up the stairs.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 12:02 - 12:05 pm

12:02 - 12:05 p.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 100 - Harris and Klebold return to the library and fire upon law enforcement and rescue workers who are evacuating the injured outside in the parking lot.
12:05 - 12:08 pm

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 12:05 - 12:08 pm

12:05 - 12:08 p.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

  Diagram 101 - Harris and Klebold commit suicide in the library.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 75 - Harris moves northeast of table #6 and shoots and kills Kelly Fleming. He then shoots under table #2 hitting Lauren Townsend and injuring Jeanna Park and Lisa Kreutz.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 55 - Harris shoots Kasey Ruegsegger, injuring her.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 68 - Klebold steps east towards table #2 and fires under table #2, hitting Valeen Schnurr and Lisa Kreutz.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 73 - Harris shoots under table #6 injuring Nicole Nowlen and John Tomlin.
Phase 2 -- Making the Scene Safe,

Addressing the Impact to the Community

By 4:45, the SWAT teams finished the initial search of Columbine High School, clearing the 250,000 square-foot two-story building. The deceased, including two suspects, had been checked and pronounced dead by Dr. Colwell of the Denver Health Medical Center. The deadly shootings and massacre at Columbine was over.

However, there were still concerns that, because of the size and expanse of Columbine High School, it was possible the first teams could have overlooked some area in the school where other students or suspects might still be hiding. Investigators had reported that a number of students and staff interviewed after escaping from the school had thought there had been more than two gunmen. A second sweep of the building and the grounds was ordered to ensure there were no more victims or suspects to be found.

Bomb Technicians Find More Explosives

The location of unexploded bombs, some equipped with timers and possible booby traps, became a primary concern. The initial SWAT teams had discovered bombs throughout the building, outside on the school grounds and in certain vehicles in the student parking lots. While fresh SWAT teams were being briefed in preparation for a second sweep, bomb squad officers went inside the school looking for explosives, removing the unexploded and flagging the exploded bombs. They also used the mechanical robot to remove a device from the cafeteria.

Within the first hour of the bomb squad beginning its search, Jefferson County Dispatch advised that a timed-explosive device had been recovered from a car in the high school parking lot. The priority for the bomb squad shifted from searching inside the school to the parking lots. Still more devices were removed from both Harris and Klebold’s cars using a robot, and the cars then sealed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).

Several bomb dogs also were brought in to assist in sweeping the exterior of the school, checking parking lots and the school grounds for explosive devices. At 10:40 p.m., a pipe bomb accidentally detonated as a bomb technician lowered it into the bomb trailer. The pipe bomb had a striking match attached to it and the match ignited when it brushed against the trailer wall. The technician saw the spark, dropped the bomb into the trailer and fell backward to avoid the explosion. Other devices that were being lowered into the trailer in the basket along with the pipe bomb also exploded.

Neighborhood Evacuated
The command post was concerned about public safety. Because of the bombs discovered around the perimeter of the school and in the parking lots, the Sheriff's Office ordered residents to evacuate the neighborhoods south of the school. Dispatchers notified the residents, who were asked to go to a nearby shopping center, where deputies and victim advocates greeted them. They remained at the mall until their neighborhood was declared safe later that evening.

**Fresh SWAT Teams Make Second Sweep**

Secondary SWAT teams, paged by Jefferson County to do a fresh search of the school, were staged and waiting to enter the building. Additional information given to them included:

- The earlier SWAT teams had successfully evacuated numerous students, faculty and staff from classrooms and hiding places in the building and cleared the school.

- The second SWAT sweep was needed in conjunction with the bomb squads to thoroughly clear the interior of the building, including rafters, catwalks, and closets of the large school.

- Thirty explosive devices and one car bomb in the southeast parking lot had been found by 10 p.m. Because of the number of explosives, the secondary SWAT teams were not expected to make entry until later that evening.

- The Colorado State Patrol SORT team and Jefferson County reserve deputies were holding the inner perimeter.

- Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office crime scene technicians would begin processing the scene once the secondary sweep was completed and the school building and grounds declared clear and safe of unexploded devices.

- Threats had been received toward other schools in the area for the next day.

Around 10:30 p.m., fresh SWAT teams, with the assistance of bomb technicians, entered the school to conduct a comprehensive second search of the school. SWAT teams providing that second sweep were teams from the Thornton/Northglenn Police Departments, Adams County Sheriff’s Office, Boulder County Sheriff’s Office, Boulder Police Department and Commerce City Police Department.
First SWAT Teams Debrief, Meet With Critical Incident Team

The initial SWAT teams were directed to Leawood Elementary School to meet with the Jefferson County Critical Incident Response Team investigators. The Critical Incident Response team, also known as the “shoot team,” is called when an officer fires his or her weapon during an incident. The team conducts its own investigation when a shooting occurs. Members meet with each officer and ask for an account of his or her involvement in the incident, how many shots were fired and at what target.

A psychiatric team, on contract with the Sheriff’s Office, also met briefly with the teams before they were relieved of their duties.

County, School and Sheriff’s Office Plan Next Steps for Community/Media Response

In Golden at the dispatch center, plans were underway for the next day’s support response. Representatives from the school district, the county and the Sheriff’s Office met to coordinate the response to the media and to the community, both locally and worldwide, as the impact of the day’s tragedy began to sink in. Collectively, the group decided to set up a communication center at Columbine Public Library, close to Columbine High School and Clement Park, but far enough away to reduce the impact at the school and the crime scene.

Victims’ Families

At 6 p.m., the Columbine Public Library was closed as a secondary meeting point for students and parents, and the victim services efforts shifted to Leawood Elementary.

At this point, authorities knew there were fatalities but, until additional sweeps were made, the actual number of fatalities had not been confirmed. Families remaining at Leawood who had not found their child were asked to fill out information sheets. Those information sheets were passed on to the Jefferson County Coroner’s Office.

At least two victim advocates were assigned to each family with a missing child/spouse. Advocates were also sent to the hospitals to support the families of the injured. The advocates stayed with the families for as long as they were needed, then continued to be accessible 24 hours a day by pager. All advocates left Leawood Elementary at 2 a.m. Wednesday morning, but by 4 a.m. many were called back to be with the families “who just couldn’t stay at home.”

The advocates also maintained an information feed from the coroner’s office so that information could be communicated to the parents as soon as it became available.

National teams of crisis counselors, offered by President Clinton, remained on standby.

Community Support
While secondary sweeps of the school and the grounds were being conducted and the crime scene secured, street barricades and security personnel kept a curious public at a safe distance.

Throughout that first night, the Salvation Army fed 350 to 400 people from its canteen and then served hot breakfast for 200 the next morning. The nonprofit organization also provided blankets, dry socks and clothing for those on scene.

As April 20 wore on, weather conditions worsened, and snow was in the forecast for the next few days. The National Guard provided tents and heaters for the first responders.

An overwhelming surge of phone calls had tested the communication system to the maximum. US West erected temporary towers, commonly known as COWS (Central Office on Wheels), which expanded the capability for more phone lines. US West erected the first tower in Clement Park on Tuesday to aid in the emergency response communications. A second COW was constructed the next day outside the public library communication center.

Help also arrived from Air Touch on Wednesday morning. Through its emergency program, Air Touch delivered 200 digital cell phones to the personnel at the school site as well as at the communications center. The digital system provided up to 10 times the capacity of the analog phones.

Local hotels offered rooms for residents evacuated from their neighborhood as well as victims' relatives and friends arriving from out of town.

In the initial hours of the crisis, the school district had given dispatchers a rough floor plan of the school. By late evening, reporters wanted copies as well, and the county's Geographic Information Services (GIS) Department obtained plans of the upper and lower levels of the school and delivered copies to Public Information Officer Steve Davis for him to distribute to the media.
The following diagrams show the significant events and movements of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold on April 20, 1999. The witnesses to each event are shown as green dots. The injured are shown as yellow only during the event that caused the injury and return to green if they witnessed other events. The deceased are shown as red and convert to gray once that event has passed. Harris is shown as a red dot with the letter “H” inside it and Klebold is shown as a blue dot with the letter “K” inside it.

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April 20, 1999 at 11:00 am

11:10 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 7 - Eric Harris drives into the junior parking lot and parks his Honda.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 48 - Harris and Klebold enter the library and move west in front of the front counter.
11:29 - 11:36 am
EVENT SUMMARY
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 49 - Klebold shoots toward the north computer table as he moves west past the main counter in the library killing Kyle Velasquez.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 50 - Klebold and Harris set down backpacks on the south computer table.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 51 - Klebold and Harris walk west between the north and south computer tables.
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 53 - Klebold drops his black trench coat on the north side of table #18.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:10 - 11:14 am
11:10 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 8 - Harris walks from his vehicle, past the cafeteria, up the outside stairs and towards the west entrance.
April 20, 1999 at 11:10 am

11:10 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 9 - Dylan Klebold drives into the senior parking lot and parks his BMW.
11:14 - 11:22 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 10 - Just prior to the shootings, Klebold walks into the cafeteria through the southwest lower entrance and walks toward the vending machines.
11:14 - 11:22 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 11 - Harris is seen walking toward the main west upper entrance carrying a duffel bag.
**EVENT SUMMARY**

**April 20, 1999 at 11:14 - 11:22 am**

**11:14 - 11:22 a.m.** (NOTE: **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 12 - Harris and Klebold return to their vehicles and collect their duffel bags containing additional explosive devices.
11:19 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 am

11:19 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 15 - Harris removes his black trench coat and drops it near the top of the stairs.
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 18 - Sean Graves crawls to the west cafeteria door where he lays in the doorway.
11:19 - 11:23 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 19 - Klebold walks down the stairs and shoots Lance Kirklin.
11:19 - 11:23 a.m.    (NOTE:   GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 23 - Harris and Klebold shoot toward the soccer fields. No one is injured.
DIAGRAM OF COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

11:19 - 11:23 am

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:19 - 11:23 am

11:19 - 11:23 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

  - Diagram 26 - Harris and Klebold enter the school through the west entrance.
TIME LINE

11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 56 - Harris walks to the south side of table #19 and shoots under it, killing Cassie Bernall.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 57 - After shooting Cassie Bernall, Harris turns to a female student and asks her if she wants to die. This student observes blood begin to flow from Harris’ nose.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 58 - Klebold again shoots back at table #15, hitting Patrick Ireland as he attempts to administer first aid to another injured student.
11:29 - 11:36 am
TIME LINE

EVENT SUMMARY
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

·   Diagram 59 - Klebold moves to the east side of table #16 and grabs Isaiah Shoels in an effort to pull him from under the table.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 60 - Harris moves toward table #16 and shoots under it, killing Isaiah Shoels.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:   GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 61 - Klebold also fires under table #16 from the east side, killing Matthew Kechter.
11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 62 - While standing to the west of table #16, Harris throws an explosive device in a southerly direction. The device rolls under table #15 and is retrieved by Makai Hall who throws it in a southerly direction where it explodes.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 63 - Smoke is seen raising from under table #16 from where Harris had thrown the device.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 64 - Harris moves south to the west bookshelves where he jumps on the shelves and begins shaking them back and forth. Harris then walks between the bookshelves moving in an easterly direction.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 65 - Harris walks north between the west bookshelves. He fires shots southward at the bookshelves
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 67 - Klebold moves back around the display case and shoots under table #1, injuring Mark Kintgen.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 69 - Klebold walks south along the west side of table #2 firing several rounds under the same table and killing Lauren Townsend.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 70 - Harris is seen entering the east section of the library (near table #3) from a pathway between the bookshelves.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 71 - Klebold moves west of table #3 toward Harris, after which one of the gunmen looks under table #3 and states, “Pathetic.”
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 72 - Klebold and Harris move south to table #5 where they stop to reload weapons. One of the gunmen taunts Valeen Schnurr regarding her belief in God.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 74 - Klebold moves to the end of table #6 and shoots and kills John Tomlin.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 76 - Harris goes to the south library windows and looks out into the south parking lot.
11:24 - 11:26 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

   Diagram 28 - Shortly after the gunmen enter the school, shots are fired toward the east entrance. (This event may be the same as event 35)
11:25 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 31 - Klebold continues shooting east.
11:25 - 11:29 am

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:25 - 11:29 am

11:25 - 11:29 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 32 - Klebold is seen shooting south down the library hallway.
11:25 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 36 - Harris is observed walking east toward the east entrance.
11:25 - 11:29 am

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:25 - 11:29 am

11:25 - 11:29 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 37 - Klebold runs west in the north hallway toward the library hallway.
**EVENT SUMMARY**

April 20, 1999 at 11:27 - 11:29 am

**11:27 - 11:29 a.m.**  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 39 - Klebold again shoots east down the north hallway while Harris is looking for something in his duffel bag.
11:27 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 41 - Klebold turns around and walks west toward the library hallway.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 77 - Klebold and Harris pass through the east side book shelves into the center section. Both shooters stand near table #13 where they again reload weapons.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 78 - Harris walks north to the south computer table to gain access to the blue backpack containing additional ammunition. Harris then returns to the area near tables #11 and #13.
TIME LINE

DIAGRAM OF COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  **GREEN** dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 79 - Harris tells the student under table #11 to identify himself. The student, a classmate of the shooters, identifies himself and Klebold has a brief conversation with him. Klebold eventually allows the student to leave the library.
11:29 - 11:36 am
TIME LINE

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 80 - While standing north of table #11, Harris shoots under table #9 killing Daniel Mauser.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 82 - Klebold and Harris move north in the center section and proceed to the southeast corner of the far south computer table.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 83 - Harris is seen in the west section of the library throwing an explosive device containing an orange liquid toward the south.
11:29 - 11:36 am
TIME LINE

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 85 - Klebold confronts and threatens Evan Todd who now is hiding behind the main counter.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 86 - Ballistic evidence shows Klebold shoots back into the “kitchen” area of the library although this is not observed by witnesses.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 87 - Klebold and Harris discuss leaving the library and going to the “Commons.” Prior to leaving, Klebold slams a chair down on a computer located on the main counter Patricia Nielson is hiding under.
11:29 - 11:36 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:29 - 11:36 am

11:29 - 11:36 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 88 - Klebold and Harris leave the library.
11:36 - 11:44 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 91 - A fire breaks out in the storage room and Harris and Klebold run from the area.
11:36 - 11:44 am

Diagram 93 - A teacher puts out the fire in the storage room.

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:36 - 11:44 am

11:36 - 11:44 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 93 - A teacher puts out the fire in the storage room.
11:27 - 11:29 a.m.    (NOTE:   GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 42 - Sanders crawls to the corner of the science hallway and a teacher helps him into science room 3 where first aid is administered.
EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:27 - 11:29 am

11:27 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

Diagram 43 - Klebold is seen standing outside the library.
DIAGRAM OF COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

11:27 - 11:29 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:27 - 11:29 am

11:27 - 11:29 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

· Diagram 44 - Klebold is seen walking south past the library window from inside the library.
TIME LINE

DIAGRAM 45

EVENT SUMMARY

April 20, 1999 at 11:27 - 11:29 am

11:27 - 11:29 a.m. (NOTE: GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 45 - Klebold is seen standing outside the library window (hallway area) with a weapon.
11:27 - 11:29 am
April 20, 1999 at 11:27 - 11:29 am

11:27 - 11:29 a.m.  (NOTE:  GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

- Diagram 46 - Harris is observed standing in the hall outside the library throwing a lit device (resembling “dynamite”) in a southerly direction.  Moments later there’s an explosion in the hall directly outside the library.
Diagram 98 - Harris and Klebold leave the office area and walk north through the art area, firing into the ceiling as they are walking and make their way back to the cafeteria.
April 20, 1999 at 2:38 pm

2:38 p.m.   (NOTE:   GREEN dots indicate witness positions who observed the activity)

  · Diagram 102 - Patrick Ireland comes out the library window.